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ABSTRACT
THE ECONOMICS OF CORRECTIONS: AN EXPOSITION
by
Gail S. Funke 
Advisor: Professor Herbert Geyer
The purpose of this dissertation is to present an exposition 
of the applications of economics to corrections. The approach includes 
a synthesis of knowledge in the area, suggestions on how economics 
might be further brought to bear on correctional issues, and recommenda­
tions for future research. The overall framework is one of policy 
analysis, in which objective, scientifically-based information is used 
in the action setting of public programs.
A review of the history of corrections is included to provide 
an appreciation for the multiple, conflicting goals under which cor- . 
rections functions today. A review of the state-of-the-art in cor­
rections provides a sense of the magnitude of the populations, activi­
ties, and expenditures which characterize this component of the 
criminal justice system.
The role and contributions of cost, comparative cost, cost- 
effectiveness, and cost-benefit analysis are extensively surveyed, 
illustrating the substantial existing knowledge of correctional inputs 
and the lesser state of output measures and valuation.
Economic research on institutions (prisons and ,jails) is 
reviewed and critiqued. Preliminary findings on correctional cost 
functions, the nature of marginal and average costs for state and
iv
federal institutions are reviewed and policy recommendations discussed. 
Prison industries are discussed in the context of opportunity costs, 
human resource accounting, and the need for goal specification prior 
to further analysis.
Corrections in the community is analyzed from an economic per­
spective; private sector service providers, subsidy programs, and 
offender restitution, fees, and financial aid are reviewed from 
both the viewpoint of current research findings and the potential for 
additional economic research.
Contributions and recommendations are examined for their 
feasibility in a policy setting and suggestions are offered to improve 
future research and widen the application of economics to corrections.
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Chapter One
INTRODUCTION AND STUDY OVERVIEW
1.1. Study Purpose
The purpose of this inquiry is to investigate and analyze 
the relationship and application of the principles of economics to 
the field of corrections through a synthesis of existing knowledge, 
the incorporation of economic thinking into correctional issues and 
the provision of recommendations for future research. Both economic 
principles and issues of social deviance have been with us since the 
beginning of collective behavior, yet the relationship has hardly been 
formally recognized and never systematically represented. In part this 
may be attributed to the nature of the two fields. Ihe development of 
the theory and concepts of microeconomics, for example, took place over 
a period when public production was less broad than today. Critical 
analysis of public provision of goods and services has been late in 
arriving. Perhaps, too, the issue has been clouded because of the 
tendency to view the process of service delivery as the product.
None of this is to say that economics has not been responsive 
to questions surrounding public goods and services. Rather, the 
issue is more one of the extent of the applications and the absence 
of a systematic framework for cataloging and assessing the contri­
butions. Richard Musgrave took this approach when he collected and 
applied additional economic principles to develop his theory of the 
public economy.^ By recognizing issues such as resource use and 
income distribution he broadened and enhanced the relevance and
2application of the theory of the public household. (The author lays 
no claim to producing a work of equal magnitude, only of similar 
intent.) Musgrave thus armed scholars with a systematic representa­
tion of the myriad of concepts and tools available to examine the 
activities of the public sector.
However, the dearth of a similar systematic application to 
corrections cannot be laid solely at the doorstep of economics. 
Corrections must take the responsibility for being more a collection 
of changing activities with changing goals than a clearly defined 
field. Amorphousness is perplexing generally, but lethal in analysis; 
issues do not spring forward ripe for analysis —  often it is not 
perceived that an analytical problem exists or that choices can be 
made. Corrections has been characterized by conflicting goals and 
evolving financing since its inception. It is, perhaps, the only 
public activity whose goals and process spawn such considerable 
disagreement; in others, conflict tends to center more on process 
(e.g., not whether a service should be provided, but rather by whom 
and to what extent).
Application of economic principles to address correctional 
issues of course occurs. This range of applications remains but a 
segment of the potential depth and breadth at a time when the need 
would appear to be great. Criminal justice system activities gener­
ally and corrections particularly consume large amounts of public 
and private resources. Issues such as cost containment, correctional 
standards, and the role of prison industries have prompted those 
responsible for corrections' activities to sometimes turn to the
3economist for assistance. Questions surrounding determinants of 
criminal behavior and the implications for policy have begun to 
interest a generation of economists. What is still missing is a 
framework to systematically categorize these extant and potential 
contributions. Economics represents a way of thinking about the 
world that is manifested in theorizing about an issue or applying 
a specific analytical technique. But it is the way of thinking that 
must provide the backdrop for a useful framework, the structure 
under which the concepts and techniques are arrayed.
If corrections is ready for such an application, an analytical 
hybrid has eased the way. In recent years the concept of policy 
analysis has emerged as a framework for addressing public issues. 
Policy analysis is the unification of scientific research and the 
action setting of public programs. Multi-disciplinary in nature, it 
is the vehicle by which economics has entered the public program 
arena. But its decision focus is the attribute of interest for the 
analytical process. Stated simply, policy analysis requires that the 
analytical process take.into account the setting in which research 
findings will be implemented.
It is, then, with dual users in mind, that this thesis is 
developed. Hopefully, economists will find the categorization of 
existing and potential concepts and applications useful, and inviting 
of further research (all first works cannot be ends but only begin­
nings). Hie correctional perspective is deliberately incorporated to 
guide this development and, perhaps, conserve resources. Similarly, 
it is hoped that corrections' professionals will regard the economic 
perspective of their problems as an incentive to further incorporate
economic thinking into their operating framework and policy decisions. 
The focus is on corrections as an activity, or collection of activ­
ities, rather than on crime or deterrence (although deterrence 
literature is reviewed and cited to provide balance and examples for 
the correctional system). We are interested in principles and 
applications of economics which will produce better, manageable, 
more informed corrections.
1.2. Corrections
Corrections is a part of a larger set of activities known as 
the criminal justice system; other system components include police 
protection, judicial, prosecution and defense services. All activi­
ties are carried out at all levels of government but police protection 
is chiefly a local function, while corrections is primarily a state 
function. Of the $24 billion criminal justice system expenditures in 
1989, governmental' shares were: federal: 13 percent; state: 28 percent; 
local: 59 percent. Corrections' expenditures were $5.5 billion and
the shares were: federal: 5 percent; state: 58 percent; local: 36
2
percent (of total criminal justice expenditures).
1*2.1 Cbrrectional Activities
Corrections comprises activities of supervision, confinement, 
and rehabilitation provided in varying degrees to persons convicted of 
crimes or confined awaiting adjudication. Supervision of some kind 
is always present, controlled by the sentencing function. The other 
features are affected by the disposition; one or both may be present. 
Dispositions include:
5• institutional incarceration (maximum, medium, 
minimum security prisons, camps, reformatories, jails)
• probation (community supervision, varying intensity; 
usually an alternative to incarceration)
• parole (community supervision, varying intensity; 
usually follows incarceration)
• community corrections (halfway houses, work and educa­
tion release; may be used as adjunct or alternative to 
incarceration)
• other (pretrial diversion, restitution, community 
service) -
• fines and suspended sentences.
1.2.2. Crime
The two broad crime categories under which persons may be 
arrested, tried, and convicted include felonies and misdemeanors. 
Felonies include serious crimes such as murder, arson, burglary, 
assault, etc. and are usually punishable by prison terms exceeding 
one year. Misdemeanors are less serious, punishable by terms under 
one year and often represent the category into which felony offenses 
are plea bargained. As a general matter, convicted felons are usually 
supervised by state authorities, while local jurisdictions supervise 
misdemeanants. Variations occur, however, both in the mode of super­
vision and definitions of crime. Some states take total responsibil­
ity for misdemeanant populations (e.g., North Carolina) while others 
take none (e.g., Massachusetts). Many offenses are regarded differ­
ently by jurisdictions (e.g., possession of marijuana) and conviction 
and sentencing practices (as well as crime statistics and offender 
population distribution) will reflect these differences, creating wide 
variation in incarceration rates and time served.
6Few persons apprehended for crimes ever reach the correctional 
system. In fact, only slightly over half of all estimated serious 
crimes is reported to police; arrests comprise 20 percent of reported 
crime. The probability of conviction of the charged crime or a lesser 
offense is slightly less than one-half; about half of those arrested 
are subsequently convicted. In 1978, ten million serious crimes 
(homicide, rape, assault, burglary, robbery, larceny, auto theft)
3
were reported. Admissions to state and federal institutions totalled 
153,300, of which 77 percent were parole violators. Releases totalled 
145,600, of which 17 percent were unconditional and 70 percent involved
4
supervision of some kind. Figure 1 presents a generalized flow 
chart of the American criminal justice system.
1.2.3. Correctional Populations
Correctional clients may be supervised at the federal, state 
and local level. The federal system provides incarceration, probation 
and parole services for its clients. Some state correctional systems 
are responsible for all activities, including community corrections 
and jails, while others may only control secure incarceration.
Probation may be a state or local function. At the federal level, 
prisoners and persons under supervision are overseen by the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons of the U.S. Department of Justice. At the state 
level, the Department of Corrections may be a separate administrative 
body or part of an umbrella agency such as Health, Education and 
Welfare, Social and Health Services, etc. Adult and juvenile agencies 
may be combined or separate. Local corrections may be carried out 
by the jails, courts, or separate agencies.
7FIGURE 1-1 
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8Absolute levels and distribution of correctional populations 
vary widely by state, reflecting different preferences for supervision 
and incarceration rather than differences in crime rates. At year- 
end 1980, nearly one-half million persons were confined in prisions 
and jails, an increase of 42 percent from 1972; there were 21,000 
federal, 299,000 state and 158,400 local prisoners.^ Populations 
had been relatively stable for the preceding two decades. Hie largest 
growth in population has been at the state level, with an increase 
of 125,000 prisoners during the nine-year period. Closed (secure) 
prisons account for approximately 60 percent of persons in state 
correctional facilities; the balance are housed at farms (13 percent), 
road camps (3 percent), community corrections centers (4.7 percent), 
and reception-diagnostic (intake) centers ( 5 percent). At closed 
institutions, 40 percent of inmates are designated maximum security, 
one-third medium and the balance minimum security. Parole and pro­
bation populations account for an additional 1.5 million persons 
under supervision.
1*2.4. Correctional Services
Accounting for differences in correctional per capita expen­
ditures, as well as reflecting a state attitude toward offenders, is 
the range of services offered under different correctional alterna­
tives. Services provided in secure settings will vary in number and 
level tut include education (elementary through college), vocational 
training, counseling, diagnostics, medical and dental care, recreation, 
visiting; inmate work programs (prison industries); library and legal 
services, religious services, work and education release, and pre­
release services. Some institutions (states) are more treatment or 
rehabilitation oriented and provide substantial enrichment services, 
while others take a more punishment-oriented approach, stressing hard 
labor and few privileges.
Services in the community may be provided in the probation, 
parole or halfway house setting. Probation and parole may include 
specialized caseload services such as employment placement or counsel­
ing, but minimal contact and supervision is more common. Services 
provided through residential settings may include counseling, job 
placement, or drug or alcohol therapy.
1.3. Historical Perspectives
It is neither necessary nor helpful to consider corrections 
merely as a free-standing phenomenon of the present. Indeed, an 
appreciation or sympathy for modern corrections may best be gained by 
examining its history. Services have been provided under changing 
jurisdictional control, financing, and goal structures; this has 
created many problems, not the least of them analytical. While these 
issues are treated more extensively in the main text, an overview is 
offered here of the changing nature of control and financing, goals 
and purposes.
1.3.1. Control and Finance
Corrections began in this country as a local function, where 
offenders were confined in city and county jails.^ Larger institu­
tions, called Houses of Correction, were begun in the seventeenth 
century; these were financed and maintained by counties. In 1787, 
the first "penitentiary" was opened in Philadelphia; the Walnut Street
10
Jail separated sentenced felons from misdemeanants and detainees —  
for the first time. By 1800, eight states had constructed prisons; 
in other states prisoners continued to be held in old county jails 
and houses of correction. The early and mid-nineteenth century wit­
nessed construction of additional, large (1,000+ beds) state insti­
tutions .
During this time, federal prisoners were cared for by state 
and local jurisdictions. By 1885, there were over 1,000 federal 
prisoners in state prisons and another 10,000 in local jails. Ten 
years later these figures had grown to 2,500 and 15,000 respectively. 
Finally, at century's end, federal money was appropriated to rebuild 
the military prison at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
The early twentieth century saw a movement toward more state­
wide assumption of prison supervision. Previously, although states 
built and financed their own institutions, these constituted little 
more than a collection; what would be called a state system today 
simply did not exist. Indeed, the tendency to locate prisons in 
remote settings which were difficult to access set the stage for the 
independent, "reservation" style of prisons, a feature which prevails 
yet today in many states.
By the early 1900s, the use of probation as an alternative 
to imprisonment had begun to emerge. Most northern states had pro­
bation laws by 1910, and by 1915 such laws were also found in the 
western states; other regions followed later. Today, probation may 
be a state or local function; the issue regarding whether it still 
serves as an alternative to prison is widely debated.
11
Another alternative to incarceration, work-release (a prisoner 
may be housed in a secure setting but is free to go to work during 
the day), was introduced in 1913 in Wisconsin. This alternative was 
developed because of severe prison overcrowding and in succeeding 
years many convicted persons were channeled into work-release. For 
forty years, no state followed; in 1957, North Carolina passed similar 
legislation for similar economic reasons. By 1965, there were laws 
for some kind of work-release in 24 states.
Halfway houses —  community residence in a non-secure set­
ting —  were first suggested in 1817 in Massachusetts to no avail. 
Three facilities were opened during the nineteenth century and were 
privately operated and financed by charitable organizations. It 
was not until mid-twentieth century that their numbers began to pro­
liferate. In 1961, the Federal Bureau of Prisons funded the first 
federal pre-release center. Such houses, still largely private, 
represented the beginning of private sector involvement in the pro­
vision of correctional services. Their purpose has not been to serve 
as total alternatives to incarceration except for juveniles.
Other private sector activities in corrections have also 
occurred during the past 25 years. Specific service provision, rather 
than total corrections, in areas such as drug abuse, training and 
employment has become prevalent. As corrections has moved from the 
county jail to the community,its problems have become more complex 
as more services are supplied in more settings under variegated 
financing arrangements.
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1.3.2. Purposes of Corrections
The purposes, or supposed goals of corrections have ebbed and 
flowed over more than three centuries from punishment, reform and 
self-support to treatment, rehabilitation and finally reintegration. 
This flow has been affected by changing views of criminals and their 
behavior as well as the role of the institution-prison itself in 
society. However, it is interesting to note that it is the relative 
emphasis, more than the goals themselves, that has changed. A punish­
ment motive, for example, still exists, if better couched in profes­
sional terms and implicit practice. This multi-goal phenomenon aids 
in understanding the sometimes piecemeal and seemingly unfocused 
nature of corrections today.
Early corrections in America translated into punishment by 
death as a common sanction. The "goal" at that time was removal of 
the offender from society. In Philadelphia, in 1682, the Quakers 
introduced the idea of "partial removal" by substituting confinement 
for death. The emphasis was on hard labor and time to repent; the 
prisoner lived and worked in solitude, confined always to a single 
cell.
The perspective of reform was introduced in 1787 with the 
Walnut Street Jail. The separation of convicted felons permitted 
for them a program of discipline and labor, with an opportunity for 
early release, if "reformed."
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the perceived 
needs of the prisoner began to be comingled with the needs of the 
system. The Auburn system provided for solitary cells and congregate 
labor, which was more than the busy work of the Quakers. As larger
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numbers became confined, this idea of the self-supporting prison, 
where work was not performed just for its own sake, gained favor. In 
1825, the lease system began, whereby a private contractor could pay 
a fee and own the services of the convicts. This arrangement created 
many self-supporting prisons.
The mid-1800s saw the development of the reformatory concept 
for younger offenders; training and education became the tools by 
which to accomplish positive behavioral change. These changes were 
largely the result of the efforts of private groups. Social activists 
influenced the 18th and early 19th century prisons far more than any 
concern springing from corrections itself. The federal government 
was caring for its own prisoners by the turn of the century but as 
yet there existed no adequate agency to provide leadership. The Fed­
eral Bureau of Prisons was not created until 1930. By 1915, however, 
another trend was on the way: the beginnings of the understanding of 
the prisoner as individual, rather than part of an incorrigible 
collective. Under this approach, the individual prisoner was regarded 
as sick with evil ways;' rehabilitation or the "medical model" 
endeavored to alter this inappropriate behavior. The 1970s saw the 
rise of the concept of reintegration, whereby treatment was modified 
to provide those skills and habits necessary to perform productively 
and legally in society; program participation also was made voluntary. 
In 1975, the concept of the self-supporting prison was raised again 
(this time by federal assistance to correctional industries) and the 
appeal of at least self-sufficient industries continues to the present. 
The concept has been modified dramatically from the old contract- 
labor systems, however. Today’s self-sufficient industry is intended
14
to attain that goal within the contect of meaningful work (rehabili­
tation) and improved work habits (reintegration).
Corrections has experienced a history of goal ambiguity and 
conflict. Three hundred years have clarified some goals, removed 
others, but left a legacy of multiple goals. The historical emphasis 
on confinement in fortresses has created a pattern of slow adaptation; 
it simply is not easy to change correctional technology. Confinement 
and punishment embody much different production processes than train­
ing and community involvement. And, public preferences really are 
not known, but have tended to vacillate, often influenced by publicity 
on crime.
1.3.3. Goals of Modern Corrections
From both a social and analytical perspective, it is useful 
to understand the mandates and expectations under which corrections 
operates today. It is the change in relative emphasis, rather than 
the presence or absence of particular goals, that guides much of 
today's correctional activity. There is more emphasis on offender as 
individual and some attempt to use programs in a tailored way. This 
is not to say that perfect diagnosis and classification exist. Crit­
ics charge that we overincarcerate (the rate of incarceration per 
100,000 population in the United States exceeds that of every nation 
in the world save South Africa) and that a taste for punishment re­
sults in confinement of many persons more suited to gentler alterna­
tives .
The goals of correction, then, in the tJhited States remain a 
conglomerate of punishment, deterrence (avoidance of future crime by
15
the offender or by others due to the "example" of incarceration), 
safety (through incapacitation), recompense (an "in-kind" payment, 
such as forfeiture of freedom or loss of job or skills, made by the 
offender to society for deviant behavior) and rehabilitation or 
reintegration. Some of these "modern" goals were articulated by 
Voltaire:
Hie end of punishment, therefore, is no other 
than to prevent the criminal from doing further 
injury to society, and to prevent others from 
committing the like offense.
and by Bentham:
The evil of the punishment musg be made to exceed 
the advantages of the offense.
The conflict between punishment and rehabilitation has been 
addressed by two persons, 120 years apart. Rather than eliminating 
one or the other, the suggestion is to make the treatment more explic­
it. First called the "Irish System," the concept was promulgated in 
England in 1855 as a response to the closing of the American penal
9
colonies. Treatment occurred in three stages: the first, pure 
punishment, in solitude; for two years; the second, congregate labor 
leading to some release date; finally, supervised release. This 
system was in fact used but politics ended the practice after a few 
years.
A similar idea recently appeared in the economics literature. 
Tabasz argues for an explicit, two-staged system of solitary confine­
ment (punishment) and rehabilitation, claiming that the present 
simultaneity robs each concept of its effectiveness and does not sat­
isfy the public's need to punish.(Indeed, Becker argues that post 
release job discrimination results because it is felt prisoners were
16
not punished enough.^) While the idea may be conceptually appealing, 
it may be that society is indeed quite comfortable with this mixed 
set of goals and that the explicitness borne of discreteness would 
not be welcome. It appears, then, that for the time being, correc­
tions is saddled with this multiplicity of goals. The economist, like 
the reformer, will simply have to work with (or around) them. It is 
hoped that the advent of better analysis at least may make the price 
of the ambiguity more explicit.
1.4. Economics and Corrections
1.4.1. Corrections and the Criminal Justice System
The economic analysis of corrections confronts the same issues 
as analysis of public services generally, with a few additional 
considerations. As with other public activities, price is absent, 
outputs undefined or ambiguous. But because corrections is often 
evaluated by what persons do not do, including those with whom the 
system has no contact, and because of the multiplicity, fragmentation 
and interdependence of criminal justice system activities, the prob­
lems are exacerbated. Consider the issue of consumer preference. 
Assuming for the moment the citizen as consumer, there exist many 
arenas in which preferences for criminal justice system activities 
generally and correctional activities specifically may be expressed. 
Besides the normal federal, state and local election processes, there 
are referenda, interest groups and so forth —  but there are many 
criminal justice system outcomes. In a sense, the non-offender public 
makes choices for second (criminal justice system) and third (offender- 
client) parties. An increase in demand for police services, for
17
example, will create repercussions throughout the criminal justice 
system, even without any expressed change in preferences regarding 
these other activities. A change in preferences about parole will 
create effects on other segments of the system. In other words, pre­
ferences expressed for sanctions or activity levels at one point in 
the system impact on many others. Absolute budget constraints limit 
the level of a particular function (law enforcement, incarceration), 
while relative budget constraints or changes in relative shares may 
bottleneck the system and aggravate the initial problems of constraint. 
Higher police allocations may produce more arrests but courts may be 
backlogged or prisons full. The criminal justice system is a collec­
tion of interdependencies —  caseloads, calendars, cells —  which are 
not managed as if the linkages were recognized.
This interdependence is crucial to understanding and analyzing 
corrections. It results in corrections having no control over its 
major input —  convicted offenders. If decisions about determinate 
sentencing and parole reduction are included, corrections may also 
have little control over its output (the quantity, not the quality). 
Corrections is also a field in which the quality of its output, i.e., 
released offenders with some portfolio of education, skills, therapy, 
etc., is judged by outcomes beyond its purview (recidivism —  addi­
tional criminal behavior). If crime-free behavior (for correctional 
clients) is what the public views as a final good, then corrections 
is essentially an intermediate-goods producer —  of investments in 
human capital. In addition, its constituency is characterized by 
negative attitudes, its purpose(s) shifting and conflicting and its 
interdependence with the competing segments of the criminal justice
18
system problematical.
1.4.2. Correctional Decision-making
Cne last consideration is necessary to round out the setting —  
the correctional decision-making process. It has been suggested that 
policy analysis is the appropriate framework for organizing and carry­
ing out economic and other analyses. Policy analysis explicitly 
recognizes the decision milieu in which choices are made and implement­
ed . The preceding discussion has highlighted some of the issues 
facing correctional decision-makers. Some further comment on the 
nature and process of planning and research in corrections is warrant­
ed. Because of its history of confinement and the unpleasant nature 
of its clients, corrections grew up located in remote settings, staffed 
with caretakers. Prison management translated into controlling offend­
ers, minimizing escapes and generally maintaining order. Such isolated 
containment attracted reformers, eventually psychologists, tut few 
others until recently. Research and analysis were virtually unknown 
for most of its history, although this phenomenon is not unique to
corrections: "It is only recently that analysis has been formally
12associated with public decision-making." Corrections, moving from 
a system of institutional caretakers to the state umbrella was perhaps 
farther away from other public activities in its lack of professional­
ism. The decision sphere was not one which incorporated large quanti­
ties of scientifically derived information. Che author, reviewing 
current decision-making in corrections, found a "widespread belief that 
to take all data is in some way a sign of a poor decision-maker; a good 
decision-maker is to some extent one who can manage on the smallest
19
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amount." Another study identified the gap between decision-makers 
and their researchers; many managers preferred not to use scientifi­
cally-derived information tut to rely on "experience" or summary
14
data. But the right questions are beginning to be asked, if not 
always by corrections itself, by the legislatures which guide and 
finance. Cost constraints, correctional standards, the demand for 
relevant programming, the role of the private sector, increasing expec­
tations —  such issues provide a milieu ripe for —  indeed, in need 
of —  analysis.
1.4.3. Economic Analysis
This section expands on the conceptual framework introduced 
at the beginning of the chapter and provides some examples from the 
literature on progress and problems. The process by which the study 
will be conducted is outlined and some areas of inquiry suggested.
Economics, as we know only too well, is the study of the pro­
cesses by which scarce resources are allocated among alternative uses 
to satisy wants. Its concepts and analytical techniques are designed 
to produce information which will foster optimal decisionbmaking —  
for the individual, the firm, the industry, the public program admini­
strator .
Conceptually, economics and other scientific processes proceed 
similarly. A phenomenon is observed and selected for analysis; a 
search for a general theory to explain the phenomenon then ensues. 
Often, these two steps occur nearly simultaneously, as when an analyst 
searches for manifestation of a theory. Then, relevant concepts and 
analytical techniques are identified. Data are collected, the
20
techniques applied, and it is tested whether, or to what degree, the 
theory explains the phenomenon. In policy research, public policy 
activities are presumably guided by analysis. This general process 
has been applied to many public service areas, e.g., health care, 
education, etc. Within the sphere of criminal justice, many applica­
tions have taken place.
The process has, however, been less systematically applied 
to corrections. Analysis has been conducted, tut no organized body 
of knowledge guides the process. Economics as a way of thinking 
in corrections is very rare. For example, concepts such as the 
theory of the firm, production, even demand and supply, have not 
been systematically overlaid upon the issues confronting corrections.
1.4.4. Why Economics Has Not Been Useful in Corrections
In order to understand the potential contributions of
economic principles to corrections (and, indeed, to guide the
analysis), it is useful to consider some of the reasons for the
lack of analysis.
The issue has not gone unnoticed. Kenneth Avio, writing in
1973, found it "puzzling" that economics had not been used more
15broadly in analyzing correctional institutions. Blumstein, Cohen
and Nagin in a vast analysis and critique of the research concluded
(in 1978) that after ten years of analysis, there was still no good
evidence on either the existence or magnitude of the deterrence
effect.^ Sam Myers provided an echo for the eighties in his
work on punishment and rehabilitation, reflecting that economists
17have had little to say on these issues.
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1.4.4.1. Definitions. A systematic, if summary, investigation of the 
reasons may help clarify why analysis has not been more widely used. 
Part of the problem has been definitional. Inputs and outputs, the 
sine qua non of economic analysis, simply have not been defined in a 
manner suitable for analysis. In social service delivery, one ordi­
narily begins with goal statements as a way of defining an output.
But until recently, it has been common to encounter correctional 
goals such as: "protect society," "rehabilitate," "provide positive
attitudinal skills" with no assistance on clearer definition and 
measurement. Some of this may be endemic to social service provision; 
a 1975 study encountered the goal: "having the client feel better
about him/herself" in many organizations providing correctional 
18services. And some may be the confusion between output and out­
come: lower recidivism is an outcome which may result if a related 
output (possibly skills training) is appropriately produced. There 
has been some tendency to muddle the two and hold corrections directly 
responsible for outcomes. Cn the other side, inputs have not always 
been defined or sometimes even known. In part this may be blamed 
on the budget process as well as general lack of incentive. Legis­
latures tend to prefer line item budgets because resources are 
presumably explicit. But this confounds the problem of categorizing 
inputs along more programmatic, or functional lines, i.e., in a 
context more suitable for economic analysis. Capital budgets, for 
example, are typically centralized and not tied to the organiza­
tional unit on whose behalf the expenditures are made. Other infor­
mation may be maintained centrally and never appear in the outlays
22
of a correctional facility. As Schick observes, "conventional
budgeting is fundamentally anti-analytic and . . . efforts to funnel
policy analysis through routine budget prodedures are not likely to 
19succeed." Budgeting systems, besides being non-analytic, are 
usually non-comparable between political subunits. And, until the 
1970s, budget constraints were not generally recognized as explicitly 
as they are today.
1.4.4.2. Data Problems. Poor or unavailable data continue to
present serious problems. For a time, the inadequacy of data
was not widely recognized- in 1975 a correctional researcher
stated, most inaccurately: "each action or service is costed by
applying business office or auditor figures to each unit of action
20and service and totalling the cost." It is precisely because this 
was not and is not the case that facile and wholely misleading com­
parisons frequently are made, e.g., average daily prison costs in 
state X and state Y. There are measurement problems: Zimring 
speaks of the use of the "police eraser" in distorting reported
21crime figures which may subsequently find their way into analysis.
Data may be available but too highly aggregated: specific components,
inclusiveness and completeness may be indiscernible. Among other
criticisms of Erlich's work on capital punishment as a deterrent is
22the charge that the data he used were too highly aggregated.
Finally, data may be unavailable or simply hard to get. Seemingly
straightforward items for the private sector become difficult to
discern in public accounts. One study of prison costs required con-
23siderable time and effort to determine fringe benefit expenditures.
Another required similar pains to determine client attendance and
24turnover m  community programs. The few studies of cost functions
for correctional institutions have had to omit quality considerations
from their analysis (a critical oversight in the face of prison over-
25crowding and correctional standards) because of unavailable data.
1.4.4.3. Effect on Analytical Process. The effect of all this on 
the analytical process has been frustrating if not devastating. Cne 
outcome was that essentially only specific studies on specific 
problem areas were performed, usually with targeted funding. An 
analyst simply could not perform meaningful studies with the avail­
able definitions and data, so research has been idiosyncratic. The 
woeful state of in-house corrections' research has already been 
noted. Second, many research results have been qualified, often 
suspect. Blumstein, et al, found many studies on capital punishment
flawed, failing to control for a variety of additional variables,
26and sensitive to small variations in assumptions. Results have 
been incomplete; for example, marginal costs are notoriously diffi­
cult to deduce for almost any criminal justice system activity. 
Analyses which would be strengthened by such information (e.g., the 
savings in incarceration costs attributable to a pre-trial diversion 
program) are robbed of their full impact. The lack of appropriate 
cost allocation procedures often results in omission of information 
and a less comprehensive analysis.
1.4.4.4. Effect on Policy Decisions. Analysis performed in the 
policy arena carries a special burden since presumably activities
will be altered in accordance with findings. Proponents of capital 
punishment, for example, have cited Erlich's work as proof of deter­
rence, perhaps without realizing that this work is still widely 
debated. Preliminary work on cost functions could be used to 
justify prison populations substantially larger than existing experi­
ence. The costs of a wrong decision in such matters are not low. 
Sometimes the policy recommendations (whether appropriate to the 
analytical procedures or not) simply may be infeasible, perhaps 
because of the analyst's lack of familiarity with the phenomenon 
(e.g., corrections) under analysis. For example, one author con­
cluded that, since violence in prisoner populations was a major cost
determinant, the cost-conscious administrator should minimize the
27intake of violent persons. It was not uncommon in the early 1970s
to observe the use of average institutional costs as the "savings"
28occasioned by utilizing community alternatives. The problem is 
more than academic since decisions based on incorrect information 
will themselves be incorrect. The policy arena provides enough 
opportunities to misuse even correct information.
Finally, another author bemoans the "theory gap" whereby the 
present stock of knowledge "is singularly bereft of a general 
theoretical structure in which to incorporate and organize particular 
experimental findings." The remarks are made with respect to 
deterrence but their relevance is far from limited. The same author 
concludes by identifying a "credibility gap" with respect to scholars 
and policy: "In short, policy makers do not trust social scientists."'
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1.4.4.5. Sane Recanmendations. Without belaboring the issue, it 
is worth noting that some social scientists have produced some con­
crete suggestions for improving analysis, if not the analytical 
process. A poignant example makes the point: there exists research
which has identified, by state, the changes in index crime prison
populations to achieve a reduction in crime, a , (i.e., an incapaci- 
30tation effect). Ihe problem arises because a , the crimes com­
mitted by individuals while free, has not been estimated. Recanmenda­
tions for amending this and other problems in deterrence are quite 
straightforward: the need for specific, individual-oriented knowledge
of crime types, levels, and career length. Other information needed 
includes cross-sectional time series on crimes and criminal justice 
system processing, by state, county and city jurisdictions and SMSAs; 
better data ty age, race and sex across such variables as reported
crime, arrests, charges, convictions, numbers of persons sent to each
31type of correctional institution, and average length of stay. And
these are only the data required to begin estimating the existence
and magnitude of deterrence. Research and analysis in corrections
has those same data needs and a multitude of others. What is needed,
however, is more than good information, or economists in analytical
roles: what would truly benefit corrections is an economic approach —
as Becker maintains, analyzing an entire phenomenon from an economic 
32perspective.
1.4.5. A Typology of Contributions
Having explored what has not been done, we turn to a brief 
discussion of progress in the field. Ihe discussion is organized
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around the features of successful analysis, from opening corrections 
to economic analysis to providing viable public policy options.
1.4.5.1. The Economic Approach. Seme work has been most valuable
because it illustrates the general applicability of economic principles
to criminal justice system activities. Becker, for example, removes
much of the "mystique" from criminal behavior by classifying it as
part of a more general (utility) theory. A person commits crime
when the expected utility exceeds that of other (legal) activities.
33Essentially this clears the way for non-extraordinary analysis.
He goes even further and discusses potential policy recommendations
within the context of negative externalities, claiming that the
introduction of fines essentially eliminates the analytical differ- 
34ences. Erlich makes a similar contribution by treating crime
35within the choice model of behavior under uncertainty. Such work
serves to legitimize the approach proposed here.
1.4.5.2. Contributing Analyses. These refer to work that, while 
not an exact application of economic principles to correctional 
activities, serves to identify parameters or constraints and help
delimit analysis and recommendations. Such work has been performed
36by Blumstein and Cohen on the stability of punishment. While still
calling it "a theory," the authors extensively examine data and 
conclude that the United States has a taste for a specific level of 
punishment. It is punishment, rather than crime, then, that is 
maintained at constant levels. This is accomplished by either alter­
ing definitions of and sanctions for criminal behavior or altering 
37punishments. (Ihe President's Crime Commission noted in 1967 that
crime rates and actual numbers of crimes were partially a function
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of behaviors termed illegal.) If Blumstein and Cbhen are right, 
or even close, there are important implications for policies attempt­
ing to reduce actual levels of correctional populations.
1.4.5.3. Applications of Concepts. There are some cases in which 
economists have applied economic concepts to correctional activities. 
Avio, for example, uses the theory of the firm to postulate a model 
of the prison as a standard, non-profit, multi-product firm. He
thus treated the prison as an economic entity, producing incarceration
services and training services. The production function included
a factor for "negative" training (criminal career development fos-
39tered by too long an incarceration). Tabasz considered cost func­
tions for prisons producing captivity and rehabilitation outputs;
he proposed a model which examined crime costs over the career of
40an offender, including net captivity benefits. Choice models
have been offered by several authors as explanatory of criminal
41behavior pre- and post-incarceration.
1.4.5.4. Analysis. The literature abounds with analytical efforts.
Some are tied directly to a theory hypothesized as explanatory. Avio
42applies his model to the Canadian prison system; Tabasz analyzes 
the operations of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, estimating the in­
crease in social value for additional dollars allocated to the 
43Bureau; Cook analyzed recidivism data in Massachusetts, finding
that a positive change in legitimate opportunities reduced parolee 
44recidivism. Singer took a human capital approach and used data
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on pre-incarceration earnings to estimate the value of foregone 
45inmate labor.
Other (indeed, the majority of) analyses have been performed
with a more indirect theory link. That is, the analysis was a
specific application designed to answer a specific question, rather
than an offshoot to first theorizing about the problem. A common
example is cost-benefit analysis, which is widely used in program
evaluation. Holohan, for example, was interested in the scholarly
application of cost-benefit analysis and used a diversion project as 
46his focus. Funke and Wayson were requested by the State of
Massachusetts to estimate the operating cost of a local house of 
47corrections. One hybrid study even presented the theoretical con­
cepts of cost-benefit analysis cross-referenced to a practical 
application.^
1.4.5.5. Public Policy. Some studies do not proceed to policy
recommendations, others do. Of these, some are global, some possibly
infeasible. Becker, for example, called for the use of fines as an
optimal criminal justice policy theoretically, but recognized that
data did not exist by which to estimate a fine which must compensate
49for the price of the offense and the cost of apprehension. Avio 
recommended a more centralized decision-making process for Canadian 
Corrections but acknowledged that the government probably would not 
relinquish the sentencing decision to correctional authorities.^ 
Thbasz, in analyzing the Federal Bureau of Prisons, concluded that 
the Bureau should minimize its incarceration of persons over forty, 
as they were less dangerous and the captivity benefits were low.'*'*'
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This latter, through the use of parole, is a recommendation capable 
of implementation.
1.5. An Exposition
The following chapters will present a systematic investigation 
and categorization of the principles and techniques of economics as 
applied to the field of corrections. The preceding review has identi­
fied a certain timeliness for exposition: the state-of-the-art of
corrections, the scattered nature of the research (much of it of good 
quality), and the need for viable policy options suggest that such 
work is needed.
The study will address major issues and activities of correc­
tions and the economic theory and concepts which have been or could 
be used to study them. Questions to be addressed include the 
relationship between the theory and the issue; and, what concepts 
are relevant to understanding, defining and analyzing the issue. 
Available research will be reviewed and critiqued in light of the 
application of theory, assumptions employed, data used, and policy 
feasibility. For example, assumptions might be made which are 
inappropriate to the correctional framework and these need to be 
made explicit. Further, the data collected might be insufficient or 
inappropriate, too aggregated, etc. Finally, policy recommendations 
will be examined for their realism and feasibility in a correctional 
setting.
1.5.1. Special Considerations
Several economic concepts have extraordinary relevance for the 
analysis of correctional activities and will be encountered in
30
several settings.
• Opportunity Cost. This is a critical, yet often 
unused concept in corrections, particularly in 
decisions involving large capital investments.
Because prisons are very costly and very durable, 
constructing them may reduce future flexibility to 
utilize less coercive alternatives. Human opportunity 
costs also are more important, given the nature of 
corrections, in which decisions are made by a few for 
many. Millions of dollars of productivity are fore­
gone by incarceration and detention; the choice to 
minimize idleness has a high cost in terms of foregone 
skills training and potential future behavior. A 
system that opts to maximize punishment and minimize 
humaneness may be incurring future costs as well as 
those of the present. Failure to incorporate opportunity 
costs may understate the costs of correctional activities 
and lead to inappropriate resource allocation.
• Externalities. The impact of correctional activities 
extends far beyond supervision and care. Punishment 
through confinement may produce some undesired side 
effects, including the "school for crime" phenomenon. 
Providing community services may strain the resources 
of non-criminal justice agencies yet not appear in any 
accounting. Exclusion of such external costs will tend 
to understate the real cost of correctional undertakings.
• Indivisibilities. Lumpiness of resources creates 
problems both for the analyst and for changing produc­
tion processes. One generally either has an entire 
prison or a complete system of perimeter security or 
none at all. Such factors may affect analysis and 
subsequent policy recommendations.
• Joint Products. Prisons produce a combination of 
services,including incarceration, deterrence and re­
habilitation, which may not uniquely separate for 
analysis. Vocational training may produce a combina­
tion of job skills and positive attitudes, yet not be 
susceptible of division. It is critical to recognize 
these joint products, even if analysis is not possible, 
in order not to overstate costs.
1.5.2. The Issues
The multitude and complexity of the issues present problems 
to corrections but opportunities for economics. With this in mind,
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two presentation formats will be used, one by correctional issue, 
outlining the components discussed above. The second will group 
the correctional issues within the economic concepts used to address 
them. The intent is to produce analysis and recommendations which 
are of value to corrections as well as economics. Issues to be
discussed include:
• C^timal Scale of Plant —  the concept of an "ideal" 
prison size;
• Cost Analysis —  the nature and level of total, average 
and marginal costs for different corrections activities;
• Subsidies —  provision of incentives by states to local 
jurisdiction;
• Restitution —  financial reparation fcy offenders to 
victims;
• Transitional Aid to Offenders —  the use of financial 
incentives to control criminal behavior;
• Private Sector Service Delivery —  the nature 
of the market and characteristics of the firm;
• Gost-Effectiveness Analysis —  its role in evaluating 
correctional programs;
• Cost-Benefit Analysis —  its structure and usage in a 
correctional setting.
The intended total result is to illustrate the conditions 
under which economics is relevant and the assumptions and informa­
tion required to carry it forth. It will display not only the 
appropriate applications of existing techniques but also the insight 
to be gained from the analysis of correctional issues and activities 
from the perspective of economics.
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Chapter Itoo
THE CORRECTIONAL SETTING: PAST
2.1. Introduction
The development of corrections in the United States has been 
characterized by one author as: "A History of Good Intentions."^ -
Indeed, the colonial departure from prevailing European philosophy 
set the stage for the development of a prison, then correctional system 
with attendant political, managerial and economic consequences.
To understand corrections as it esdsts today and to begin to apply 
the principles of other disciplines to its problems, one might first 
benefit from an understanding of the historical background, the 
setting which truly created modem corrections. The organization and 
management of today had their origins in the creation of the prison 
system and the reform movements of the nineteenth and twentieth cen­
turies. The systems presently in place have emerged only recently as 
a totality resulting from reform efforts, population and financial 
pressures, and changing treatment philosophies. Economists and other 
social scientists working in public policy can gain insigfit into 
present corrections by considering its past. Goal conflict exists 
today because new ideas were consistently overlaid on the original 
penitentiary concept, never eliminating it, but rather creating an 
uneasy truce.
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2.2. The Beginning
Goldfarb and Singer write: "Essentially our correction system
is built around imprisonment. Had we followed the example of our
European forebears, this might not have been the case. The systems of 
punishment in the earliest colonial period reflected the practices of 
England and the continent: execution, flogging, mutilation, branding, 
and lashing.^ More minor criminals —  "unruly apprentices, sturdy 
beggars, strumpets, vagrants and rogues" were disciplined in work­
houses, or Houses of Correction which were instituted in England at 
the end of the feudal system.^ By 1576 each English county had its 
house of correction for the unruly and its jail for detention prior 
to trial. ^ This practice of using confinement only as an intermediate 
step prevailed in early America, with serious corporal punishment or 
execution the ordinary outcome for other than very minor crimes. 
Confinement per se, then, was not the punishment, only its p r e c u r s o r .6 
The early houses of correction continued to hold vagrants and minor 
criminals for whom capital punishment was not justified.
The first harbinger of change occurred in 1682, at the behest 
of William Penn. A change in the laws of Pennsylvania made hard labor 
in a house of correction the primary method of punishment of most 
crimes in that state. The first departure was short lived: after
Penn's death, the Pennsylvania assembly in 1718 reinposed much of the
old English criminal code. TWelve new capital offenses were identified
o
and corporal punishment was re-emphasized.
2.2.1. The American System
The more formal beginning of the American prison system as it
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is known today was proposed by Benjamin Rush, a signer of the
Declaration of Independence. Rush sought to remedy the mockery which
had been created in the wake of the abolishment of the widespread
use of capital punishment —  the use instead of public humiliation
and degradation, including hard (public) labor in harlequin costumes.
In 1787 Rush proposed that imprisonment be used as punishment in lieu
(generally) of execution and of corporal punishment. This idea was
g
considered "novel,” "even radical" in the colonial period. The Rush 
concept was that prisons be used to "regenerate” offenders (rather 
than public humiliation) and that work was the way to regeneration.
The outcome of Dr. Rush's proposals was America's first 
penitentiary (it was also his idea not to use the word "prison"). In 
1790, a new section of the Walnut Street Jail in Philadelphia called 
"Penitentiary House" was opened. It was within the jail itself but 
reserved for the confinanent of'Sentenced, hardened criminals.”^
Thus the Walnut Street Jail became, in the words of its historian,
"The Cradle of the Penitentiary. And, "the more obvious reconrnenda- 
tion that 'doing time' should replace capital and corporal punishment 
was in 1790 written into American penal philosophy for all time."^2
Indeed, besides forever setting the tone of the American 
prison system, the Walnut Street Jail was the first penitentiary in 
the world. During the first ten years of its existence it became a 
"mecca for students :of penal reform."^ However, the social tone was 
not all that was set at this time. This and the penitentiaries soon 
to follow were constructed along European designs used in Belgium and 
Rome: "The atmosphere was like a medieval fortress. It incorporated
no imaginative plan, nor did it create a reformative atmosphere."^
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Later authors would claim that this type of physical design, in­
corporated into indestructible buildings, created a permanent 
divergence between acconmodations and reform programs.
2.2.2. Prison Practices
The opening of the first penitentiary also marked the conmence- 
ment of the system of "solitude." Patterned after the Quaker system, 
this arrangement required total silence and solitary confinement. 
Inmates lived and worked in their cells, later in small groups, but 
conversation was not permitted and eye contact discouraged, lest 
"contamination" result. The concept of solitude was thought to produce 
introspection, then repentance, and finally, reform.
The movement spread quickly to other states; at century's 
turn, many states eliminated the widespread use of capital punishnent, 
called for reform and constructed penitentiaries. The institutions 
were fairly large (300-500 beds) and generally consisted of rectangular
tiers of cells which either were placed along the outside walls or
%■
back-to-back in the center of the rectangle. The major departure from 
this cell-block design was created by Jeremy Bentham in 1791. An 
economist with a major interest in prisons, Bentham designed the 
Panoptican, a circular set of cell block tiers, overseen by a control 
point in the center. Although one institution of such design is still 
in use in Illinois, this was the most unsatisfactory institutional 
design of the era, creating substantial surveillance and security 
problems.
The next "model" institution and program be cane Auburn Prison 
(New York). With the construction of single cells in 1823, the
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"Auburn System" soon was emulated in America and worldwide. The new 
code was silence, not solitude. Prisoners performed group work in 
total silence; since they no longer continually occupied their cells, 
new dimensions of 7-by-3Vby-7-feet were smaller than at Walnut Street. 
Auburn also inaugurated the "lock-step" a system of walking, or 
shuffling, with head down, from cell to workplace.^ Cell design too, 
then, began to reflect the philosophy of the times. Sing Sing's cells 
(7-by-3-by-6-feet) reflected the sentiment of the warden: "Reformation
could not possibly be effected until the spirit of the criminal was 
broken."I?
2.2.3. Early Finances
William Penn and Benjamin Rush not only changed American penal 
philosophy but in doing so created a continuing financial burden for 
the states. The financial history of corrections is characterized by 
burgeoning construction and operating costs —  even to the present —  
and a constant quest for means by which to defray these costs. As will 
be seen, prison labor was the major vehicle by which institutions of 
all kinds were financed; this approach took many directions in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and has finally come full circle 
in the 1970s and 1980s. While the data on the level and financing 
of operating costs are limited, it is known that such costs accounted 
in part for the demise of the Walnut Street Jail in 1835. It was 
during this time that Pennsylvania, at least, developed the system of 
charging the counties for the prisoners they sent to the keep of the 
state. In 1834 the charges at the Eastern Penitentiary in Philadelphia
were:
41
Provisions (clothing, food, fuel, medicine):
$.20/day/inmate
1R
Bedding: $2.00/year/irmate.
The chargeback was not the only method of defraying the state1 s 
costs, however. Inmate-produced goods were sold on the open market 
and produced additional revenues. While at the beginning of the cen­
tury these devices were insufficient to produce self-supporting prisons, 
the picture improved over time. It was estimated that the nation's 
prisons "lost" $165,000 from 1797-1829, but by 1830 many were operating 
in the black.^
2.2.4. Self-support
Ihe concept of self-support, that a prison should indeed 
provide for itself, is critical to understanding the developments 
of the nineteenth century aid the implications for correctional 
practice today. In essence, self-support dictated for over one 
hundred years the occupation of inmates in income-producing, rather 
than reformative or educative activities. Ihe approach probably 
delayed as well the formation of centralized state systems and the 
acceptance of corrections as an entity, in addition to influencing 
the public regard for prison functions.
In colonial times, prisoners' costs were defrayed through 
fines, indenture, contributions of relatives or sale of goods. The 
employment of prisoners by the jailers was the precursor of the 
public, or state account system which began with the penitentiary 
movement. Under this system, the state fed, housed and clothed 
its prisoners, bought raw materials, supervised production and sold
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the prison products. Its success was somewhat delimited by the fact
that the usual warden was not experienced in business affairs. Ihe
nineteenth century saw the emergence of the contract system,
(Massachusetts, 1807), which proliferated after the opening of Auburn
(1824). Under this systan the state provided necessities of life to
its prisoners but engaged a private contractor to buy raw materials,
superintend the use of the inmates, and market the finished goods.
The contractor divided his profits with the institution or otherwise
on
paid fop the use of the inmaters. Innate pay was not unknown under 
this system and the prisoners at Auburn averaged $.23 - $.48/per day.^ 
This system was considered more efficient than the state account 
system but obviated reform; it became the practice to retain wardens 
according to the return on prisoner labor.
Another variation on this system was introduced in Kentucky 
in 1815: the lease system. Under this arrangement, the state "handed 
the prison over bodily" to the leasee, i.e., engaged in a contract 
under which the contractor was completely responsible for the inmates. 
Food, shelter, clothing, and an assurance of escape prevention were 
all supplied by the contractor who then put the prisoners to work
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and paid the state a sum for their labor. Again, while counter­
productive to reform efforts, this system was financially successful 
and flourished in the nineteenth century. Since the "keeper" or 
warden received half the net profit, this position became, popular, 
beginning in the 1840s.
While, as indicated, there are little aggregate data available 
until the late nineteenth century, the Prison Discipline Society of
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Boston gathered and published whatever pieces of information were 
made available to them by the various states. While hardly conclusive 
or capable of analysis, they provide a sense of the magnitude of ex­
penditures and revenues. A report from the Walnut Street Jail in­
dicated that over a seven year period, salaries and provisions totalled 
$31,200 while crafts and other prisoner earnings, and city and county 
chargebacks produced revenues of $43,900. In 1829, a New Jersey 
prison recorded expenditures of $6,200 and revenues of $3,400 while 
for Connecticut these figures were $5,900 and $9,100 respectively.
In 1852, a total surplus of $23,000 was returned to the revenues of
OO
nine states. One occasionally ccmes across in the Reports an 
excerpt extolling the lucrative opportunity of inmate labor.
2.3. A Changing System
By 1835, although the Walnut Street Jail had perished from 
escapes, riots, and financial and administrative problems, there was 
no doubt that the penal system in America was firmly established.
Ihe early glow of reform was by then caught up in some harsher 
realities, such as the lack of effect on crime, and the riots that 
followed the granting of minor privileges and the deemphasis of the 
system of silence. However, construction continued: ’’The failure of
the theoretical inspiration to take hold did not check the rapid 
development of prisons throughout the land."^ This phenomenon was 
recognized in Europe, where America was lauded for changing prison 
ideas.^
2.3.1. Reform Efforts
The mid-nineteenth century, however, saw the emergence of
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reform efforts which would create permanent effects on the prison 
system. First conceived for juveniles, or young adult first offen­
ders because of concern that ’’reform1' was not being effectuated, the 
new approach had some unique features. One was the introduction of 
the indeterminate sentence, whereby sentence was not fixed, but left 
to vary until the prisoner was "reformed.” The other was a grading 
system, under which the prisoner earned new privileges, housing, and 
lowered supervision for appropriate behavior. This plan was known 
as the "Irish System" and is credited to Sir William Crofton, who 
intorduced the principle abroad. Under this arrangement, the 
prisoner first underwent a period of punishment and retribution 
characterized by solitary confinement and harsh conditions, Then, 
through good behavior, the prisoner moved among different (better) 
living, supervisory and working arrangements, and then to supervised 
release. This system would also prove to be the formal forbear of 
the use of good time, parole and conditional p a r d o n .26
As with most variations, or reforms, of the original 
penitentiary concept, these ideas originated from private individuals 
or groups and not from concern arising from prison officials. "New” 
twentieth century notions of parole and probation had their origin 
decades before in the isolated, small efforts of well-meaning 
individuals. In any case, in 1876 the concept of reform for the 
prisoner had its formal beginning in the opening of the Elmira 
Reformatory for young men. The new emphasis was "reformation rather 
than vindictive suffering” and embodied indeterminate sentencing, 
education and a graded reward system which prevails t o d a y .27
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The impetus for the reformatory was probably spurred as much by 
perceived crime waves as anything else and a new era was now 
envisioned. "Nobody suspected the disillusionment just around the 
corner."^®
Ihe new concepts, while real and heralded, were somewhat 
overshadowed by dramatic increases in prisoner populations which 
forced a wave of construction during this period. Ihe architecture 
continued to mirror the earlier fortress-style which was so contrary 
to the reformatory system. Even Elmira, sadly, doubled and eventually 
tripled its original 500-inmate population and conceded that the 
programs were not working. Prison industry became a concern for in­
mate management and control at the same time that the prosperous 
years of pay-your-own-way convict labor arrangements were faring 
poorly.
2.3.2. Financing and Prison Labor
The early lease and contract systems had helped realize a 
nineteenth century goal of self-supporting prisons. However, these 
systems faced opposition later in the century from reformers, dis­
traught administrators who had little control, and groups concerned 
with prison-made goods carpeting in private markets. In 1885, the 
value of prison-made goods constituted one half of one percent of 
the value of private goods. This statistic was used successfully by 
status quo advocates until the end of the c e n t u r y .30 An everpresent 
concern was the avoidance of idleness among the inmates. Three new 
work systans emerged during this time, two of which continue today. 
These systans only gradually supplanted the old lease and contract 
arrangements.
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Ihe piece price system restored control of the prisoners to 
the wardens, who presumably would provide more considerate care. 
Instead of, in effect buying the prisoners, the contractor now paid 
seme agreed sun for the work performed by prisoners on various goods. 
The daily schedules and output quotas were determined by the prison 
administrators. The goods continued to be sold in the market; 
however, this system never became prevalent and peaked in 1895 when 
14 percent of the inmates (9,000) worked under this arrangement.
By 1940 it had virtually disappeared.
The state-use system, however, endures to the present. First 
inaugurated in 1865, by 1899 this system was in place in thirty-five 
states. The state is still the manufacturer under this system but 
the disposal of goods is sharply delimited. As the name suggests, 
priscn-made goods generally may only be sold to public agencies and
OO
divisions, usually state, but sometimes local. All aspects of 
production are under the auspices of the prison administration. This 
system represented the final concession to the interests against 
unfair competition. By the end of the nineteenth century the con­
tract and lease systems were operative, but declining.
The public works and ways system has to some degree always 
been a part of the prison system and its support. It is mentioned 
here as the last formal convict-labor program although it reached 
more prominence in the early twentieth century. The control arrange­
ments are much the same as under die state-use system, except that the 
focus is on structure or improvement of public works, such as roads, 
buildings, land clearing, etc.^ There was little early conflict
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in the competitive market, although the mid-twentieth century would 
see the prohibition of the use of Federal funds for prison construc­
tion employing convict labor.
All of these work systems, however, while restoring control 
to prison officials, did less to enhance the self-supporting prison 
than did their predecessors. It is testimony to the strength of 
the reformers that the more lucrative, if onerous, systans were 
eventually replaced by the more problematical state-use and public
r\t
works systems. Ihis problem was exacerbated by the fact that at 
the end of the nineteenth century there was little that could be 
characterized as a state prison system, only a conglomerate of in­
stitutions operating within a state's boundaries. By century's turn, 
upwards of sixty institutions were housing perhaps seventy thousand 
persons. Nonexistent were central offices of administration which 
produced budget requests to state legislatures and coordinated their 
system's activities. While states clearly were contributing to the 
support of their prisons, even aggregated data only became available 
in the twentieth century. Nationwide data on prisoner populations only 
became available in 1885 because the Department of Labor was interested 
in prison industries and began to generate statistics.
At century's end, then, the financing structure of American 
prisons had changed. It was now clear that it wnuld be necessary for 
the state to assume an ever-increasing role in the financial support 
of prisons.
2.4. The Twentieth Century
Called by same the "Progressive Era," the first twenty-odd
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years of the century did indeed witness significant departure from 
prior years. It was generally acknowledged that the prison move­
ment which had begun well at the beginning of the nineteenth century 
was not working well at its end. Hie Auburn system ended for all 
time and what one author calls the "heyday of reformatory penology” 
occurred during this period. Ihe reformatory concept was plagued 
by poor administration, restrictive labor laws and evidence that
criminal behavior seemed unaffected by prison —  or reformatory —
• 36experxence. u
2.4.1. Treatment
Changes during the early twentieth century included new 
practices behind the walls: silence was eliminated, as was the lock­
step; "amusements" were initiated, including recreation, exercise, 
visiting privileges, prisoner organizations and work clothes rather
07
than striped costumes. Then cane the psychiatrists and the 
beginning of diagnostics and classification. This marked the 
beginning of treatment (or punishment),of the individual, rather than 
according to the crime. Environmental, psychological and mental 
factors were viewed as critical contributory factors and their speci­
fication necessary to defining deviance and promoting the adjustment 
38process. However, this recognition of the prisoner as an in­
dividual with special needs was not immediately translated into 
programs; at that time, and many claim even now, it was not known, 
given the "problon," how to cure it. ^  However, the practical appeal 
of the institutional control suggested by this approach was not 
without favor. In addition, it fostered the growth of alternatives
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to prison, such as probation and parole, but also further use of the 
indeterminate sentence.
2.4.2. Probation
A system of probation, or supervised release in the community, 
had its beginnings in Boston when a bootmaker took pity on an arrested 
drunk. John Augustus personally and closely supervised nearly 2,000 
people from 1841-1859, predating widespread use of probation by fifty 
years. (Augustus' other innovation, realization that alcoholics re­
quired specialized treatment rather than punishment, predated actual
40implementation for one hundred years.) The United States was the 
first country to use probation: at 1900, six states had provisions
for and used probation; by 1920, thirty-three states had adult 
probation and all had juvenile probation; the system became operative 
in all the states in 1956. The probation decision is made at the 
time of sentencing; frequently the judge is provided with a pre­
sentence report prepared by a probation officer which is designed 
to assist the choice between secure and non-secure alternatives.
2.4.3. Parole
Parole, as probation, had its "father," in this case an 
Australian penal colony governor. Emerging at the same time as 
John Augustus' probation, parole, or the serving of part of one's 
sentence under supervised release, was adopted by the English, then 
the Irish, before being used at the Elmira Reformatory in 1876.^ 
Itoenty states were using parole by 1900, forty-four by 1922. Wide­
spread use of parole was prevalent in the states soon after its
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adoption; over one-half of the releases were parolees in the 
twenties, about 70 percent today. Critics argue that the use of 
parole may actually work with the indeterminate sentence to increase
/ O
the time spent under supervision.
Ihe twenties and thirties brought institutional specializa­
tion —  prisons for the criminally insane, more reformatories, in­
stitutions for women, and differentiation by security level. In part 
this was made possible by ever-increasing populations, state assump­
tion of prison systems and the need to separate for appropriate treat­
ment. It was during this period that the concept of "defective de­
linquent" emerged —  the practice of sentencing those so designated
/ *5
to lifelong custody if necessary. Many of the new prisons were 
extraordinarily large, thoroughly departing from the old concept of 
an ideal, five-hundred bed institution. Illinois and California 
had prisons holding more than 3,000 persons and Michigan had one 
institution with capacity in excess of 5,000 beds.
2.4.4. Ihe Federal System
It was also during this period that the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons was created. There were federal prisoners confined in state 
and local facilities in the nineteenth century (11,000 in 1885 
and 28,000 in 1895). At the turn of the century, funds were finally 
allocated to construct a federal facility at Fort Leavenworth. Other 
prisons followed, but the federal sector operated much as the states —  
without a centralized administrative framework; oversight was provided 
through the Department of Justice.44 In 1930, the United States Bureau 
of Prisons was created within the Justice Department, establishing a 
separate prison, parole and probation administration. At its creation,
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the Bureau already had three penitentiaries, two reformatories, 
and eight camps under its jurisdiction. During the 1930s, new legis­
lation placed more serious types of offenses (kidnapping, national 
bank robbery, racketeering) under federal jurisdiction and new con­
struction was necessary to alleviate overcrowding. The numerous in­
stitutions created the capability to establish an elaborate classi­
fication system; through this and other practices the federal system
45was regarded as a model for some states.
The twentieth century, then, saw dramatic changes in systems 
of prison administration, treatment modalities and alternatives. The 
1950s saw riots, turmoil, and overcrowding, followed by new construc­
tion, reform and the re introduction of standards by which to measure 
correctional conditions and performance. The American Prison Associa­
tion in recognition of the times changed its name in 1954 to the 
American Correctional Association. By 1960 most states had classi­
fication systems and the staff to carry them out; citizen participa­
tion was occurring and vocational training became more widely used. 
Prisoners' rights to litigation and grievance procedures were
tr
recognized. Research and evaluation of treatment and effectiveness 
were undertaken; in 1968 the establishment of the Law Enforcement 
Assistance Administration provided federal funding for innovation, 
technical assistance and evaluation research. The final step, 
residential treatment in the comcunity, also came in the 1960s, 
although the concept, as the other changes, was not without precedent. 
One author has characterized the period 1930-1960 as a closed time, 
when prison administrators were expected to manage their own in­
stitutions and contain matters behind the walls.^
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2.4.5. Conxmnity Treatment
Halfway houses, which provide supervision to the offender in 
a residential ccmnunity setting were first introduced in Massachu­
setts in 1817; a few other, private houses appeared during the nine­
teenth century but the idea was not popular. Ihe American Prison 
Association, contemplating their use in partial lieu of sentence, 
feared that such houses would "perpetuate (the) prison stigma and 
create a permanent class of undesirable citizens.'"^ Seine support 
at the turn of the century from the Volunteers of America resulted in 
a halfway house for Sing Sing releasees and a few more in other 
cities. However, as parole was used more widely, corrections 
officials maintained that such houses were not necessary and finally 
all were closed following the Depression. As parole later proved 
less than totally satisfactory, the idea was reintroduced in the 
1940s; however, the houses really constituted pre-release centers 
on prison grounds and violated the concept by this isolation. The 
movement rekindled, still under private auspices, in the 1950s, but 
was not considered a total alternative except for juveniles. An 
accompanying concept, work-release, had similar origins —  it was 
informally used in the nineteenth century, legalized in one state in 
1917 and lay dormant until 1957.^
In 1959, Dismas House (Fr. Charles Dismas Clark, S.J.) 
was founded in St. Louis to provide shelter and help for released in­
mates returning to the coominity. In 1961, the Bureau of Prisons 
opened its first city-based pre-release centers and in 1965 the 
Prisoner Rehabilitation Act authorized the Bureau to establish houses 
in the community. A network was finally created in 1963 with the
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founding of the International Halfway House Association.^ Halfway 
bouses remain small and mostly privately funded but now have formal 
contracts with corrections agencies to provide client services.
Ihe emphasis in corrections has gone from confinement, to 
reform, to treatment to rehabilitation, to querying whether any 
approach is effective. Present corrections may be said to be pro­
viding a mixture of rehabilitation, retribution, recompense, deterrence, 
and incapacitation.
2.4.6. Populations and Finances
Prcm 1885, when nationwide data were first collected, to 1970, 
the number of persons incarcerated has increased nearly sixfold. When 
this is standardized by population, however, incarceration rates 
per 100,000 persons have increased by only 28 percent. Table 2-1 
illustrates prison and jail populations 1885-1970 for federal, state 
and local institutions. In 1885 the incarceration rate was 115 
prisoners per 100,000 population; it was 147 per 100,000 population 
in 1970, with fluctuations during the intervening years.
The financial burden imposed by the elimination of the con­
tract and lease systems has already been chronicled. In 1902, states 
devoted 10.3 percent of their total expenditures to corrections; that 
share is about 2 percent today. Expenditures increased gradually 
(although declined as a share of total expenditures) until 1946, 
then increased dramatically. This in part reflects the final decline 
of the contract system and the end of a wartime lfboom" in industry 
production under war contracts. Indeed, by the 1920s and 1930s the 
total elimination of the lease system had removed any vestige of
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TABLE 2-1
a/
PRISON POPULATIONS AND INCARCERATION RATES, 1885-1970“
Per 100,000
Federal State Local Population
1885 41,877 15,882—k 114.9
1895 54,244
1904 78,726
1917 3,018 71,442 42,216 126.8
1922 5,540 78,673 65,918 142.01
1926 6,803 89,322
1930 12,181 115,314
1935 14,777 129,888
1940 19,260 154,446 138,717 237.22
1945 18,638 115,011
1950 17,134 148,989 98,343 175.6
1955 20,088 165,692
1960 23,218 189,739 133,058 193.0
1965 21,040 189,855
1970 20,038 176,391 131,591 146.5
a/ Sources: 1922-1970: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical
Statistics of the United States, Bicentennial Edition, Parts I 
and II (Washington, D.C.: 1975); 1917-22, Nmiber of Prlsoneri~ln 
Penal Institutions (Washington, D.C.: 1923; 1885-1904: Department 
of Labor, Convict Labor: Annual Report of the Ccmnissioner of 
Labor (Washington, D.C.). 
b/ Partial sample of survey for National Prison Association, 1886.
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self-support; it was observed that "huraanitarianism was proving 
expensive.'The 1929 ban on interstate commerce of prison-made 
goods forced the disappearance of private contractors. In 1923 such 
arrangements accounted for 24 percent of the value of prison-made 
goods, state-use only 18 percent; in 1932 these shares had reversed, 
to 8 percent and 28 percent, respectively; and by 1940 there was no 
contract activity and state-use accounted for 60 percent of the value. 
To 1940 also, the current dollar value of prison-made goods declined
CO
from $76 million to $57 million. The number of inmates involved in 
prison industries has steadily declined as a percentage of the total 
inmate population since 1885 and by 1970 fewer absolute numbers of 
inmates were so employed. This latter decline was interrupted by the 
Depression and World War II.
By 1970, then, states were spending upwards of $1 billion on 
corrections and supervising over 176,000 prisoners. Old prison 
fortresses were being supplemented, not supplanted, with new institu­
tions with construction costs approaching $50,000 per bed. Rnphasis 
on treatment and rehabilitation provided additional financial pressure, 
with annual per inmate costs in the thousands. Prison industries had 
ceased to provide much assistance in attaining self-sufficiency and 
in fact generally were losing money. Corrections had, in fact, became 
big business and its programs and activities were ripe for economic 
and policy analysis.
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Chapter Ihree
THE CORRECTIONAL SETTING: PRESENT
The preceding chapter has outlined the forces and events 
which shaped corrections as it exists today. This chapter provides 
an overview of the level and type of correctional expenditures, 
populations and correctional activities. Since economic analysis is 
capable of providing information on a wide variety of correctional 
issues, this chapter provides familiarization with various correc­
tional dispositions and their characteristics as well as information 
on expenditure levels and distribution.
3.1. Definitions and Activities
Corrections refers to the set of functions and activities 
which provide supervision and treatment to persons convicted of 
crime. This definition is often broadened to include persons in 
pretrial status, but our focus here will generally be on the post­
adjudication population.
3.1.1. Criminal Justice System
More a collection of activities than a system, criminal jus­
tice functions include law enforcement and police protection, 
judicial services, legal services and prosecution, public defense, 
and corrections. System activities are carried out by all levels of 
government. Table 3-1 illustrates criminal justice system relative 
shares, by function, for 1978. Nationwide, criminal justice ex­
penditures for that year were $24 billion, of which corrections
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represents 23 percent. This amounts to nearly $110 per capita,
while corrections expenditures were $25 per person, nationwide. The
major criminal justice activity is police protection (54 percent of
all expenditures), primarily carried out at the local level;
corrections is primarily a state function. Local governments
account for nearly 60 percent of all criminal justice expenditures,
state governments 28 percent, the federal government 13 percent.
TABLE 3-1 
Criminal Justice System 
Relative Shares, 1978-
Percent 
of Tbtal
Activity
Criminal
Justice Federal
Shares
State Loca]
Police Protection 54.4 14.9 14.4 70.7
Judicial 12.7 10.5 33.0 56.5
Legal Services 
and Prosecution 6.0 14.7 26.4 58.8
Public Defense 2.2 39.9 18.7 41.4
Corrections 22.9 6.1 57.5 36.4
Other 1.8 19.9 28.0 52.1
aJ Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics and U.S. Bureau of the Census, Expenditure and 
Employment Data for the Criminal Justice System 1978. (Washing­
ton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980).
Table 3-2 displays the relative shares of total expenditures 
for the' criminal justice system and corrections, 1971-78 for state 
and local governments. Criminal justice system expenditures have 
remained fairly constant at about 4 percent at the state level and 
about 12-13 percent for local governments. For the states,
TABLE 3-2
RELATIVE SHARES .
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FY 1971-78-' 
(Dollar Amounts in Thousands)
State Local" " "  1—1 1 1 l- ' 11 " ' I -  ■    — .1 I | »||1 || . , || ,l | j ii. , |
Total
Expenditures
Percent
Criminal
Justice
System
Percent
Corrections
"" l
Total
Expenditures
Percent
Criminal
Justice
System
Percent
Corrections
1971 66,199,825 4.0 2.0 54,553,238 12.1 1.6
1972 72,483,444 4.0 1.9 61,336,542 11.9 1.5
1973 78,013,610 4.2 2.0 67,849,595 11.9 1.5
1974 86,193,242 4.5 2.1 73,352,505 12.4 1.7
1975 104,193,071 4.4 2.1 83,784,662 12.5 1.7
1976 124,107,908 4.2 2.0 93,692,546 ‘ 12.8 1.8
1977 128,767,717 4.5 2.2 101,117,425 12.8 1.8
1978 136,544,931 4.9 2.3 109,502,000 13.1 1.8
a/ Sources: U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, National Criminal 
Justice Information and Statistics Service, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Series
1973-79 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office); _______ , Trends in Employment and
Expenditure Data for the Criminal Justice System 1971-77 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1980); Bureau of the Census, State Government Finances Series 1971-78 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govemnent Printing Office, 1972-79).
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corrections' share has also hovered consistently at about 2 percent, 
slightly less at the local level. Ibis constancy is perplexing; it 
may be a random occurrence or the result of a subtle predetermina­
tion. Corrections' expenditures have fluctuated significantly over 
the decade in both current and constant dollar terms (see Table 3-6) 
yet relative shares remain virtually unchanged. Less surprising but 
still interesting is the correctional share of criminal justice system 
allocations illustrated in Table 3-3. The results follow from Ibble 
3-2 and indicate the federal corrections' share at about 23 percent 
of all criminal justice system expenditures, states at 48 percent 
and local jurisdictions at 14 percent.
3.1.2. Corrections
Upon conviction, an offender may be fined, released or 
sentenced to supervision under the auspices of a corrections depart­
ment. Such departments may be separate state agencies or part of 
another umbrella agency. (There are about 115,000 separate criminal 
justice agencies at the state and local level; of these, 5,500 are 
corrections' agencies, and 20 percent are at the state level. Adult 
agencies comprise 85 percent of the state and local total.) The level 
and circumstances of supervision are set by the sentence, which may 
be fixed (or determinate), or indeterminate, usually with a range. 
Dispositions fall into three major areas: an event, such as a fine 
or restitution payment; supervision in confinement; or supervision 
in the community.
Nationwide, over two million persons are under federal, state 
or local correctional supervision on any given day. Of these, about
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TABLE 3-3
RELATIVE SHARES 
DIRECT CORRECTIONS EXPENDITURES TO CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM EXPENDITURES 1971-78*/
Total Federal State Local
Percent
Corrections
Percent
Corrections
Percent
Corrections
Percent
Corrections
1971 21.8 9.1 49.3 12.9
1972 20.6 8.9 46.7 12.5
1973 21.1 10.3 46.4 12.9
1974 21.8 11.5 46.6 13.3
1975 22.3 9.9 47.5 13.7
1976 22.3 10.5 47.6 13.8
1977 22.9 10.8 49.0 13.8
1978 22.9 10.8 47.5 14.0
a/ Sources: U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration, and U.S. Department of the Census, Trends in 
Employment and Expenditure Data for the Criminal Justice System 
19^1-77, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980)
Tables 2, 4, 8, 10.; _______ , Expenditure and Employment Data for
the Criminal Justice System 1978, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1980) Table 1.
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one-fourth are in federal or state prisons and local jails; nearly 
two-thirds are on probation; the balance are on parole.'*' Exact 
figures are available for all functions only for the federal system; 
state prison populations are counted every year. Jails are surveyed 
irregularly; the last census was taken in 1978 and before that in 
1972. Parole figures are kept somewhat more regularly; but proba­
tion is administered from 885 separate agencies and completely reliable 
figures are seldom available.
These populations in no way represent a national consensus on 
what constitutes deviant behavior nor what combination of retribu­
tion, punishment, rehabilitation and reintegration is appropriate 
for the offender; nor what the length of the supervision period should
be. Incarceration, probation and parole rates vary by state and the
2intrastate variation is even more complex. One may observe urban- 
rural differences in sanctions for crimes; some states may incar­
cerate only felons, others may include misdemeanants; some states 
widely utilize community alternatives, others do not.
3.1.3. Institutions
These represent secure confinement under federal, state or 
local auspices. There are 55 federal facilities, 1,324 state 
facilities (925 adult) and over 3,400 local jails, including prisons, 
camps, community facilities, etc. There are about thirty federal 
and six hundred state facilities which could be classified as prisons 
in the traditional sense. Institutions vary by security level: 
maximum, medium, minimum; although women's institutions, because of 
smaller populations, generally incorporate all security levels.
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Other specialized units include reformatories, honor camps, work-
and pre-release centers. Offenders sentenced to confinement are
normally first diagnosed and classified to determine necessary level
of security and treatment plans. Prisons normally provide a variety
of education, counseling, vocational and work opportunities although
these vary widely in quality and inmate participation rates. Idle-
3
ness continues to be the primary pastime of inmates. In 1979, for 
example, there were 25,000 inmates working in state prison in-
4
dustries —  9 percent of the population. Education and vocational 
programs experience similar or lower participation rates. Federal 
prisons tend to have higher participation rates; their 1979 industry 
participation was over twice that of the states. Programs of any 
type are far more limited in jails.
Table 3-4 presents federal, state and local correctional 
institution populations for 1971-78. Populations declined in the 
1960s but increased steadily in the seventies. Ihe increase from 
1971 to 1978 was 56 percent for the states, 42 percent federal and 
12 percent in jails. However, since 1975, populations have been 
increasing at a decreasing rate. Ihe average length of stay in
5
prison is presently about 22 months, and has been increasing.
While jail populations presently number nearly 160,000, this figure 
provides an inaccurate reflection of the number of persons who 
experience detention or sentence. Jail turnover is high, estimated 
at about 5 million persons annually. There appears to be a trend 
toward longer prison sentences and increasing populations, although 
a recent study found prison capacities to be as accurate a predictor
g
as more elaborate models.
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TABLE 3-4
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION POPULATIONS 1971-78^
Federal State Local
1971 20,948 177,113
1972 21,713 174,470 141,600
1973 22,815 181,534
1974 22,361 196,105
1975 24,131 218,619
1976 26,799 236,492
1977 32,088 267,936
1978 29,803 276,799 158,400
a/ Sources: U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration, National Criminal Justice Information and 
Statistics Service, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics,
Series 1973-78. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office): U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
Prisoners in State and Federal Institutions on December 31, 1978, 
National Prisoner Statistics Bulletin SD-NPS-PSF-.6. (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980).
Incarceration rates are one way of indexing prison populations. 
America incarcerates at the highest rate in the world, with the 
probable exception of South Africa and the Soviet Union. Table 3-5 
illustrates incarceration rates at the federal and state level for 
1971-78, and an increasing trend is apparent. In 1972, 163 persons 
were incarcerated per 100,000 population, but by 1978 this ratio 
had risen to 209, an increase of nearly 30 percent. (The infrequency 
of jail census efforts prohibits deriving total incarceration rates 
except in selected years.) Whether driven by available bedspace or 
punitive tendencies or longer sentences, it is clear that progressively 
higher proportions of the population are experiencing secure confinement.
67
TABLE 3-5
INCARCERATION RATES?/ 
(per 100,000 population)
U.S. Total Federal State Local
1971 2.0.2 86.2
68.31972 162.9 10.5 84.1
1973 10.9 86.8
1974 10.6 93.0
1975 11.0 102.0
1976 13.0 111.0
1977 14.1 117.8
1978 2 09 . 3 13.4 124.6 71.3
a/ Sources: U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration, National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics 
Service, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1978 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979) Table 
6.22; U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
Prisoners in State and Federal Institutions on Decenber 31, 1978, 
National Prisoner Statistics Bulletin SD-NPS=PSF-6 (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980) p.3 and Table 1.
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In 1978, state and federal admissions (153,300) exceeded releases
7
by nearly eight thousand persons. Had a constant incarceration 
rate prevailed, institutional populations in state and federal institu­
tions would number 224,205 instead of 306,602.
A recently completed study projects increasing state prison 
populations but a slowing of the rapid growth of the mid 1970s; under 
the fastest growth rate, a population of about 340,000 prisoners was 
predicted for 1983.®
Characteristics of the institutionalized population are 
surveyed periodically. The population is predominantly male (96 per­
cent ), nearly evenly balanced racially (except the different repre­
sentation in the general population produces a much higher incarcera­
tion rate for blacks), and young (38 percent are under 25 years old,
60 percent under 30 years old). Slightly over half are incarcerated
9
for serious crimes against persons (murder, rape, assault, robbery). 
Prisons over one hundred years old still house 16 percent of the pop­
ulation; 26 percent are confined in institutions built between 1875 and 
1924. Seventy percent of all maximum security prisoners are housed in 
institutions over fifty years old; 30 percent are in facilities more 
than one hundred years old. As a result, larger institutions (1,000+ 
beds) accommodate 56 percent of the institutional population while a 
mere 22 percent are housed in facilities with capacities of five 
hundred beds or less, a recommended alternative, according to correc­
tional standards, for some time.^
3.1.4. Probation
Probation may be imposed as an alternative to incarceration. 
Hie term generally is set by the maximum sentence, but legally may
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exceed it because the individual is not in an incarcerative status.
A short jail term occasionally precedes probation. One-half to three
quarters of all convicted persons are sentenced to probation annually.
Exact figures are elusive: there is no general agreement between
states as to which jurisdictional levels should administer probation —
laws vary by state as do the administrative arrangements. Five states
administer juvenile and adult probation through the Department of
Corrections and thirty states provide separate agencies to jointly
administer probation and parole services; thirteen states administer
adult probation locally through the courts and thirty-two have this
arrangement for juveniles. As an example of the magnitude of locally
administered probation, New York has sixty-nine separate probation
departments.Figures available for 1976 indicated that 1.25 million
persons were on state and local probation with another 67,000 under
federal supervision. Nationwide, the 1977 probation rate was 583 for
n 2
each 100,000 personsPreliminary (unpublished) 1979 figures 
indicate that 1,126,000 persons were on state and local probation with 
another 42,000 under federal supervision. Ehtries slightly outnumber 
removals, so a small increase in probationer populations is taking 
place.
Probation is designed to assist convicted persons by providing 
supervision and guidance. Generally, there are conditions, such as 
reporting to the probation officer, remaining a local resident, or 
the inclusion of fines or restitution payments. Ihe usual service 
arrangement is a once/monthly contact for a few minutes at the 
probation office. Caseloads of over one hundred are not uncommon.
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Some probation departments offer more intensive services under a 
specialized caseload, whereby the probation officer provides extra 
guidance in securing employment or other services, or with a con­
tractual arrangement under which the probationer or parolee and officer
14mutually agree to behavioral objectives to be accomplished.
3.1.5. Parole
Parole is the practice whereby an incarcerated offender serves 
some remaining portion of the sentence under supervision in the com­
munity. It tends to be a state or Departmernt of Corrections func­
tion. Parole boards are full time in one-half the states and 
generally are political appointees. Most boards have full autonomy 
although in a few states they report to the governor. Parole is not 
considered automatic and decisions are made by a parole board which 
typically visits a prison once a month, interviews potential candi­
dates (e.g., those who have served at least one-third of their 
sentence), and analyzes related information. Generally, about one- 
half of those interviewed at any given time are granted parole, which 
is the prevalent method of release. The release conditions resemble 
those of probation but there is ordinarily more intense contact and 
supervision in the beginning. Persons on parole are increasing as 
each year parole entries exceed those removed.^ In 1976, over 
one quarter-million persons were on parole, with 16,000 of those
under federal supervision. The 1977 parole rate was 98 per 100,000 
16persons.
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3.1.6. Community Corrections
Placement in a residential setting in the community is some­
times used to ease the adjustment process of released adult offenders. 
For juveniles, this alternative is used more frequently instead of 
incarceration. The halfway house, as it is frequently called, pro­
vides counseling and other services such as employment placement, 
education, training, suhstance abuse, either in-house or through 
community resources. Facilities may be privately managed, working 
from contractual arrangements with departments of correction, or 
operated directly by correctional agencies. A recent survey found 
an average daily population of over 13,000 adults in 402 community- 
based pre-release facilities, during 1978. Fifty-six percent of the 
facilities are state-operated; 40 percent are privately managed and 
the federal system and local governments each operate 3 percent.
17Overall capacity of these facilities is estimated at 16,500 beds.
3.2. Expenditures
Total corrections expenditures totaled $5.5 billion in 1978,
nearly one-fourth of all criminal justice system expenditures.
Financing comes from direct state expenditures, intergovernmental
transfers and assistance from federal grants. Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration (LEAA) grants to states and localities
18totaled $715 million for the period 1971-78. For the period 
1971-78, corrections expenditures increased 94 percent in current 
dollars for all levels of government. Table 3-6 presents correctional 
expenditures for the period in current and constant dollars. In 
constant dollars, federal expenditures increased by 65 percent (123
TABLE 3-6
CORRECTIONS DIRECT EXPENDITURES FY 1971-78^ 
CONSTANT DOLLARS 
(1972 = 100)
(Dollar Amounts in Thousands)
Federal State
Direct
Expenditures
Constant
Dollars
70 Change 
Constant 
Dollars
Direct
Expenditures
Constant
Dollars
% Change 
Constant 
Dollars
1971 $110,801 $119,656 $1,323,104 $1,400,110
1972 133,272 133,272 11.4 1,377,776 1,377,776 - 1.6
1973 170,854 159,230 19.5 1,533,920 1,449.829 5.2
1974 214,529 185,098 16.2 1,812,529 1,530,852 5.6
1975 216,778 170,022 - 8.1 2,193,000 1,690,825 10.4
1976 256,352 190,738 12.2 2,474,783 1,797,228 6.3
1977 298,712 209,329 9.7 2,847,020 1,917,185 6.7
1978 337,174 217,813 4.0 3,176,963 1,959,878 2.2
1971-78 122.8 64.9 94.0 34.8
TABLE 3-6 - Continued
CORRECTIONS DIRECT EXPENDITURES FY 1971-78-/ 
CONSTANT DOLLARS 
(1972 = 100)
(Dollar Amounts in Thousands)
Local
Direct
Expenditures
Constant
Dollars
% Change 
Constant 
Dollars
1971 $ 857,168 $ 907,056
1972 911,282 911,282 0.5
1973 1,035,434 978,671 7.4
1974 1,213,338 1,024,779 4.7
1975 1,433,535 1,105,270 7.9
1976 1,654,377 1,201,436 8.7
1977 1,788,329 1,204,427 0.2
1978 2,008,574 1,239,096 2.
1971-78 91.0 32.3
a/ Sources: U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 
Expenditure & Employment Data for the Criminal Justice System, Series 1971-78. 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, Business Statistics. 1978 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1979). (Federal & State & Local purchases of services 
deflators.)
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percent current), state by 35 percent (94 percent current) and local 
by 32 percent (91 current). Tbtal constant-dollar expenditures for 
1978 are $3.4 billion. Real state expenditures only increased by 
2.2 percent from 1977-1978, the smallest change of any level of 
government.
3.2.1. Non-Capital Outlays
Expectedly, labor comprises the largest share of expenditures: 
72 percent federal; 68 percent state; 70 percent local. In 1978, 
265,000 persons were employed directly by corrections agencies; 
additional personnel services frequently are provided under con­
tractual arrangements and do not appear in these totals. Table 3-7 
presents employment and payroll information for 1971-78 for all levels 
of government. Correctional employment has risen nearly 50 percent 
since 1971, but federal employment rose by 72 percent, local by 53 
percent and state employment grew by 43 percent. Th6 "average" 
correctional employee earnings in 1978 were $20,300 federal (an 
increase of 22 percent from 1977); $14,200 state (a 6 percent in­
crease); $13,800 local (an increase of 4 percent). Hie large dis­
parity between federal and state-local is partially explained by 
higher federal pay scales generally and the fact that federal salaries 
do not vary by region. Extreme regional differences and the higher 
turnover fof new employees at entry-level salaries) explain a great 
deal of the differences. Historically, prison employees earned less 
than almost any other employee group. Cue author claims this resulted 
in only the most uneducated, most unskilled workforce, a workforce 
that through seniority, found its way to managerial positions.
TABLE 3-7
CORRECTIONAL EMPLOYMENT, 1971-78^/
(Dollar Amounts in Thousands; Full-time Equivalents)
•  Federal    State _____
Nuifcer of % Change, % Change Nuifoer of % Change,
Bnployees Payroll Employees Payroll Employees Payroll Employees
1971 7,140 92,304 - - 106,045 943,776 -
1972 7,929 112,752 11.1 22.2 107,785 1,040,520 1.6
1973 8,969 130,644 13.1 15.9 112,176 1,146,780 4.1
1974 9,967 154,620 11.1 18.4 121,160 1,328,520 8.0
1975 10,707 188,316 7.4 21.8 126,933 1,479,024 4.8
1976 11.717 203,256 9.4 7.9 134,420 1.655,136 5.9
1977 11,760 195,348 0.4 - 3.9 145,552 1,956,948 8.3
1978 11,918 241,983 1.3 23.9 151,408 2,155,848 4.0
% Change^ 
Payroll
10.3 
10.2
15.8
11.3
11.9 
18.2 
10.2
TABLE 3-7 - Continued
CORRECTIONAL EMPLOYMENT, 1971-785/
(Dollar Amounts in Thousands; Full-time Equivalents)
________ Local _______  _____
Nurfcer of % Change, % Change,
Qnployees Payroll Employees Payroll
1971 66,776 605,640 , -
1972 70,079 674,316 4.9 11.3
1973 75,134 767,436 7.2 13.8
1974 82,070 898,404 9.2 17.1
1975 86,880 1,028,280 5.9 14.5
1976 93,156 1,176,288 7.2 14.4
1977 97,696 1,302,792 4.9 10.8
1978 102,058 1,412,556 4.5 8.4
a/ U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, National Criminal Justice 
Information and Statistics Service, Trends in Expenditure and Employment Data for the Criminal 
Justice System 1971-77, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Oggice, 1980), Tables 5, 9, 11 
. Expenditure and Employment Data for the Criminal Justice System 1978, (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980) pp. 3-4, Tables 4-5.
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The limited vision thus brought, he maintains, kept development at a 
19
low ebb. In any case, even correctional administrators today often 
earn less than their counterparts in other activities; college degrees 
are beginning to become a requirement for some administrative and 
security positions.
Table 3-8 illustrates the distribution of state correctional 
expenditures for seven years. Institutions for men comprise the 
largest expenditure category. Care and treatment costs vary by type 
of institution; the allocation for juveniles is higher than their 
corresponding proportion of bedspace. (The predominant philosophy 
has been that juvenile offenders have a greater rehabilitation poten­
tial which justifies the more specialized, costly treatment.) The 
same perspective prevails for women as well. For localities, data 
are more limited but a sample of expenditures indicated that in­
stitutions (i.e., jails) account for approximately seventy percent 
of expenditures.^
Probation, parole and pardon functions now account for one- 
eighth of expenditures;, the increase in administrative costs 
reflects the reorganization of corrections into separate departments 
during the decade.
The aggregated nature of the data prohibit detailed examina­
tion and analysis. However, even in aggregated form some contrasts 
are apparent. Corrections at the state level expends over five times
as much on prisons as on probation, pardon and parole. Limited data
21for localities suggest this ratio to be about 2.5. The distribution 
of population, however, is markedly in the reverse, with 22 percent
TABLE 3-8
DISTRIBUTION OF STATE DIRECT CORRECTIONAL EXPENDITURES, 1971-77^
Institutions
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Total 70.6 75.1 74.3 72.7 70.7 69.9 68.5
' Men 45.7 46.0 45.4 45.4 45.1 45.0 45.0
Wbmen 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.1
Juveniles 23.3 23.6 22.7 20.1 19.1 18.6 16.6
Other b/ 3.6 4.2 4.5 4.4 4.2 4.8
Correctional Administration 3.7 4.6 5.6 6.4 7.1 7.7 7.2
Probation, Parole & Pardon 8.6 11.0 12.7 12.6 12.4 12.5 12.0
Miscellaneous 6.2 1.5 1.0 1.4 1.7 1.9 2.3
Capital Outlay 10.9 7.8 6.4 6.9 8.1 8.0 10.0
a/ Sources: U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, National 
Criminal Justice Information and Statistical Service, Expenditure and Employment Data for 
the Criminal Justice System, Series 1970-71-1977 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1972-78). 
b/ Included in percent for men.
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of the supervised population incarcerated nationwide, the balance in
the community. A Colorado study revealed that the institutionalized
population consisted of 15 percent of all supervised persons, yet
consumed 85 percent of expenditures; the relationship was just re-
22versed for persons under community supervision. Probation and
parole costs are, understandably, much lower than institutionaliza­
tion. In New York, 1978 costs per parolee were $1,100 for super­
vision, but the range of $5,000 to less than $500 reflects the differ­
ing intensity of service. Probation services ranged from $260 to
23$285 annually per client. Federal probation, nationwide, cost 
$800/client in 1977; no breakdown on parole supervision was available.
The (slightly) falling share of institution expenditures has 
come mostly at the expense of facilities for juveniles. However, in 
real terms the average annual expenditure per inmate has been declin­
ing over the last four years. In aggregated money terms, the annual 
average expenditure for each of the 268,000 inmates in custody during 
1977 was $7,279, a slight decline from the prior year and a 35 per­
cent increase over seven years. But in real terms, this expenditure 
was $4,900 in 1972 dollars and has fallen by $1,000 since 1972. Ihe 
detail for states appears in Ihble 3-9, demonstrating the total change 
in real terms to be -12 percent for the 1971-77 period.
This annual per capita cost does not convey adequately the 
range of costs. Some states, with substantial overcrowding and few 
services, fall well below this average. Secure prison confinement 
expenditures will greatly exceed costs for camps and farms, for 
example, because of their high security and program costs. A recent
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study of the New York prison system identified annual per-inmate 
costs ranging from $10,700 for Attica to nearly $21,000 for a women's 
facility. In New York City the average per inmate cost in 1978 was 
$24,900, or $68 per day.^
The New York study provides a detailed example of the distribu­
tion and magnitude of prison operating costs. In the state prison 
system, inmate costs separate as follows:
Security 50%
Administration, Plant 22%
Operations, Prisoner 
Processing
Prisoner Necessities 15%
Programs 10%
Prison Industries 2% 25
TABLE 3-9
ANNUAL AVERAGE INMATE COSTS IN CURRENT AND CONSTANT DOLLARS 1971-1977
STATE INSTITUTIONS 
(1972 = 100)
# Inmates
Cost/Inmate 
Current 
Dollars
Percent
Change
Cost/Inmate 
Constant 
Dollars
Percent
Change
1971 177,113 $5,274 $5,581
1972 174,470 5,930 12.4 5,930 6.3
1973 181,534 6,278 5.9 5,934 0.07
1974 196,105 6,719 7.0 5,675 - 4.4
1975 218,619 7,092 5.6 5,468 - 3.6
1976 236,492 7,315 3.1 5,312 - 2.9
1977 267,936 7,279 - 0.5 4,901 - 7.7
Tbtal Change 34.50 -12.23
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Some attendant inmate dollar figures in 1978 include: food, $1.83/
day; health services, $532/year; administration, $3,300/year;
26security, $7,500/year; programs, $1,500/year. Community facilities,
by contrast, have costs ranging from, nationwide, $6,300 - $10,000/
client/year for only basic services, to $8,600 - $13,400/client/year
for comprehensive in-house services- Other service delivery mixes
27fall within this range.
Local data are somewhat less thorough than those for state 
or federal activities but based on expenditure and population informa­
tion previously displayed, plus an estimated 71 percent jail share 
in 1972 and 70 percent in 1978, some comparisons are possible. For 
1972, average annual inmate costs in local jails are estimated at 
$4,600; in 1978, the cost in current dollars was $8,900, but $5,500 
in real terms. The internal distribution of costs, however, varies 
widely,between state or federal institutions and jails. Jails expend 
far more on booking, in-processing, out-processing and court-related 
functions than does an institution which confines the average person 
for nearly two years.
3.2.2. Capital Outlays
A final note on capital is warranted for perspective. Thble 
3-7 indicates that in 1977 capital expenditures were 10 percent of 
state correctional expenditures, an increasing proportion following 
a 1971-72 decline. This represents approximately $28.5 million; and 
generally reflects major improvements to physical plant and new 
construction. However, variations in accounting practices create 
difficulties in analyzing this aggregated figure. In addition,
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carrying, or financing charges are typically not included in such 
figures (nor are imputed rents) so that true capital charges will 
always be understated. Subsequent parts of this study will address 
this problem, but the estimating process is somewhat tedious, 
generally individuated.
The costs of expansion are not trivial; for 1981 a per-bed 
cost (a catchall phrase which encompasses cell, administrative and 
program space, perimeter security, etc.) is estimated at over $70,000 
for medium-security institutions and well over $80,000 for maximum 
security. Financing charges triple or quadruple these bed costs.
3.3. Conclusion
Modern corrections exhibits similarities to and variations 
of the historical visions. On the one hand, the goal of Penn and Rush 
to substitute confinement for death and torture has certainly been 
realized. The goal of repentance and reform through solitude and in­
dustrious labor probably has not. Corrections today may be said to 
have as a goal the policy of reintegration —  less the reform and 
rehabilitation of earlier eras, but the positive re-entry of con­
victed persons into society. The variety of mechanisms to accomplish 
this has expanded from imprisonment to include many forms of community 
supervision. The number of persons under supervision is increasing 
and prison populations represent ever higher rates of incarceration 
per 100,000 population.
Expenditures for corrections totaled $5.5 billion in 1978 for 
which approximately $3.8 billion (70 percent) was expended on the 
22 percent of the population which is incarcerated; 18 percent was
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expended on supervising the remaining population (78 percent) in the 
community. In real terms, the average dollars expended per prisoner 
have been declining since 1973.
Correctional administration has changed markedly over two 
hundred years. Evolving from a system of individual prison fiefdoms 
charged with maintaining order, today's federal and state administra­
tions tend to be centrally organized (the federal system is regionalized 
but has a central office). Chly local corrections still mirrors the 
independent style of yesteryear. Ihe field is becoming professionalized 
and departments of research are becoming more common and frequently do 
more than maintain population statistics. The advent of federal money 
in the 1970s permitted program innovation and evaluation. Cne still 
encounters the range, however, between the pro-active, progressive 
states and those which conduct corrections in less ambitious style.
Ihe concept of the self-supporting prison vanished at the 
turn of the century; since then, functions, populations —  and 
expenditures —  have grown substantially. Prison industries, once 
the vanguard of support, are now under some scrutiny to assess the 
feasibility of making themselves self-supporting. Nationwide, the 
states had 1978 industry gross sales of $233 million but costs 
exceeded revenues for most. In New York State, for example, the
29costs of industries were $13.5 million but revenues were $9.6 million.
A few states are experimenting with subsidies and chargebacks; 
under the first arrangement, states provide a subsidy to localities 
which keep under their jurisdiction persons who otherwise would have 
been committed to state facilities; chargebacks are similar to the
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eighteenth-century practice of assessing local jurisdictions a fee 
for sending convicted persons to the state system.
Two divergent themes reflect corrections today. The first 
is the overall difficulty of providing services in the face of increas­
ing commitments and legislative parsimony. "Cutback management" has 
become a widely voiced, if not widely applied term. The other theme 
is the advent of standards for correctional activities, a sort of 
nationwide professionalization of the field.
While standards in some form have existed for nearly four 
hundred years, in the seventies a national accreditation agency was 
formed to evaluate the conditions, policies and procedures of prisons, 
jails, field and community services. The process is elaborate and 
essentially provides for the usage of the same criteria in assessing 
the various correctional facilities and activities.
Corrections thus faces the twin pressures of budget constraints 
and the need to improve the quality of its output. It is with this in 
mind that we turn to the various contributions of economics in 
analyzing and explaining correctional activities, and the utility of 
such analysis in a public setting.
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Chapter Four
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CORRECTIONS : COST ANALYSIS
4.1 Introduction
Cost analysis has been the most widely utilized application of 
economic analysis to corrections. In a field where, until recently, 
quantitative information on inputs and outputs was virtually unknown 
and -unused, cost analysis has provided decision-relevant information. 
There are four broad types of cost analysis: cost, comparative costs, 
cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit. Cost and comparative cost 
analyses require comprehensive and accurate information about re­
sources —  the input side. COst-effectiveness analysis requires 
identification and specification of outputs, and cost-benefit analysis 
values the outputs and permits comparison with inputs. The most 
powerful policy tool of the cost analyses, cost-benefit analysis has 
not been the most widely utilized technique. The frequence with which 
it is requested in program evaluations and government solicitations 
belie the difficulties associated with applying this technique in a 
corrections setting. Merely specifying the input side has not been 
unproblematical.
Although the prevalence of cost analysis is of recent vintage, 
and use of cost-benefit analysis even more recent and rare, the earlier 
use of this latter technique is worthy of mention. The economics of 
corrections perhaps had its foundation a century and a half ago (as 
we discovered that many "new" ideas in corrections had their origins
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in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries). A scant half-century 
after the beginning of the American prison system, the use of impris­
onment for certain crimes was questioned in a cost-benefit framework. 
While the author, an attorney, may be faulted for not calculating 
marginal costs or estimating future benefits, his work is presented 
here as a real, if lighthearted example of the first use of cost- 
benefit analysis. Even included is also the first known estimate of 
offender opportunity costs.
TABLE 4-1
a/
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF IMPRISONING DEBTORS
Cbsts AC
Apprehension $3.38
Commitment 2.86
Jailer's key fees .40
Filling out citation 1.00
Serving citation 1.25
Justice's fees 1.00
Board ($.25/day x 31 days) 7.75
Value of debtor’s time 
($.50/day x 31 days) 15 .50
TOTAL $33.14
Eenefits
Average debt $5-20
Total actual debt recovered $456.75
Average debt recovered $ 10.62
Benefit-Cost Ratio: $10.62
No. of Cases
43
43
43
= 0.32 
$33.14
_a/ Adapted from Charles Sedgwick, Esq., 1830 letter to Prison
Discipline Society, Reports, Vol. 1 (Boston: 1855), pp. 391-2.
We now turn to more contemporary applications of cost analysis.
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4.2. The Input Side: Cost and Comparati ve Cost Analysis
Correctional inputs are of course not different than inputs 
utilized in any production process. The analytical issue has been to 
identify and correctly evaluate all inputs associated with a particular 
activity in order not to underestimate true costs or to develop a dis­
torted production function (with the concomitant effects on efficiency 
and output levels). Production processes vary according to the activ­
ity under analysis: field or community services, or institutions.
4.2.1. Typology of Costs
A series of cost definitions have been developed specifically
to permit analysis of correctional activities. The perspective is 
economic hut the components specifically relate to corrections 
activities.'*'
4.2.1.1 Criminal Justice System Costs. These include direct outlays
for, or the imputed value of, goods and services provided by:
• Law enforcement agencies;
• Courts;
• Legal services agencies, bureaus or firms;
• Other agencies, organizations or individuals whose 
stated mission could not be carried out if there 
were no crime;
• Activities of organizational units or individuals 
financed by any of the above.
The criminal justice system thus is defined to comprise the activities
and agencies listed above.
Criminal justice system costs may be further subdivided in the
following way:
• Public Expenditures —  direct outlays for, or the 
imputed value of, goods and services provided or 
financed by governmental agencies or units.
• Private Expenditures —  direct outlays for, or the 
imputed value of, goods and services provided or 
financed by non-governmental agencies or units.
4.2.1.2. External Costs. These include direct outlays for, or the 
imputed value of, goods and services provided by all agencies, organ­
izations or individuals external to the criminal justice system 
defined above. External costs, also, may be further subdivided into:
© Public Expenditures —  direct outlays for, or the 
imputed value of, goods and services provided or 
financed by governmental agencies or units. (Examples 
would include: welfare, health, and mental health 
departments or facilities; employment and training 
programs; public schools and departments of education.)
• Private Expenditures —  direct outlays for, or the 
imputed value of, goods and services provided or 
financed by non-governmental agencies or units, e.g., 
private mental health practitioners.
4.2.1.3. Direct and Indirect Costs. The following types of costs 
apply to both criminal justice and external costs when a specific 
"cost objective" is sought, for example, the cost of an activity such 
as citation, arrest, diversion, and so forth.
A fairly simple way to view direct costs is to consider them 
as including personnel expenditures and others directly associated 
with the provision of a specific service to a specific client. For 
example, the salary of a patrol officer issuing citations to specific 
individuals, would be considered a direct cost of the citation activity. 
Likewise, transportation costs incurred in the provision of that 
service would be considered direct costs.
Indirect costs, according to standard federal government
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definitions, include those "(a) incurred for a common or joint purpose
benefiting more than one cost objective, and (b) not readily assignable
to the cost objectives specifically benefited, without effort dispro-
2
portionate to the results achieved."
In terms of this analysis, point (a) includes expenditures for 
items associated with more than one activity, where the specific 
proportion devoted to each is not readily identifiable, e.g., admini­
strative costs. Point (b) above refers to the expenditures that under 
the normal definition would be direct costs hut that are more practi­
cally treated as indirect costs. For relatively self-contained 
activities, such as correctional institutions, most halfway houses, 
and diversion projects, indirect expenses do not play a large role.
Most expenditures for these activities are readily assignable to the 
"cost objective," or activity, in question. It is important to 
emphasize that identifying direct costs of a particular activity and 
indirect costs allocable to that activity are simply means of arriv­
ing at an accurate picture of the activity's total cost, as measured 
in an accounting framework.
4.2.1.4. Opportunity Costs. Hie central concept of economic cost, 
opportunity cost, is a measure of the cost that results from under­
taking one activity and thus foregoing another. Sometimes it is 
directly reflected in resource prices, but sometimes it is necessary 
to develop or modify resource prices. It may be viewed from many 
different levels of resource aggregation. That is, there is an oppor­
tunity cost associated with:
• A single resource which could be used in different 
ways (such as a person who can hold different jobs);
• A set of resources which could be used in alternative
criminal justice activities (such as $10,000 for pre­
trial detention instead of release activities);
• A set of resources which could be used in alternative
criminal justice program areas (such as educational
programs for pretrial instead of post-adjudication 
inmates);
• A set of resources which could be used in alternative 
public activities (such as government doctors for 
criminal justice instead of public health programs);
• A set of resources which could be used in public or 
private activities (such as $10 million in loans to 
build a correctional institution instead of private 
homes).
From the perspective of a single resource which could be used 
in different ways, one measure of the opportunity cost of an inmate in 
pretrial detention is the productivity of his labor that is foregone; 
or, the opportunity cost of using a person to teach inmates is the 
teaching (or other tasks) he or she might have performed elsewhere.
At the level of alternative pretrial activities, the opportunity cost 
of using a set of resources to perform one particular activity (for 
example, detaining accused persons) can be considered the result or 
product that could be obtained from using those same (or smaller) 
resources in other types of pretrial activities (such as diversion or 
release on recognizance). At other levels of resource use suggested 
in the list above, individual pretrial activities, or pretrial activ­
ities as a group, can be compared to other criminal justice activities, 
or non-governmental activities.
In all of these comparisons, if the opportunity cost (that is, 
the product of the activity foregone) is greater than the product of 
the activity undertaken, there is a loss or "cost" to society above 
and beyond the types of costs described earlier. Ibis loss to society
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is a social cost attributable to undertaking the activity whose pro­
ductivity is lower. The question of how to define and measure pro­
ductivity (or more important, relative productivity) becomes a major 
problem when the analysis moves from the level of individual resources 
to criminal justice activities whose "products" are differentially 
defined as deterrence, rehabilitation and so forth, by policy-makers 
and analysts.
4.2.2. Decisions Using Cost and Comparative Cost Analysis
These analyses, as indicated, are useful when only knowledge 
of inputs is necessary to the decision or planning process. Examples 
of such decisions include the implementation of standards to improve 
the conduct of correctional activities. Here, the output is somewhat 
specified by the content of the standards, but does not constitute an 
integral part of the analysis. We assume, rather, that agencies are 
interested in the new resources and attendant costs of correctional 
change. Other scenarios include jurisdictions interested in the true 
costs of conducting correctional activities or internal analyses of 
fixed and variable costs. Comparative cost studies involve analysis 
of alternatives: prison vs. community treatment; residential vs. 
nonresidential care; alternative procedures for carrying out criminal 
justice functions (e.g., citation vs. arrest, traditional vs. inten­
sive probation caseloads, diversion vs. pretrial detention).
4.2.2.1. Considerations in the Analysis. The typology of costs pre­
sented above outlined the range of costs which must be considered for 
accurate analysis. Each analysis will exhibit its own variation on 
that generalized typology; jail costs may only include items related
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to operations and capital construction, while an analysis of a diversion 
program would include external, community-incurred costs; an analysis 
of prisons might include the opportunity cost of land and physical 
plant.
Budget, or expenditure analysis will ordinarily constitute the 
first step in discerning costs. Object-of-expenditure or method-of- 
payment budgets confound the analysis; program budgets help but still 
may not allocate administrative or other indirect costs. Some costs 
may appear in other agency budgets or be shared with other operating 
units. Often an activity's cost will be subsumed within a larger 
entity and cost allocation or application of surrogate or proxy 
measures will be necessary.
There are available manuals on budgeting and cost analysis as 
well as extensive technical narratives within actual studies.^ The 
intent here is not to reproduce the detail of the various analytical 
procedures but rather to highlight the caveats to assure appropriate 
evaluation of finished studies.
4.2.3. Types of Analysis
As suggested above, the detail and types of costs to be examin­
ed will be determined in large part by the policy decision being 
informed. Providing an overview of costs may supply a sense of magni­
tude to the just curious; while more detailed, carefully drawn infor­
mation will be necessary to inform a specific decision. Aggregated 
analysis, such as the cost of crime nationwide (see Appendix A) may 
be useful for national priority setting, but wauld be of little use 
to a correctional decision-maker.
4.2.3.1. Techniques. At a fairly aggregated level, some techniques 
for performing cost analysis are presented below. These techniques 
are notable because they produced cost information in an area which had 
never been analyzed —  correctional standards. As such, they provided 
valuable data to corrections decision-makers interested in the general 
impact of standards and produced national, or aggregated data on the
4
resource implications of change. Originally performed in 1974, the
research has been upgraded recently to include evaluation of assump-
5
tion and revision of dollar estimates. The cost estimates, while pre­
pared from nationwide data, are presented for "typical" subunits or 
jurisdictions and have utility for general planning purposes. Che 
technique, sample budgeting, was used to produce resource and cost
information for halfway houses and pretrial diversion programs conform-
£
ing to National Advisory Commission Correctional Standards. No 
single organization studied was providing all the services suggested 
in the standards, nor was all necessary cost information available in 
one setting. Essentially a composite, based on actual, comparable 
operating entities, was constructed, which illustrated ranges both for 
services provision and cost. Table 4-2 illustrates the results of the 
sample budget technique, with a comparison of basic and comprehensive 
services for halfway houses. Other hybrids (e.g., basic services plus 
community resource referral) are not included but fall within the 
upper and lower bounds of the table. Table 4-3 provides another 
example of a sample budget for an employment diversion activity.
Model budgeting was developed for cases in which the proposed 
activities so differ from existing practices that actual or sample 
budgets would yield misleading information on resources and costs.
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TABLE 4-2
a/SAMPLE BUDGETS, HALFWAY HOUSES, 1978—'
Item
Personnel
Salaries and Wages 
Director 
Asst. Director 
Counselors 
Night Counselor 
P-T Counselor 
Secretary/Bookkeeper 
Housekeeper/Cook 
Fringe Benefits (19%) 
Total
Other Costs 
Professional fees & svcs. 
Travel
Kent/Rental equiv. 
Maintenance 
Utilities 
Conmuni cations 
Supplies 
Food 
Other 
Total
Total Operating Costs 
Annual Client Cost (18) 
Dailv Client Cost
Basic Services 
Average Cost
$ 18,142 
14,154 
12,112 (1) 
11,038 (1) 
4,660 (1)
8,605 
7,874 
14,554 
$ 91,139
$ 3,456 
3,595 
11,644
2,600
4,402 
2,094 
2,913
17,822 
1,883 
? 50,409
$141,548 
$ 7,364 
$ 21.54
Comprehensive Services 
Average Cost_____
$ 18,142
1 4 ’15 4  V /
44,713 2/ 
11,033 (1) 
9,320 (2)
8,605 
7,374 
21,633 
$135,479
3,456 
4,064 , 
12,316 £f
2,600
4,402 
2,460 
3,295
17,822 
' 1,883 
"$ 52*798
$188,277 
$ 10,460 
$ 28.66
a/ Source: Original Fbrk, Donald J. Thalheimer, Cost Analysis of
Correctional Standards: Halfway Houses (Washington, D.C.; 1975), 
updated by Funke and Ways on, 1979. 
b/ Three counselors and psychologist, 
c/ Includes equipment 0 $1,172.
TABLE 4-3
3 /
SAMPLE BUDGET, EMPLOYMENT DIVERSION, 1978—
Item
Personnel
Salaries and Wages 
Administrator 
Job Developer 
Counselors 
Screeners 
Data Analyst 
Se ere tary/Receptionist 
Accountant 
Fringe Benefits (19%)
Overtime
Total
Other Costs 
Professional Fees and Services 
Travel
Pent, Utilities and Maintenance 
Coirmunications 
Supplies 
Adminis tration 
Duplication 
Clients Emergency Fund 
Other 
Total
Total Operating Costs 
Average Client Costs .
Design Capacity (260)
Actual Clients (250)
Successful Clients (200)
Average Cost
$ 22,778 (1)
13,529 (1)
92,211 (7)
37,007 (3)
16,781 (1)
10,144 (1)
8,158 (1/2)
38,124
1,513
$240,245
$ 2,143
10,664
19,762
5,960
10,120
9,976
1,700
5,671 *
3,963
5 70,959
$311,204
$ 1,197/vear $3.28/day 
$ 1,245/year $3.41/day 
$ 1,556
a/ Source: Original Wbfk, Ann M. Whtkins, Cost Analysis of
Correcticnal Standards: Pretrial Diversion (Vfashington, D.C. 
1975) , updated by Funke and Wars on,' 1979.
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Cost estimation is thus performed in a more indirect manner than the
7
usual examination of existing budgets and expenditures. This technique 
has been used to analyze the resource implications of standards for
g
probation and pretrial services. The basic procedure involves pre­
cisely describing the functions of an organizational entity and then 
estimating the personnel and other resource units required to carry 
out these functions. In the case of probation, for example, the num­
ber of probationers, services required and the time and other resources 
necessary to provide these services would be ascertained. Ibis is 
calculated for each procedure, using survey techniques to determine 
the actual time and type of resource required. Support and super­
visory staff and other resources are determined once the line staff 
complement has been identified. Figure 4-1 illustrates work unit 
values for probation functions and Table 4-4 presents a model budget 
for probation services.
The differential cost technique has the most utility for 
comparisons of different activities designed to achieve similar ends.
The procedures associated with each activity are identified; procedures
common to all activities and clients are excluded from the analysis; 
side effects, or externalities associated with new procedures are 
added to the analysis. This technique has been used to estimate the 
costs of utilizing less drastic interventions in lieu of pretrial
9
arrest and detention —  field citations and summons. In this case 
the common desired outcome is appearance in court. The method may 
be expressed thus:
n
Cbst of Activity j = ^ (C. x F.)
L 1 x'
i=l
Where:
Activity j = one of the alternative procedures, 
in the example, traditional arrest, 
field citation, stationhouse citation;
C  = average cost/person for a procedure i 
required under activity j;
F. = case flow exposed to procedure i under 
activity j; and
i = procedures to which equal numbers of 
persons would not be exposed under all 
alternatives, i.e., procedures unique 
to one or mjge but less than all
activities.
Figure 4-2 illustrates the potential case flow, nationwide, 
for utilization of alternatives to arrest. Table 4-5 indicates the 
case flows and, resources, times and costs for the various procedures, 
fora "typical" jurisdiction.
Much of the good or useful work in the field is notable either 
for comprehensiveness and accuracy or for unique approach, as the 
analytical techniques discussed above. The bibliography contains more 
extensive references; selected studies are reviewed here to illustrate 
methodology, analytical detail and interesting results. Because the 
general technique/is essentially cost-input analysis, the reviewed 
work is arrayed by topical area, with the exception of opportunity 
cost.
4.2.3.2. State Corrections. A detailed study of the cost of correc­
tions in one state has been conducted by McDonald.^ He encountered 
substantial problems in the analysis, including indivisibility in 
expenditures and poor reporting and accounting: " . . .  one correc­
tions agency in New York which spends over $100 million a year has not
12issued an annual report in over a decade." Costs of many agencies
FIGURE 4-1
cl/Service Structure and Work Unit Values, Probation—
Services to Probationers
Probation Processing 
and Reporting
• regular terminations
.25 hrs./case
• early completion
.40 hrs./case
• revocation 6.5 hrs./case
PreSentence Investigation 
and Reporting
• short form 4.5 hrs./case
• long form 7.5 hrs./case
PROBATION ATMENISTRATICN
Services to the Courts
Needs
Assessment
4.5 hrs./case
Supervision
• minimum .75 hrs./case/mo.
• medium/low 1.50 hrs./
case/mo.
• medium high 2.00 hrs./
case/mo.
• maximum 3.00 hrs*/
case/vcd
a/ Source: Donald J. Thalheimer, Cost Analysis of Correctional Standards: Conraunity Service
(Washington, D.C.: 1977) .(adaptation by author) .
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TABLE 4-4
MODEL BUDGET, PROBATION SERVICES, 1978-/ 
(typical jurisdiction of 700,000 population)
Item Average Cost
Personnel
Salaries and Wages 
Director $ 20,757 (1)
Supervisors 161,773 (10)
Probation Officers 742,632 (60)
Support Staff 204,970 (28)
Fringe Benefits (19%) 214,725
Total $1,344,857
Other Costs
Professional fees and services $ 23,993
Travel 24,734
Rent, Utilities, Maintenance 65,314
Ccmnunications 20,840
Supplies 21,454
Administration 112,325
Training 12,481
Other 10,888
Total ? 292,029
Total Operating Costs $1,636,886 '
Average Costs^
Minimum Supervision $12.53/mo. $150.30/year
Medium Supervision $31.96/mo. $383.50/year
Maximum Supervision' $50.07/mo. $600.87/year
a/ Source: Original work, Donald J. Thalheimer, Cost Analysis of
Correctional Standards: Connunity Supervision (Tfeshington, D.C.
1977), updated by Funke and Wayson, 1979. 
b/ Based cm average caseload of 71, with 2/3 of probation officer 
time spent in this function.
FIGURE 4-2
Case Flow Used for Analysis of Citation Activities Nationwide, 1977—'1
Total Annual 
Arrests
10,189,900
Eligible for Citation
19.30% of 
Annual Arrests 
1,966,651
Not Released
45% of Eligibles
884,993
PetainecT]-
Released
55% of Eli,sables 
1,081,658
Appear in 
Court 
 3s---
Fail to Appear Once
11.1% of Released
Stationhouse Citation 
50% of Released
540,829
Field Citation 
50% of Released
540.829
Fail to Appear Tfoice 
3.9% of Releasees 
42,185
a/ Source: Original Tfork, Susan Ifeisberg, Cost Analysis of Correctional Standards: Alternatives
to Arrest (Washington, D.C., 1975): upgraded by author, 1979.
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TABLE 4-5
COSTS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE FUNCTIONS, 1978-/
("typical" urban county)
No.of AC/ Total
Activity/Procedure Clients Resource Time Accused Costs
Citation
Field 620 Patrol 15" 3.15 1,953
Stationhouse 620 Patrol 30" 6.30 3,906
Bookings 10,122 Patrol 75" 15.75 159,422
Detention 2,807 Patrol 7.5" 1.58 4,435
Detention 6’ 5,88 16,505
Failures to Appear
#1 138 Patrol 30" 6.30 869
#2 48 Patrol 13" 2.73 131
Magistrate 30" 14.62 702
Prosecutor 30" 11.10 533
P. Defender 30" 13.09 628
a/ Source: Original 'work, Susan Tfeisberg, Alternatives to Arrest
C-feshington, D.C.: 1975); updated by Funke and Wayson, 1979.
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were found buried in the accounts of others; the budget for the New 
York City Department of Correction reflected less than two-thirds of 
total 1978 jail outlays. "In short, the accounts in most states do 
not readily reveal how much money taxpayers spend on criminal justice 
and corrections.
McEbnald's study protocol included site visits and numerous 
meetings with officials to collect and analyze expenditure data.
(Ihis continues to be the best assurance of accurate, complete analysis 
of a fragmented system.) In aggregated terms, the study found 1978 
expenditures on state and local corrections to be $600 million, while 
another $2.2 billion was expended on other functions of the criminal 
justice system. These figures and those that appear subsequently in 
the text are among the most carefully derived ever obtained for a state 
correction system. Some major findings:
• Prison expenditures are 30 percent higher than 
correctional budgets indicate. Fringe'benefits, 
retirement, some psychiatric services and drug 
programs are funded from other accounts. Federal 
grants comprise nearly $5 million of the $285.5 
billion estimated in the study.
• Incarceration costs vary widely —  from $9,500 to 
$39,000 per prisoner year. Smaller, lower-security 
prisons tend to have higher costs than more traditional, 
large institutions.
• Staff-inmate ratios increase as security levels 
decrease; overall security represents 50 percent of 
all costs.
• Prisoner programs account for 10 percent of all 
expenditures.
• It was impossible, given present reporting systems,
to determine a statewide cost per client for probation 
services. In New York City the cost ranged between 
$260 - $285/year.
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• The cost of holding a prisoner in a local jail is 
$38/day outside few York City. The cost is $68/day 
in New York City.
The study's impact is muted only by its failure to include
allowances for capital charges, although the new bed cost figures
($70 - $90,000) are consistent with other new work and financing
charges are discussed; and by lacking a mechanism to separate costs
by factor of production within function. Fringe benefits for the
state are not reported in corrections expenditures and they could not
be overlaid on personnel costs, yet they constitute a sizeable $9/day/
inmate. Table 4-6 presents 1978 corrections costs in New YGrk State
by function. The distribution of average inmate costs provides a
sense of the importance of various functions in correctional thinking.
The appropriation for drug abuse treatment, for example, was $.01/day
for every inmate in the system. Since only 562 prisoners were admitted
to the treatment program, the expenditure for each of these inmates
was $.36/day. But 11,450 prisoners had been identified as narcotics
addicts prior to their incarceration. Outside grant monies were, how-
14ever, available to the drug program.
4.2.3.3. County Corrections. A more modest analysis of the real oper­
ating costs of a county house of corrections was conducted by the
15author five years before McDonald's work. As with the McDonald study, 
it was found that the presence of external costs caused actual operating 
costs to greatly exceed those reported in the corrections budget —  in 
this case by 28 percent. The budgets also confounded capital charges 
and non-capital costs, further distorting daily operating costs. A 
unique feature of this study was the estimation of the opportunity
106
TABLE 4-6
PRISON EXPENDITURES BY FUNCTION, NEW YORK STATE, 1978^
Annual Cost Daily Cost/ 
Function Total Cost Inmate k/ Inmate
S ecuritv
Guarding Prisoners $109,918,691 $ 5,795 $15.88
Emergency Units 39,681 0 .20
Uniforms 1,403,479 74 .005
Identification & MLsc 96,472 5 .01
Administration£/ 23,354,858 1,231 3.37
Plant Operations 24,396,206 1,286 3.52
Prisoner Processing 1,455,655 77 .21
Prisoner Necessities
Food Prep & Service 12,638,535 666 1.83
Health Services 10,098,956 532 1.46
Recreation 2,113,188 111 .31
Wages 3,231,743 170 .47
MLsc. (laundry,
clothing, etc.) 5,951,207 314 .86
Programs
Coordination 5,364,648 283 ' .77
Psycho- therapeutic 1,866,635 98 .27
Drug 75,000 4 .01
Academic Education 6,653,419 351 .96
Vocational Education 5,295,095 279 .76
Religious 1,344,850 71 .19
Tenp. Release & MLsc. 1,529,134 81 .22
Prison Indus triesjV 4,403,075 232 .64
Other 555,069 29 .08
Fringe Benefits 60,326,732 3,180 8.71
Total §272,112,328 $14,346 $39.30
a/ Source: Douglas McDonald, The Price of Punishment: Public
Spending for Correct ions in New York (Boulder, OP; l9#0), Tables 
z.4, 2.7, 2.8,2.9, 2.10.; Capital Charges not included, 
b/ All estimates (except prison industries) based on 1977-78 state 
population of 18,968. 
c/ Includes central office as well as facility administrative 
expenses. 
d/ Expenditures net of revenues.
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costs of land and facilities (see later discussion). The analysis is 
conducted with the same detail as McDonald's; its modesty arises from 
the fact that it was a single operating unit, although combined with 
a jail which created some allocation problems.
The impact of excluding capital charges but incorporating non­
reported costs is indicated in Table 4- 7. The study methodology re­
sembled McDonald's, including extensive on-site survey work. It might 
be mentioned in passing that this study was commissioned by a state 
department of corrections which had an interest in buying and operating 
the facility. The county, before contemplating sale, was interested 
in knowing what its corrections operation was costing and what the 
worth of the facility was. Aside from public hearings, to date, action 
has yet to be taken.
4.2.3.4. Correctional Standards. A 1979 study identified for the
16
first time, state costs for compliance with correctional standards.
The analysis was conducted in five states involved in the accreditation 
process of the American Correctional Association Standards. Since 
these standards will be the ones by which most states will abide, the 
analysis was intended to produce interest beyond the subset examined. 
Protocol followed the studies above, except in this case, marginal 
costs were of interest. It was not possible to use statistical cost 
functions, both because of the snail number of organizational subunits 
and because the focus was on incremental costs associated with new, 
rather than existing, activities. An added feature of the work was 
the development of detailed architectural costs for renovation and 
new construction. Traditionally these figures have been more elusive
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TABLE 4-7
EFFECT OF COST ANALYSIS ON LOCAL BUDGETS^
ADC
Cost Component___________________ Total Cost______(or change)
Original HOC Budget */
Adjusted HOC Budget (capital excluded)
$2,131,458
2,064,458
$25.84
25.02
Jail Staff 
2 Senior C.O. $27,223 
9 C.O. 93,986
121,209 1.47
Fringe Benefits 
Medical 63,753 
Retirement 98,539
162,292 1.97
Food Services 69,692 .84
Transportation 29,106 .35
Sheriff (5(X= of time)
Salary 10,700 
Fringes 1,131
11,831 .14
Total $2,458,588 $29.80
Administrative Overhead 45,552 .55
TOTAL CURRENT COSTS $2,504,140 $30.36
Federally Finded Programs 228,997 2.78
ESTIMATED FUTURE COSTS $2,733,137 $33.13
a/ Source: Billy L. Way son, Gail S. Funke and Thomas A. Henderson
A Model for Policy Analysis Training. (Washington, DC: L.E.A.A.,
1978).
b/ HOC: House of Corrections.
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to derive than operating costs, usually being presented in gross, un­
detailed form.
Total compliance costs for the five states were prepared by
standard (465 standards for adult institutions alone), organizational
subunit (prisons, parole, community facilities), and major item-of-
expenditure (capital and non-capital). Estimated costs were $85
million in 1978 dollars for the five states, of which $16 million was
for annual operations and $60 million was for capital charges for plant 
17and equipment. It is doubtful that actual outlays will approach
these figures since 100 percent compliance is not a requirement of
the accreditation process. In addition, compliance is idiosyncratic
and different jurisdictions will have varying interpretations of the
content of the standards and the resources required for compliance.
However, the knowledge of implementation costs, particularly in the
detail provided in the study, is expected to have utility in the
planning process. The concept of systems planning, mentioned earlier,
is facilitated by an analysis which aggregates not only by facility
but across standards category (e.g., education, training, etc.).
Table 4-8 provides an excerpt of the compliance costs for one state.
Although the project findings highlighted the deteriorating capital
stock of correctional institutions, not included in these estimates
are ongoing renovation and construction exceeding $100 million. In
addition, these states received $39.9 million in L.E.A.A. monies for
correctional improvement from 1971 to 1978 which must- be considered
18as additional outlays associated with standards compliance.
A 1975 study of jails identified local costs for compliance 
with state-promulgated jail standards. Again, the only work on a
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TABLE 4-8
COMPLIANCE COSTS— PERSONNEL— SELECTED STANDARDS 
CANON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, COLORADO, 1979-
Standard Short Personnel
No. Description Type Time Total
Special Management Inmates i i
4210E Visitation Privileges— Corr. Supv. .8 FIE —' $74,920
Segregation Corr. Officer
Step 4 1.6 FIE
Corr. Techni­
cian .8 FEE
Corr. Officer
Step 4 .8 FEE
4213E Segregation—  shave/ Corr. Officer
shower Step 4 .4 FIE 40,502
Corr. Officer
Step 4 2.0 FIE
4214E Segregation— laundry,
hair, etc.
Barber Shop Corr. Supv. 1.0 FEE 27,824
Laundry Corr. Officer
Step 4 .2 FEE
4216E Legal Materials LawLibrarian .9 FIE 19,800
(Lib II Sten 4)
4217E Reading Materials Lib II Step 4 .3 FEE 6,600
4222E Psychological Assess­
ment Psychiatrist 1.0 FEE 46,528
Sanitation, Safety and Hygiene
4246E Special clothing—
kitchen
4249E Daily Clothing Exchange
Medical and Health Care Services
4253ET. Madical/ttental Svcs. Dentist 1.0 FEE 74,329
Dental Asst. 2.0 FIE
Oral Hygienist 1.0 FIE
4264E Records Clerical 1.0 FEE 10,769
4279E Psychiatric Consulta­
tion Psychiatrist .56 FIE 28,082
a/ Source: Gail S. Funke, Cost Analysis of Correctional Standards:
Colorado. (Alexandria, VA: IEPS,1980). 
b/ FTE = Full-time equivalent.
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statewide basis, a compliance cost of over $60 million was estimated
19for 45 jails to conform to a set of 248 standards. The analysis
highlighted the problems of gathering accurate and complete local data
and the disproportionately high compliance costs for very small jails,
both for operations and capital improvements. A feature which confounds
the economist's need for clearly specified outputs in order to ascertain
the inputs necessary to achieve them is the often vague content of
standards; e.g., standard 32: "Staff shall be constantly alert to
prisoner depression, family rejection, loneliness, resistance to
staff or programs, and the effects of use of substances prohibited
20by facility rules or law." The methodology of the study involved
an in-depth, case study approach for a sample of the jails to determine
deficiencies and compliance resources. Extrapolation, with indexes
21and weighted averages was used to derive costs for all jails.
Policy recommendations emanating from this work included study of 
regional jails and cessation of the jail function in small jurisdictions.
4.2.3.5. Opportunity Cost. Opportunity cost analyses are seldom per­
formed in corrections and usually not as a separate effort. Yet, as 
discussed above, the concept is a critical one for many aspects of 
corrections. Two contributions are discussed here which touch on 
sensitive areas: the foregone producitvity of incarcerated prisoners, 
and the"value" of prison land and physical plant.
The value of foregone productivity due to incarceration is of 
interest from society's perspective because of the loss of goods and 
services not produced and taxes paid. In addition, the figures have 
utility for cost-benefit analyses addressing the costs of incarceration.
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While not estimated here, there are additional burdens of public
assistance and deterioration of family and communityfies • in 1973
Singer estimated the value of foregone productivity and the analysis
22was repeated with more recent data in 1979. Essentially, the method­
ology involved appplying data on the characteristics of the inmate 
population (job type, educational level) to occupational categories 
with earnings weighted by educational attainment. Allowances were 
then made for ex-offender unemployment rates and participation in prison 
work programs to develop a net figure. Client-provided information 
might be less than fully accurate but this is probably more than com­
pensated for by indirectly valuing the institutional work at "outside" 
rather than prison wages. Table 4-9 presents estimates for 1978 of 
foregone productivity, per inmate year and nationwide.
The opportunity costs for prison site and facilities were
23developed as part of an overall study on local correctional costs.
They illustrate the use of multiple data sources to produce an approx­
imation for a 300-bed institution. Essentially, the land (368 acres) 
was valued at its best alternative use —  rural residential housing; 
and insurance estimates were used to estimate building value. The 
equipment value was included as well because of the state’s contem­
plated purchase. Table 4—10 illustrates the costs for the house of 
correction, including an estimate of foregone tax revenue.
This section has summarized in varying degrees of detail a 
selection of contributions of cost analysis for correctional functions 
nationwide, as well as state and local analyses. Contributory method­
ologies were discussed, and exhibits from much of the work were 
presented to convey a sense of the detail and findings. The
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TABLE 4-9
FOREGONE INMATE PRODUCTIVITY, 1978^
State
Estimation Institutions
A. Potential Productivity per 
Inmate Year (assuming zero 
unemployment)
B. Unemployment Allowance 
(A x .15)
C. Allowance for Inmate Involve­
ment in Institutional 
Maintenance Work (A x .10)
D. Allowance for Inmate Involve­
ment in Prison Industries 
Vocational Training and Work 
Release ($6,554 x .33)
E. Estimated Foregone Productivity 
per Inmake Year (A-(B4C+D)) 6,384
F. Total Population (276,799)
G. Estimated Foregone Productivity 
Nationwide (E x F) $1,767,091,200
a/ Source: Original work: Neil M. Singer, The Value of Inmate
Manpower. (Washington, DC: American Bar Association, 1973) —  
and Virginia B. Wright, Cbst Analysis of Correctional Standards: 
Institutional-Based Programs and Parole. (Washington, DC;, 1976, 
updated fcy author. Potential productivity estimates of state 
prison inmates and expected annual earnings fcy job classification. 
No separate data were available for jail inmates.
$12,703
1,905
1,270
3,144
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TABLE 4-10
OPPORTUNITY COSTS, COUNTY HOUSE OF CORRECTIONS^
Total Value
Land
Prison (178 acres x $5,000) $ 590,000
Free (190 acres x $5,000) $ 950,000
Building^/ $ 9,021,000
Equipmentk/ $ 224,000
Total one-time Costs $11,085,000
Tax Revenue 
A. Free land
No. Residential units 150
Value of Lot & House $ 30,000
Tax Rate
($174/1,000 x .28) $ 1,462
Foregone
Annual tax Revenue $ 219,300
B. Prison land
No. Residential units 140
Foregone annual
tax revenue $ 204,680
a/ Sources: Gail S. Furike and Billy L. Wayson, Comparative Costs of State
and Local Facilities (Washington, D.C.: American Bar Association,
1975) and Carl W. Nelson (in Chapman and Nelson), A Handbook of 
Cost Benefit Techniques and Applications (Ifeshington, D.C.: American 
Bar Association, 1975). 
b/ Average of estimates obtained by county officials and insurance 
companies.
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following section addresses outputs through the perspective of cost- 
effectiveness and cost-benefit analysis.
4.3. The Output Side: Cost-Effectiveness and Cost-Benefit Analysis
These techniques address both inputs and outputs and thus pos­
ses greater sophistication and analytical force than cost analysis. 
Externalities gain importance here, particularly in cost-benefit anal­
ysis, as we are looking for positive outcome effects (e.g., lifetime 
earnings enhanced by a training program) as well as unplanned effects, 
such as costs borne by non-criminal justice agencies, citizens, and 
others. These analytical techniques had their primary origins in the 
systems analysis of defense projects. There exist elaborate techniques 
for conducting such analysis, which have yet to be applied to correc­
tional activities. Dozens of cost and effectiveness categories and
24ratio criteria have been developed for military systems and subsystems.
While our cost categories remain those outlined above and 
effectiveness categories will continue to stress program time, recid­
ivism, and employment as achieved by alternative endeavors, some 
general criteria on how to proceed are directly comparable, however, 
and worthy of mention here.
Kazanowski has outlined a "standardized approach for conducting 
cost-effectiveness evaluations. While more elaborate (i.e., "advanced 
systems") than correctional methodologies, there is certainly agree­
ment that all cost-effectiveness analysis must begin with:
• common, identifiable goals;
• alternative means for attaining goals;
25
• observable constraints for limiting the analyses.
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These analyses always deal with choice, and the use of economic tech­
niques to clarify and inform the choice. This is true whether or not 
a decision to alter existing situations is actually made.
Kazanowski further points out that problems in the analysis 
usually arise from poor specification of the effectiveness, rather than 
the cost side. It is necessary to specify the measures of effective­
ness; then, one may proceed to the next stage: selecting either the 
fixed cost or fixed effectiveness approach. (Or in the economist's 
parlance, C, Q variable or Q, C variable.) Formats for displaying data 
are usually developed at this stage. Cne step which is recommended
but not usually undertaken in correctional cost-effectiveness is sensi- 
26tivity analysis. For our purpose this would ordinarily constitute 
a closer examination of the assumptions and the techniques used to 
evaluate client outcomes. Sensitivity analysis is critical in all 
types of cost-benefit analysis and in any cost-effectiveness analysis 
where present value is being estimated. Its use is far from limited 
to present value, however, since varying assumptions about crime levels, 
costs of crime, external effects, averted criminal justice system 
events and costs and so forth all will affect the analytical results.
4.3.1. Decisions Using Cost-Bffectiveness and Cost-Benefit Analysis
These analyses are most useful for decisions about the effects 
of a given set of activities or the impact of a set of resources and 
production process. Cost-effectiveness is most helpful in cases where 
the outputs or outcomes are similar, e.g., reduced recidivism, job 
placement, crime-free days, etc. If it is assumed that community 
corrections, probation and prisons are producing similar outputs,
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and cost is the decision criterion, then cost-effectiveness is the 
appropriate analysis. When outputs are dissimilar (or do not share 
total commonality), when externalities are expected to play a major 
role, or when several groups are impacted, then cost-benefit analysis 
is more appropriate. Also, this analysis is highly useful to evaluate 
a single project either before commencement or before continuance to 
determine whether the worth received merits the outlay. In correctional 
practice, most cost-benefit analyses are performed on existing programs 
rather than at the pre-program stage. At a time when little was known 
about recidivism, an experimental design which utilized a control group 
was necessary to produce estimates such as averted crime and earnings 
benefits. We may be approaching the stage where prior research findings 
may be used in cost-benefit analysis of contemplated programs.
The sensitivity of cost-benefit results to their assumptions 
and the number and dispersion of benefits and costs suggests that this 
type of analysis be conducted only when adequate resources are avail­
able and the results are critical to the decision-making process. We 
begin with cost-effectiveness analysis, which identifies and quantifies 
outputs but does not value them separately. In other words, outputs 
or outcomes are evaluated solely in terms of the inputs used to produce 
them, whereas cost-benefit analysis extends the analysis and examines 
the dollar value of benefits against the dollar value of costs. In 
some cases of cost-effectiveness analysis, it may be assumed that, for 
example, a group of community providers produce equivalent client 
services and the variations in production costs are of interest. In 
other cases, alternatives may produce different levels of outputs or 
outcomes and the interest is in the "price" of these.
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4.3.1.1. A Prototype. Che feature of cost-effectiveness analysis is
that it permits a pricing of outputs in terms of the inputs used to
produce them. Comparable input costs, e.g., on a daily basis, cease
to be con par able if one alternative has a longer program time to achieve
a presumably similar outcome. The client costs, in other words, may
differ and a five-year probation term may not compare well on cost
grounds with a one-year term in a community facility with higher daily
costs. This focus also permits a quasi-output cost to be generated by
summing the total inputs per client experience. This quasi-cost may
be modified if outcomes vary between treatments. Gray, Conover and
Hennessey analyzed cost-effectiveness concepts for correctional alter-
27natives xn Minnesota and produced findings utilizing these concepts. 
Their conceptual framework is ullustrated below:
Concept
Example
Cost Measure
FIGURE 4-3
a/Cost-Effectiveness Concepts—'
Tasks, Cbjectives,
Activities Intermediate 
Products
Counseling
Inputs
Cbst-Effectiveness Cost/day 
Measure
Treatment
CXjtputs 
Cost/case
Goals, Final 
Products
Reduced
Recidivism
CXitcomes
Cost/reduced arrest
a/ Source: Charles M. Gray, C. Johnston, and Timothy M. Hennessey,
"Cbst-Effectiveness of Residential Community Corrections," 
Evaluation Quarterly, vol. 2, No. 3 (August, 1978) (adaptation).
Outputs and outcomes are valued according to the input costs 
necessary to achieve them. As such, they provide the framework within
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which a corrections agency could reallocate its resources, if, for 
example, reduced arrests at lowest "cost" was its goal.
The authors developed seriousness indices for crimes and sever­
ity indices for sentences to qualify their outcomes. Ihis technique 
greatly enchances validity but is not widely utilized. They found wide 
variation in client costs, from $3/day for adult probation to $34/day 
in halfway houses to $60/day for maximum-security facilities. Included 
in the input side were costs of other community agencies accepting 
correctional client referrals —  a feature which enhances the explana­
tory power of the figures. Detail on capital charges was sketchy, 
however, and it is unclear whether they were imputed for all alterna­
tives. Output costs (costs per case) did not reveal a consistently 
less-expensive setting; variations in length of stay make these results 
very sensitive. A very short stay at a training center produced the 
lowest cost per case for adults, whereas for juveniles, institutional­
ization or probation or parole are less costly than community treatment 
only in the very short run. Ibis finding held when analyzing outcomes
as well. In the short and long-run, however, community corrections is
28more cost-effective than institutions. The study results produced 
some policy options, such as increasing the occupancy rates in resi­
dential facilities (to reduce average costs), reducing lengths of stay 
and increasing client-staff ratios in the least cost-effective options. 
More research would be necessary to test the effect of these recom­
mendations on recidivism. Ihe study is probably most useful in pro­
viding a framework for future cost-effectiveness analysis.
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4.3.1.2. Community Corrections. A fairly complete cost-effectiveness
analysis was performed for community corrections and its alternatives 
29in Iowa. Lancaster used a risk-seriousness scale for crime and two- 
and-three-year follow-ups. Regression analysis was used to estimate 
client cost functions for prison, probation, jails and a community 
program. Using a limited sample, the study found that community 
corrections was:
• more cost-effective than the men's reformatory;
» less cost-effective than probation;
9 equally cost-effective with the jails in the short run.
For a two-year follow-up, community corrections becomes equally
cost-effective with probation and more cost-effective than jail.
Risk and seriousness proved to be better predictors of follow-up cost
than program (case) cost."^
Cost-effectiveness analysis may, as mentioned, be used to
compare a group of "similar" providers and examine their input costs.
A recent study examined 28 private sector organizations providing
31services to released offenders in one state. Regression analysis 
was used to test for significant differences between providers but 
residential status proved to be the only explanatory variable. It 
was then possible to examine the 12 residential and 16 nonresidential 
agencies from a cost-effectiveness perspective. Since only sketchy and 
poorly defined outcome data were available, the evaluation examined the 
relationship between input costs and intermediate outputs (service 
units). The analysis was presented in terms of a series of ratios, 
which, in effect compared the agencies with each other on a number 
of scales. Table 4-11 indicates the disparity of performance on
TABLE 4-11
CDST-EFFECITVENESS MEASURES, OCMMJITY CORRECTIONS PROVIEERSa
Agency^
Index: Client Index: Service Index: Service Index SU Index SU
Costs (CC)c Units (SU)C Unit Cost (SC)c Index CC Index SC
Rl 3.64 1.07 2.65 0.29 0.40
R2 1.34 1.07 0.97 0.80 1.10
R3 0.39 0.32 0.94 0.82 0.34
R4 1.32 1.49 0.70 1.13 2.13
R5 0.92 1.62 0.45 1.76 3.60
R6 0.45 1.22 0.30 2.71 4.07
R7 0.51 0.22 1.82 0.43 0.12
R8 1.08 0.53 1.60 0.49 0.33
R9 0.57 1.10 0.40 1.93 2.75
RIO 0.44 1.72 0.21 3.91 8.19
NRl 0.33 1.65 0.08 5.00 20.63
NR2 0.33 2.06 0.07 6.24 29.43
NR3 0.69 1.13 0.27 1.64 4.19
NR4 0.52 0.62 0.26 1.19 1.59
NR5 1.13 0.41 1.15 0.36 0.36
NR6 0.40 1.65 0.19 4.13 8.68
NR7 0.48 0.93 0.38 1.94 2.45
NR8 0.97 2.16 0.19 2.23 11.37
NR9 0.69 0.41 0.68 0.59 0.54
NR10 L.30 1.24 0.44 0.95 2.82
a/ Source: A. Vilinsky, G. Furike, B. Wayson, Cost-Effectiveness of Community Corrections in
Connecticut, Report to the Criminal Justice Education Center, Hartford, CT, 1980. 
b/ K = Residential; NR = Nonresidential; rruribers used instead of agency names.
C/ CC = Annual Client Costs; SU - Average Service Units/Client; SC = Annual Service Unit 
Costs.
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these measures for a sample of agencies. Recalling that these agencies 
are ostensibly providing the same kinds of services to the same kinds 
of clients, one can observe wide variation. For example, agency R7 
(a code number for a particular residential agency) provides client 
services at 51 percent of average costs for the 12 organizations (the 
"cost" side, Col. 1). However, its service unit provision (the "effect" 
side, Col. 2) is substantially below the average (.22), and the measure 
combining the two (Index SU/CC), at .43 reflects poor performance 
(Col. 4).
Similarly, when service costs and units delivered were compared, 
Agency NR8 displayed client costs near the norm, but service unit costs 
at .19; its cost-effectiveness (Index SU/SC) then becomes 11.37, 
indicating much higher than average performance. Measures such as 
these can be useful to funding organizations seeking to maximize the 
effect of resource allocations.
4.3.1.3. Correctional Institutions. Bloom and Singer evaluated both
32program content and cost-effectiveness for an institution in Maryland. 
Ihe alternative in this case was a "conventional" state prison without 
the extremely intensive treatment and longer average length of stay of 
Patuxent, which until 1977 was an official institution for "defective 
delinquents." Their model evaluated program effects on post-release 
criminal behavior, utilizing the assumption that the longer such 
behavior is avoided the more likely it is to remain so —  essentially 
a dynamic approach. Parameters P ( 00 ) indicating the long-run rearrest 
probability of releasees, and t mean » the average length of post­
release time per releasee until the first arrest, were estimated, with 
P ( oo ) =.76 and t mean = 2.3 years. Seventy-six percent of the
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sample will be rearrested by 2.3 years after release. Had this same
group been sent to conventional prison the values are P (oo ) = .84 and
t =1.3 years.^ mean J
This "success" for Patuxent becomes somewhat dulled when costs 
are brought into the analysis. The authors estimated annual prison 
operating costs and foregone inmate earnings; these figures were then 
multiplied by the average length of inmate stay at each institution to 
derive a "cost per case." Since some of these costs would be incurred 
in the future, discounting was used to produce a present value. As 
Thble 4-12 indicates, Patuxent's improved outcome (lower rearrest 
probability and a longer elapsed time before the first crime) is more 
than offset by its higher inmate costs. In effect, it costs the state 
at least $38,000 to postpone rearrest by one year."^ The results 
show that the longer stay and higher treatment costs are not justified 
on cost-effectiveness grounds. The major policy recommendation is in 
favor of controlling the length of stay by developing additional 
release criteria.
Cost-effectivehess analysis, then, is useful for evaluating 
case or client costs. The alternative which appears to be least 
costly on, e.g., a daily basis, often turns out to be more expensive 
when the desired outcomes are evaluated. This type of analysis repre­
sents a major improvement over simple cost analysis and the preceding 
excerpts illustrate that its entry into corrections is timely and 
useful.
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TABLE 4-12
COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS^
Cost For
Prison 
At Designed
Capacity At Actual
Patuxent Utilization Utilization
5% Discount Rate
Cost to State 112,000, . 57,000 39,000
Foregone inmate earnings 53,000E/ 40,000 40,000
7.57, Discount Rate
Cost to State 104,000 54,000 37,000
Foregone inmate earnings 49,000 37,000 37,000
15% Discount Rate
Cost to State 85,000 47,000 32,000
Foregone inmate earnings 40,000 32,000 32,000
a/ Source: Howard S. Bloom and Neil M. Singer, "Determining the
Cost-Effectiveness of Correctional Programs," Evaluation 
Quarterly, Volume 3, No. 4, November 1979, p. 624. 
b/ Assumes zero displacement and thus represents an upper bound.
4.3.2. Cost-Benefit Analysis
This form of analysis is perhaps the most elegant of the cost
approaches. As discussed earlier, it is highly relevant to external
effects and distribution of costs and benefits. Theoretically, there
is little difference between costs and benefits, and the analyst may
be tempted "to regard all decision problems as ones of benefit maxim-
35ization subject to resource constraints." The general approach here 
will take the more conventional practice of articulating benefits and 
costs and performing some sort of comparison between the two. The 
major analytical issue is identifying and appropriately valuing all 
relevant benefits and costs, two separate exercises. Decisions
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regarding whether a particular phenomenon is a benefit or a cost —  and 
to whom —  as well as placing appropriate values on them, are particu­
larly thorny issues in analysis of public activities. As Musgrave and 
Musgrave state: although cost-benefit analysis is "(e)minently practical 
in application, it nevertheless involves some knotty theoretical prob­
lems.
The readiness of corrections for cost-benefit analysis was
pondered over a decade ago. A review of the efforts to date, (although
these were primarily cost-effectiveness studies) led one author to
conclude that managerial and information constraints were becoming
less formidable and that an alternative to recidivism rate analysis
was a useful change. Adams also hoped that correctional administration
would become more involved with the criminal justice and societal
37systems and that analysis would play an integral role. Two years
later, he reported that progress was still slow, and in 1975 observed
that "the universe of cost-benefit studies in corrections is still
small," tut asserted that "cost-benefit analysis had found its way
into corrections.""^
Conversely, by 1977, the popularity of cost-benefit analysis
in evaluating rehabilitation programs was called into question.
Although Noble was primarily taking issue with aggregated analyses
using secondary data, the general concerns are relevant here. Both
analytical assumptions and inferences about client benefits may
serve to distort research results; a lack of agreement about the
"value" of certain activities and outcomes further complicates the 
39problem.
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The concluding section of this chapter will address more sub­
stantively the limitations of analysis, but an introduction is in order 
because cost-benefit analysis has the potential of being more value­
laden and subjective than any other cost analysis technique. The 
ultimate objective of cost-benefit analysis is to create a decision 
measure which relates the benefits, or gains, from a particular under­
taking, to its costs, or losses. Stated in terms of an objective
function which defines the social welfare, W to be maximized, thes
form may be:
z n z m
W = I I G. . -  I I L..s . , in L L lk1=1 3=1 J i=i k=l
thwhere the first term reflects the real welfare gains of the j type
t iTiwhich accrue to the i ‘ group (for all j's and i's) and the second
tbi thterm reflects the losses of the k type which accrue to the i
40group, (summed for all i's and k's). This term may be expressed as
a ratio as well, but the apparent simplicity of either expression
belies the analytical difficulties required for its calculation or
the qualifications necessary to its usage.
A frequent criticism of such analyses is that they cannot
adequately control for project quality and tend "to reduce multi-dimen-
41sional measures of performance to a single ratio." Problems also 
arise because of the sensitivity of the technique to the underlying 
assumptions, raising the issue of providing the wrong answer to the 
wrong question. For example, a small change in productivity rates 
will produce magnified variations (and indeed has) in cost-benefit 
ratios. Differing assumptions about discount rates, the future 
level of unemployment, even the selection of the earnings base for an
127
employment project will produce a wide range of ratios for ostensibly
the same effort. The decision thus made on the basis of one of the
many possible ratios has the potential for creating error by making
program decisions based on uncertain knowledge and assumptions about
42costs and benefits. Issues such as the divergence of social and
private benefits (e.g., do programs benefit only the client? the
public?), externalities or spillover effects of programs, and even the
43timing raise further questions about usefulness. The wide usage of
the (low) government rate for discounting may not be appropriate if
the program is one of high risk, since this may overstate the present
value of benefits. Or, a low benefit-cost ratio may obscure the fact
that the program may still "work," i.e., it may accomplish its objec- 
44tives.
There is little doubt that cost-benefit analysis can be a 
powerful tool in correctional evaluation. It needs to be borne in 
mind, however, following Noble and the earlier discussion that constant 
attention should be given to:
• research to provide better methods to measure benefits; 
o better cost-accounting and statistical reporting; and
45• study of the values that recipients place on services.
4.3.2.1. Analysis. There exist many correctional cost-benefit anal­
yses of differing quality. Again, as in the previous sections, a few 
studies will be discussed as illustration of the usage of the technique 
for corrections.
As with cost-effectiveness analysis, one begins with clear 
and measurable objectives. Chapman observes that consensus on the
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worth of objectives is unlikely and suggests a net-benefit criterion,
i.e., can the gainers potentially compensate the losers. He then
argues further that this must be modified along "fairness" grounds,
i.e., the decision-maker should consider distribution along with net 
46benefits. These observations appear particularly relevant in a 
corrections setting where the benefits may accrue to persons or groups 
not sharing the cost.
The next step is an articulation of potential costs and bene­
fits associated with achieving objectives. Hahn and Sullivan have
developed a set of indicators of costs and benefits associated with
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correction program evaluation (Figure 4-4). Figure 4-5 presents a 
model framework for cost-benefit analysis which illustrates long-run 
goals, objectives and activities, in this case for a juvenile diversion 
project. The benefits and costs are distributed across three groups —  
the individual, the criminal justice system, and (the local) society. 
This sort of framework, while cumbersome in analysis, is useful for 
distinguishing the recipients of benefits and the bearers of cost 
as well as the time distribution. The analysis then proceeds to 
measuring, or quantifying, as many costs and benefits as possible and 
placing a dollar value on the amenable subset.
These values may be real, as in net additions to welfare or 
net changes in resource costs; or, they may be pecuniary if offsetting 
changes in relative prices occur — the latter are relevant only when 
the analysis specifically includes distributional effects. Real bene­
fits and costs may be characterized as direct, or primary when they 
are closely related to the project objectives, and indirect, or 
secondary when they produce effects not specified in the project
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FIGURE 4 -AS/
Indicators of Costs and Benefits of Alternative Programs
Specific to the Individual Ex-offender and to Other Ex-offenders
1. hourly wages from paid employment
2. number of hours worked per week
3. welfare and unemployment benefits received
4. any subsidies on room and board in the C.R.C.'s (or alternatives)
5. any subsidies on medical and health care
6. child support payments
7. restitution for previous crimes
8. income taxes paid
9. sales taxes paid
10. nunfoer of subsequent convictions
11. type and amount of sentence imposed for each; i.e., length of 
prison sentence or amount of fine
12. estimates of the benefits (i.e., loot obtained as a result of 
such criminal activity)
13. stability and type of living arrangements
14. marriage or breakdown of marriage or equivalent
15. number of jobs held over a year
16. nunfoer of hours devoted to cornnunity service
17. nunfoer and type of conflicts with neighbors or acquaintances
18. nunfoer of close friends maintained
Specific to the Best of Society
19. the average profit made on an hour's labor of C.R.C. residents 
or "graduates"
20. medical bills as a result of crimes committed by offenders in 
the C.R.C. type group
21. property stolen by these offenders
22. the C.J.S. system costs per conviction
23. estimates of the capital, labor, and other operating costs of 
running the programs being evaluated
24. stolen property recovered
25. restitution enforced
26. fines paid by convicted offenders
27. conplaints received by neighbors regarding the C.R.C.'s
28. nunfoer of crimes oonmitted
29. nunfoer of newspaper articles praising or criticizing the new 
programs
30. other "informed surveys" of public opinion.
a/ Source: Robert G. Hahn and Richard Sullivan, "A Cost-Benefit
Approach to Evaluating Community Residential Centres," Report to 
the (Canadian) Task Force on Cbmmunity Based Residential Centres.
FIGURE 4-4 
Goal Hierarchy and Benefit-Gost Model—  ^
Broad Goal: Reduce Juvenile Crime
Minimize System Involvement (Short-Run) Reduce Recidivism (Long-Run)
Objectives: 0 Produce Positive Attitudinal Change 
0 Prepare Juveniles for Employment
Activities: e Counseling
e Contract Programming 
e Volunteer Services
0 Opportunities for Academic Achievement 
0 Job Placement
Benefits Costs Benefits Costs
1. Greater job finding 
capacity.
2. Avoid stigma
3. Avoid lost vrork time, 
-e 4. Higher self-esteem.
‘5! 5. Improve motivation. 
tJ 6. Vocations 1 skills.
>5 7. Employment during 
program participation.
1. Costs to the individual 
associated with time spent 
in Program
1. Reduce contact with 
juvenile system.
2. Increased life time 
earnings from improved 
education and skills.
8. Reduced cost to
"traditional" system.
s • Court 0 Probation
0 • Institution 0)
&
2. Program costs.
3. Cost of education and 
vocational services pro­
vided by outside agencies.
3. Reduce case backlogs.
4. Efore efficient judi­
cial processes.
5. Less long-run costs 
to juvenile and adult 
system.
1. Short-run in­
creases in average 
costs as system 
adjusts to lower 
output.
9. Increase in contribu­
tion to social welfare, 
■u • Increased taxes paid.
4H
4. Increased risk of 
victimization.
6. Reduction in crime.
7. Less fear.
8. Greater productivity.
2. Social costs of 
security manufac­
turers, etc. as 
demand declines.
3. Increased job
competition.
a/ Source: Billy L. Wayson, Gail S. Punke and Thomas A. Henderson, A Model for Policy Analysis 
Training. (Washington, DC: LEAA, 1978).
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objectives. A program specifically intended to reduce delinquent 
behavior may have as a secondary effect the increase in earnings cap­
ability of its clients, or a higher literacy rate. "Tracing of the
48more indirect benefits may be difficult, but they should be included." 
Tangible costs and benefits can be measured in the market sense; in­
tangibles cannot but ordinarily are included as descriptors in the
analysis, inside and outside benefits and costs are characterized
according to whether they occur within or outside the jurisdiction in
49which the project is undertaken.
The final analytical step usually expresses benefits and costs 
in present value, i.e., expresses future benefits and costs in present 
terms, or:
n B - C
PVNB = I —  i-
t=0 (1 + i P
where: PVNB = the present value of net benefits;
and B^ = the sum of benefits to individuals, system and society,
present and future;
= the sum of costs to individuals, systems and society, 
present -and future;
t = the time period (years) over which benefits and costs 
occur;
i = discount rate, used to express a benefit or cost^ 
occurring in the future in present dollar terms.
The choices of productivity and discount rates account for a
great deal of the sensitivity of results. Ihe literature is wide and
varied on this issue: seme argue that the government rate is too low
to account for the risk of correctional projects; others, that state
and local governments are price takers and should use their own costs;
still others that consumers overestimate present consumption value or
that a weighting schema is necessary to avoid discriminating against
51"worthy" projects. The position taken here and by others is to 
present cost-benefit results utilizing an array of discount rates, 
rather than a single number.
4.3.2.2. Pretrial Diversion. Correctional cost-benefit analyses of
high quality are still somewhat sparse. The best published effort in
the field remains Hblohan's analysis of Project Crossroads, a diversion
52project in Washington, D.C. Crossroads offered counseling, job 
placement, remedial education, and supportive services to first 
offenders in order to produce a positive outcome: dismissal of charges. 
Holohan identified three areas —  earnings, diversion, and recidivism 
reduction —  across which to evaluate benefits. A fourth, education, 
was discussed but not formally evaluated. A comparison group, ran­
domly chosen but closely matched to project participants, and follow-up 
periods of seven, nine and twelve months permitted estimation of and 
confidence in net benefit estimates. (A control group and follow-up 
period greatly enhance cost-benefit analysis but the expense and time 
mitigate against their wide use and relegate many cost-benefit efforts 
to studies of cost-effectiveness because there is no measure and 
valuation of outcomes. )
Another major contribution involved the use of regression 
analysis to estimate marginal costs (again, an expensive and time- 
consuming effort) for police, court and corrections services and 
future earnings of participants. Criminal justice system costs were 
weighted by probability and type of crime for each stage (8 ) and event 
(48), from commission of crime, through the system, into new recidivism
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estimates. Besides permitting a detailed cost-benefit analysis, the 
separate data are highly valuable for more ordinary cost analysis. 
Holohan evaluated each benefit separately and discounted at three 
rates, all of which indicated the project was a success (Table 4-13).
Finally, in the policy area, his recommendations recognize 
the fallacy of generalizing from a single project with perhaps unique 
staff, but suggests that it is indeed appropriate to view the program 
as a success; in addition, the study ratios would allow some latitude 
for including more serious offenders. Theoretically, this practice 
should stop when the benefit-cost ratio is just equal to one. Sub­
sequent evaluations on pretrial diversion, while generally somewhat 
less comprehensive than Holohan's, have indicated that this type of
program tends to produce results which hold up favorably in a cost-
53benefit framework.
4.3.2.3. Supported Work. Another analysis worth discussion involved 
a more unusual effort than pretrial diversion: a supported work pro­
gram in New YOrk City organized by the Vera Institute of Justice.
Under this program, ex-addicts and ex-offenders are hired by a subsid­
iary of Vera (Wildcat Service Corporation) or by other agencies. In 
1974, approximately 1,400 participants were working in 100 different 
white and blue-collar jobs. Wages averaged $100/week, and program 
time was flexible; thus, the "supported" characteristics of the program 
means both subsidized work and a low-stress environment. Participants
are "disadvantaged" with prior criminal convictions, low educational
54attainment and poor job experience.
Evaluation methodology included comparisons of what the city 
would have paid if the work had been performed elsewhere, with the
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TABLE 4-13 
BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS PROJECT CROSSROADS^
PRESENT VALUE OF SOCIAL BENEFITS TO SOCIETY
5% 10% 15%
Diversion $109,994.52 $104,994.77 $100,429.78
Earnings 190,282.00 170,729.00 156,074.00
Recidivism 216,963.13 198,448.07 182,634.36
Total Benefit $517,240.00 $474,172.00 $439,138.00
Total Cost $233,256.00 $233,256.00 $233,256.00
Benefit-Cost
Ratio 2.2. 2.0 1.8
BENEFITS TO NON-CRIMINAL MEMBERS OF SOCIETY
Benefits 5%__________ 10%___________15%
Diversion $109,994.52 $104,994.77 $100,429.78
Earnings £' 28,542.00 25,613.00 23,411.00
Reduced Recidivism^/ 232,150.55 212,339.43 195,418.77
Benefits $370,688.00 $342,947.00 $299,260.00
Costs $233,256.00 $233,256.00 $233,256.00
Benefit-Cost
Ratios 1.6 1.4 1.2
a/ Source: John F. Holohan, A Benefit-Cost Analysis of Project
Crossroads. (Washington, DC: National Committee for Children 
and Youth, 1970), pp. 63-64. 
b/ Tax benefits, 
c/ Includes net cost of thefts.
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actual costs of using lower-paid, lower-skilled project participants. 
This allowed calculation of taxpayer benefits as one of the measures. 
In all, four separate benefit-cost calculations were designed: social 
benefit-cost, to determine whether the program improves society as a 
whole (the traditional measure); taxpayer benefit-cost, to examine 
distribution effects; welfare benefit-cost, comparing welfare depart­
ment outlays in the presence and absence of the program; and partici­
pant benefit-cost —  to "find out how attractive the Supported Work
55Program is to prospective participants." Table 4-14 summarizes the 
results, which were subjected to sensitivity analysis. The net bene­
fits are magnified due to the low opportunity cost of labor, but this 
is an intentional program component and suggests that future selection 
should include participants who are unemployed. The successful 
evaluation results have resulted in replication of this program, but 
Friedman suggests more research in the administrative and social areas 
to determine whether program modifications are justified.
4.4. Summary
The discussion above has focused on the definition and use of 
the various types of cost analysis; a number of studies in the field 
were reviewed and illustrative results presented.
Cbst analysis is a useful tool and a necessary precursor to 
many other analytical efforts. Since a partial focus of this study 
is the utilization of economic analysis in the policy setting —  for 
decision-making —  a few final comments on the usage of these analyses 
are in order.
General limitations or qualifications fall into two broad 
areas. First, these techniques focus on inputs and outputs but have
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TABLE 4-14
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF SUPPORTED WOEK£/
(per experimental man-year)
Social Benefits & Costs 
Benefits'
Value added to goods & services $4,519
Post-program earnings 1,154
Averted criminal justice costs 293
Health (285)
Total Benefits $5,681
Costs
Participant opportunity costs $1,112
Staff & non-personnel expenses 2,362
Total costs 53,474
Benefit-Cost Ratio 1.64
Taxpayer Benefits & Costs 
Benefits
Public goods & services $4,519
Welfare reduction 1,797
Income taxes 311
Averted criminal justice costs 293
Total Benefits $6,920
Costs
Supported work costs $6,131
Benefit-Cost Ratio 1.13
Welfare Benefits & Costs
Benefits $2,639
Costs (cash & other "welfare) $2,079
Benefit-Cost Ratio 1.27
Participant Benefits & Costs 
Benefits"
Program wages & fringe $3,769
Extra-program earnings 1,154
Total Benefits $4,923
Costs
Foregone welfare $1,797
Taxes 311
Foregone earnings 1,112
Total costs $3,220
Benefit-Cost Ratio 1.53
§/ Source: Lee S. Friedman, "An Interim Evaluation of the Supported 
Work Experiment" Policy Analysis, Volume 3, No. 2, Spring 1977, 
pp.165-168.
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little to say about the process which links them. Uncertainty about
the functional relationships between inputs and outputs suggests that,
for example, replication of successful projects should be undertaken
with care. In addition, aggregated analysis may obscure effects on
client subgroups (i.e., what works, for whom?), creating additional
uncertainty.^ Kazanowski refers to this as the "sole criterion
fallacy" in asking whether the "right thing" was evaluated, or were
57there several "right things?"
A second general area concerns the use of analytical results
in the public setting. Positive and negative study results are not
necessarily welcomed with equal vigor by public officials, who "perhaps
have little to gain from positive findings hut much to lose from
58negative findings." In addition, study results are cast "in the
language of the legislators: dollars," and may attract more (negative)
59attention than more traditional evaluations.
More specifically to the analysis itself, the necessary use 
of proxy measures and shadow prices because of market imperfections, 
without consensus on valuation, suggests that results be viewed care­
fully. Valuations tend to exhibit variation and different analyses 
are not necessarily comparable. The criteria to be used for decision­
making is a related issue. Kazanowski refers to a number of "falla­
cies" which should be borne in mind When interpreting or presenting 
results. Many of these concern the quantification inherent in cost 
analyses. Use of a ratio, for example, ignores the magnitudes of 
benefits and costs. A $100,000 project with a low benefit-cost 
ratio may have more appeal than a $10 million project with a slightly
higher ratio. The ratio itself is determined by the variables in the
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analysis, a practice which tends to create the impression that all 
decision-relevant variables can be quantified.^ Any analysis is 
arbitrary in the sense that the analyst determines the variables to 
be studied. Table 4-15 presents an example of the inclusion of dif­
ferent variables, with alternative weighting schema, for a diversion 
project. Depending on which benefit variables are included, and the 
choice of productivity and discount rates, it is possible to obtain 
many different benefit-cost ratios, none of which is necessarily 
"right."
Other warnings speak to the necessity of including "spillover" 
effects and the difficulties which may underlie even just the input 
side —  e.g., the possibility of two programs having apparently equal 
costs when one may represent the use of scarcer resources at the 
margin. Finally, results should be regarded as guides: analytical 
results provide information on expected effects for a particular pro­
gram with a particular technology and a specific set of assumptions;
as such they are highly useful for the program under evaluation but
61only suggestive for program expansion or replication.
In spite of these caveats, which are really designed to assist 
in the development and use of valid and reliable evaluations, cost 
analysis generally and cost-benefit analysis particularly remain 
valuable and necessary tools for the economic analysis of corrections. 
The capacity of cost-benefit analysis to examine externalities and 
distribution and introduce a time dimension permits analyses which are 
extremely useful to decisionmakers seeking information on the impact 
of a program and its returns beyond the immediate program setting.
TABLE 4-15 
BENEFIT-COST COMPARISONS^
Benefits _______________ Estimates
.......... 1 " ■ 2 ~ '■ " 3 .. 4 ' ...5
Diversion
Short-term (reduced disposition costs) $96,575 $96,575 $96,575 $96,575 $96,575
Long-term (reduced participant rearrests) 5,047 5,047 5,047 5,047 5.047
Earnings
Short-term participant earnings , 41,648 41,648 41,648 41,648 41,648
Long-term participant earnings — 105,000 289,000 626,000 626,000
Assumptions
Productivity Rate — 0% 3% 47o 4%
Discount Rate - 77o 570 3% 3%
Total - Benefits $143,270 248,270 432,270 769,270 769,270
Costs
Program
Steady-state $429,667 429,667 429,667 429,667 ...
Actual first year — — — — 460,236
Criminal Justice System 15,399 15,399 15,399 15,399 15,399
External 82,202 82,202 82,202 82,202 82,202
Total Costs $527,269 527,268 527,268 527,268 557,837
Benefits - Costs ($383,998) (278,998) (94,998) 242,002 211,433
Benefit-Cost Ratio .27 .47 .82 1.46 1.38
a/ Source: Billy L. Wayson et al. (analysis developed by Sally F. Familton, A Model for Policy Analysis
Training. (Washington, DC: LEAA, 1978).
As administrators become more aware of resource constraints, this 
technique should gain more favor in advising resource allocation 
decisions.
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Chapter Five
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CORRECTIONS: INSTITUTIONS
5.1. Introduction
The last chapter was devoted to a discovery of the insights 
and contributions of cost analysis. These next two chapters will 
address the contributions of economics to correctional activities 
in two broad areas —  institutions and the community setting. The 
purpose of this dissertation, as discussed earlier, is not only to 
examine existing and potential applications of economics to correc­
tional activities, but to overlay the public policy decision setting 
on these applications. Applications are thus relevant as they in­
form choice, or decision. The problem is thus multi-faceted: to 
identify issues which may be enlightened by economic analysis; to 
appropriately evaluate these issues with proper data and techniques; 
and to translate, or apply findings in the context of known con­
straints on and realities of public decisionmaking.
Public officials, as their private counterparts, are in­
terested in allocation and choice in various forms, for example, 
the distribution of offender populations both between institutions 
and the spectrum of correctional alternatives; or the allocation of 
labor and capital inputs within the institutional setting; and the 
proper level and allocation of inputs among all correctional activities. 
The appropriate analogue for analysis is the theory of the firm in a 
multi-plant framework. From this it can be discovered whether an
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individual plant (prison, community treatment center) is efficient, 
and, ultimately, the distribution of inputs throughout the produc­
tion system.
Cne of the most vital contributions of economics is marginal 
analysis. Knowledge of the impact of alternative decisions at the 
margin is critical to private and public sector alike; the nature of 
the public setting creates (not insignificant) technical problems but 
the decision criteria are the same. Much of the work discussed in 
prior sections focused on data collection techniques and methodologies 
which would permit this ultimate glimpse of the margin. Concerns 
about identifying outputs and benefits are preparatory to comparisons 
with costs and evaluation at the margin. When legislators or 
administrators commission studies on impacts of sentencing changes, 
they are really asking, What will happen at the margin? When com­
parative studies of prisons and alternatives are conducted, the 
underlying issue is really the effect of placing the nth client in 
alternative dispositions. Decisions about provision of rehabilita­
tive services and their "benefits" implicitly incorporate marginal 
concepts. We now consider some of the issues associated with cor­
rectional institutions which may be and have been informed by economic 
analysis.
5.2. Optimum Scale of Plant
The plant, in this case, a single prison, is the analogue 
of the single plant of a multi-plant firm, here "producing" cor­
rectional services. In an institutional setting, the two major 
outputs may be characterized as incarceration services (confinement)
and rehabilitative services (education and work programs and the like). 
For the correctional decisionmaker, while the question may be posed as 
one of determining the "best" size prison, the implicit question is the 
determination of the prison size (or, really, population) which 
minimizes long run average costs. (An unresolved issue is cost 
minimization without quality deterioration; this is addressed later 
in this chapter.) One author suggests that the pressure on prison 
systems is indeed to minimize costs, perhaps more so than on public 
organizations producing "highly valued goods and services. In the 
short run where at least one fixed factor is present (capital), the 
issue is the determination of population sizes at which average cost 
exhibits a minimum within a given facility. Over the long run, as 
plant scale is varied, interest is again in minimum average cost but 
without the constraint of the fixed factor. We are, therefore, in­
terested in cost functions and structures —  the behavior and movement 
of costs over time. These cost functions are derived through time 
series data and are not the same as the analytical cost functions 
observed in the theoretical literature. Technology cannot be assumed 
constant over the time series; deflation procedures cannot always 
fully account for changes in input quality.
Existing analyses have been clouded by the general problems of
formative analysis in the public setting, most of which have been
addressed earlier. Good data are scarce, less than comprehensive, and
often not strictly comparable over accounting periods of between
facilities. What constitutes similar production units —  prisons —
2
presents a technical problem. Appropriate statistical techniques
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are still being examined. The problem of joint products has not
been resolved; prisons do produce the two broad services mentioned
above but the current practice of allocating labor by job title (e.g.,
guard vs. counselor) is an unsatisfactory method for measuring the
resources associated with the various products. Capital remains a 
4
thorny problem.
5.2.1. State Prisons
The first major application of econometric techniques to 
examine correctional institution cost functions was conducted by Block
5
in 1975. Three California medium-security prisons with variation in
0
their design capacity over the period 1948-1964 were examined.
Rehabilitation services were excluded and the relevant "outputs" 
designated as confinement, which included hotel, or room and board 
services, and personal goods and services such as medical care.
Quality of confinement services was assumed to be controlled by 
stratifying by security level, since inmate privileges such as freedom 
of movement, association with other inmates, visiting situations and so 
forth are more constricted in a maximum-security environment. It was 
recognized, however, that it may be necessary to question quality- 
constant assumptions as increasing numbers are confined. It was 
correctly cautioned that although the statistical results might suggest 
optimal populations in excess of those actually confined, that care be 
exercised in interpreting and implementing such results. Block further 
suggests the identification of upper and lower physical space bounds 
because it cannot be assumed that the quality of services afforded the 
nth inmate is equivalent to those offered to the first inmate.
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Hie upper bound comprises the maximum space per inmate (single celling);
the lower, some "minimum permissible level" below which authorities will
7
not permit hotel services to fall. Hotel services' quality are assumed 
here not to vary significantly with confinement.
Basically, then
C = C (P) where
C = annual cost of providing all non-rehabilitative services, 
and
P = average daily inmate population (averaged for each year), 
and ___
H - Hotel Services = H
Ihe results are interesting but qualified due to lack of data 
on capital charges and some problems with data consistency. Two in­
stitutions exhibited linear cost functions with marginal costs very 
close to average costs, suggesting constant costs, and one institution 
exhibited a non-linear cost function and in fact one in which marginal
g
costs were declining, i.e., decreasing costs.
Although exploratory, this work establishes cost functions as 
an appropriate framework for analyzing institutions.
5.2.2. Federal Prisons
Ihe Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP) is a fruitful system to 
analyze because of the high comparability of its correctional and 
accounting procedures. While not problem-free, many of the vagaries of 
state data systems are not present. In addition, the data set is very 
comprehensive and FBOP analyses are the most illuminating conducted 
to date.
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McQuire developed estimates of long run average costs for
9
thirteen Federal Correctional Institutions. Ihe empirical model 
took the general form,
LRAC = B + B.. (CD) + B„(CD)2 + B E + u o 1 I
where: CD = confined days
B = a vector of unknown coefficients to be estimated
E = a vector of proxies for environmental variables 
(e.g., quality and conditions of confinement)
u = disturbance term 
and ordinary least squares was used as the principal analytical 
technique.^ Ihe analysis examined characteristics of the inmate 
population and institutional environment which will be discussed in 
a subsequent section. Ihe estimated LRAC is asymmetrical, with the 
cost penalties higher for small-scale institutions than large.
Table 5-1 presents relevant results. Ihe minimum occurs at a popula­
tion of 1,190 persons, at a cost (1976 dollars) of $16.49/day. Ihe 
estimated optimal size did not significantly exceed some of the 
institutions studied, but was substantially in excess of the average. 
Ihere is no flat region to the curve but it is shallow and U-shaped.
Ihe cost penalties for deviation from the minimum thus are low over a 
fairly wide range.
Ihe major policy implication is that relatively larger, un­
crowned institutions are more cost-effective than are smaller ones.
Ihe range suggested by a .95 confidence interval (± 412 inmates) 
falls between 778 and 1,602 inmates; this exceeds present Bureau 
experience in the upper range and should be regarded gingerly. The 
confidence interval for the costs was ± $9.14 as applied to the minimum 
cost of $16.49/day.^
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TABUS 5-1
LONG RUN COST-OUTPUT RELATIONSHIPS^/
Confined 
Days/Month
Average 
Annual Population
Cost Per 
Confined Day
0 0 ^37.04
5,000 lb4 31.76
10,000 327 27.27
15,000 492 23.56
20,000 656 20.63
24,000 789 18.85
28,000 918 17.56
32,000 1,049 16.78
36,000 1,180 16.49
40,000 1,311 16.71
45,000 1,475 17.68
50,000 1,639 19.42
Average Population in existing FBOP institutions: 669
Average Daily Cost: $21.11
a/ Source: William J. McGuire, "An Economic Model of Criminal Correc­
tional Institutions: Empirical Cost Analysis and Gost-Benefit 
Measures," unpublished dissertation, University of North Carolina 
at Chapel Hill, 1978, Table 4-5 and text pp. 80-81 (extraction).
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Some later work by NtGbire and Witte expanded and refined the
13analysis of this data set.
Ihe basic function to be estimated was an outlay function using 
OLS procedures:
Jin (AC) = B +B Cm-B0 Jin CD+B-Jlnw, + o 1 2 3 k
B4 Jin w1 + B5 Jin ( WR £
( wi ;
H- a A + £ S + E, where 
CD = confined days
WR = Price of“capital (electricity was used as a proxy because 
no other standardized measure was available)
= price of labor (institutional staff)
A = vector of variables measuring product quality, including 
rehabilitative activities and security level
S = vector of variables measuring service conditions, in­
cluding age, racial composition, sexual composition, 
occupation, IQ, sentence, crime type, addiction status, 
prior record, marital status, incidents, racial balance, 
and auxiliary facilities.
E = random disturbance.
This generalized form was selected because it permits discovery of a
14wide set of relationships between average costs and output.
The authors identified, as before, a shallow, U-shaped 
asymmetrical LRAC, with the following relevant variables: confined days
and factor prices, rehabilitation services, security level, race, 
alcoholism, sentence length, racial balance, and crowding. Essentially, 
costs will be lower for correctional institutions which:
• are large
• have lower wage rates
• offer significant levels of rehabilitative services
• have very little or very significant overcrowding
• have larger proportions of short-term whites in their 
populations
• have low alcohol-abuse populations1
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An interesting extension of MfcGuire's analysis was the quantifi­
cation of a close relationship between the extent of rehabilitative 
services provided and optimally-sized institutions. Costs are minimized 
in a large institution offering more than the average rehabilitation 
services. With successively lesser amounts of these services, minimum 
LRAC occurs in smaller institutions. (Table 5-2 ) Since the ultimate 
cost-minimi zing institution is well beyond the data set (two-thirds of
the sample have capacities under 500 persons), care is necessary in
16interpreting the results. Ihe interesting finding, however, in
addition to supporting earlier work on scale, is that the presence of
rehabilitation services may permit accommodation of more inmates, at
lower cost, than their absence. They also found that increased physical
space per inmate is associated with lower costs and translated this into
lower costs due to a positive increase in morale which requires fewer
security-related resources. More research is necessary to determine
whether the author's claim that "(h)appier inmates are cheaper to in-
17carcerate" is an accurate characterization.
5.2.3. Penitentiaries
A limited analysis of Federal penitentiaries has been con- 
18ducted by McGuire. The analysis was limited both by sample size and
the fact that "penitentiaries largely represent an obsolete technology 
19m  corrections." Using the estimation techniques of the earlier
data set, an asymmetric, U-shaped LRAC curve was derived, with cost per 
confined day minimized at 1,667 inmates. Costs increase faster as 
smaller, rather than larger institutions are utilized. Rehabilitation 
services do not produce the cost-minimizing effects observed in
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Table 5-2 
LUNG-RUN AVERAGE COSTS, BY 
INSTITUTION SIZE AND REHABILITATION ACTTVITTESa/
Average Daily 
Population R = 0 - ~ b / R=R-o — !* 1!
- b/
RrR+a -
200 $41.87 $42.74 $46.01 $54.13
300 31.49 31.48 33.47 38.76
400 26.56 26.05 27.36 31.18
500 23.90 22.98 23.84 26.74
600 22.39 21.10 21.62 23.87
700 21.57 19.23 20.16 21.91
800 21.20 19.20 19.19 20.53
900 21.17 18.80 18.55 19.53
1,000 21.40 18.63 18.16 18.82
1,100 21.85 18.64 17.95 18.31
1,200 22.50 18.81 17.89 17.96
1,300 23.32 19.11 17.95 17.74
1,400 24.31 19.53 18.21 17.63
1,500 25.48 20.07 18.39 17.60
2,000 34.07 24.29 20.92 18.50
a/ Source: Arm D. Witte, et al., 1'Empirical Investigations of
Correctional Cost Functions" Draft Final Report to the 
National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice,
1979, Table 8-3.
b/ R is the mean observed rehabilitative activities in the
sample and o is the standard deviation of observed rehabilitative 
services.
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Federal Correctional Institutions and in any case are more likely to be 
prison-industry work than the programs of the FCI's (McGuire character­
izes programs as "active" rehabilitation and industry work as "passive" 
rehabilitation) .2<")
5.2.4. Jails
Ihe work on jails is more limited than that on prisons; but
when one contemplates the nearly 4,000 jails in the nation and the fact
that jails are much more likely to be built, or rebuilt, optimum scale
of plant becomes more‘than of academic interest. Ihe first work was
done by Block in conjunction with the prison analysis, using jail
data from California. Ihe data set included 128 jails with capacities
ranging from six to 3,200, although non-comparable data created smaller
sets for the various analyses. The results suggest nondecreasing
marginal costs and constant returns to scale when a square footage
measure is introduced. An investment function was estimated which
indicated these costs were minimized at a jail with a rated capacity 
21of 26 inmates.
22Mikesell analyzed long run costs for jails in Indiana. The 
data set was limited to 51 county jails in jurisdictions with 25,000 
or less population, a more comparable data set than Block's. The 
model used in the estimation was
AVCST = a + bCAP -t-cCAPSQ + dWAGE + eDT + fDEM
where
AVCST = average cost at capacity 
CAP = capacity 
CAPSQ = CAP2
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Wage = average monthly wage, jail personnel
DT = 2-year death rate
23DEM = jail population 4 county population.
The DT term is a quality indicator and a high DEM figure
would indicate special pressures on the jail. Mikesell recognized
that LRAC depends on service quality and quantity in addition to
input costs and requirements, but observed that there was no way to
immediately solve this analytical problem, other than to control as
2in the analysis. The results, with an R of .42 indicate a U-shaped 
curve with average costs uniquely minimized at $297 and a capacity of 
49 inmates. He recommended that the 45 jails whose capacities fell 
below this figure consider consolidation with one or more of their 
neighbors.
Again formative, these jail studies support the intuition that 
the very small jail is costly to operate. A jail with a capacity of, 
say, less than 20, may be expected to exhibit higher average costs 
than a larger facility. From a planning perspective, more research on 
optimum scale of plant,-with some attention to jail function, might 
help inform a local decision about, e.g., consolidation.
The research to date on optimal scale of plant has served to 
illustrate the feasibility of analysis and indicates the work ahead. 
Issues of similarity of production units and controlling for quality, 
as well as the translation of findings for use by decisionmakers are 
not insignificant and will be addressed in the conclusion of this 
chapter.
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5.3. Short-Run Responses to Population Changes
This section addresses the impact of changes in institutional
populations which occur when plant size does not significantly vary.
In addition to secular increases in prison populations, stringent
approaches such as determinate sentencing, decreased use of parole and
restrictions of good-time accrual are expected to compound these in-
24creases in many states. Whatever these (increases) turn out to be, 
the correctional decisionmaker is interested in the marginal costs 
for a particular institution for short-term planning. Occasionally 
an institution experiences decreases in population, e.g., with the 
opening of a new facility, and knowledge of the averted costs is also 
of interest. Usually, however, the interest is in how much "crowding"
2
an institution can undergo before marginal costs exceed average costs.
Block developed short-run cost functions for Folsom and San
Quentin prisons, over a period when the design capacities for these
26prisons remained relatively constant. In effect, the fixed design
capacity was the equivalent of holding a factor of production (capital)
constant. Expenditure data included salaries, purchases of goods and
services, and minor equipment purchases, and were deflated to 1967
2
dollars. For Folsom prison, the highest R was produced using the
functional form:
RFTC = B + B, ADIPF 
o 1
where
RFTC = deflated total costs, Folsom; and 
ADIPF = average daily inmate population, Folsom.
Marginal costs are constant over the relevant range and the total
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cost function is
RFTC = 2,499,932 + 296 ADIPF.
2
Explanatory power was low, however, at R = .20 so these results must
be viewed with care. In addition, the marginal costs appear to be very
low, suggesting either extremely low quality hotel services or some 
27incorrect data. The analysis was then refined by including a 
variable to reflect the violence history of the population (a factor 
often cited by managers in explaining higher costs). This raised the 
explanatory power to .53 and produced
RFTC = 1,849,466 + 268 ADIPF + 2,154,884 FVC
where
FVC = index for percentage of annual population
sentenced for violent crimes.
Marginal costs remain close to the first estimate. Examining for a
time trend produced an indication of a secular effect, partially due
to the increasing proportion of inmates with a history of violence.
Ibis estimated equation was
RFTC = 2,547,580 + 207 ADIPF + 20,177 T.
2 28Inclusion of these variables increased the value of R to .69.
Average cost functions were estimated for San Quentin prison
and the results indicated that average costs per inmate are declining;
2
although no single best equation was found (all had close, high R *s), 
it appears that San Quentin could experience decreasing average costs 
for a population up to 5,700 inmates. In other words, marginal costs 
remained below average costs for all populations examined and the 
data suggest this relationship may continue to very high confinement 
levels. At the very least, the work suggests that existing data on 
inmate costs tend to overestimate the incremental costs.29
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A slightly different policy approach (the technical analysis 
was identical) was taken in a study which estimated marginal costs for 
correctional facilities in Maine. Faced with known changes in popula­
tions, the study examined the relationship between planning figures for
30inmate costs and those suggested by analysis. Again, while not 
directly usable outside Maine, the analysis revealed marginal costs 
substantially below average costs. The analysis was constrained to 
a relevant range and indicated marginal costs of $750 (AC = $6,955) 
for the prison, $1,106 for the Correctional Center (AC = $13,821), 
and $1,777 for the Youth Center (AC = $19,489).^
The interesting policy issue associated with this work was
that prison authorities had requested new funds to support population
increases. In the case of the prison, the per capita request was
$760, very close to the estimated marginal costs; at the correctional
center, the per capita increase request was $948, somewhat below
study figures. While the basis for calculation is unknown, in this
case administrators came very close to estimating their actual 
32marginal costs.
Marginal costs represent useful information to decisionmakers 
facing short run increases or decreases in populations. The work to 
date suggests decreasing average costs to be the relevant phenomenon 
for individual institutions. Marginal costs will lie below average 
costs in this case so that the incremental cost of adding another 
inmate is still less than the average. This appears to obtain for 
populations well beyond current experience so that institutional 
managers may have a wide range within which to increase their popula­
tions before average costs begin to increase (if indeed they do).
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However, more research is needed on the range of population within which 
quality does not appreciably deteriorate.
5.4. Multi-piant Allocation and Cost Minimization
When inmate populations are distributed across a statewide
system, some additional findings on cost minimization can be of use.
For example, if marginal costs for populations of varying sizes at
different prisons are known and increasing, and marginal benefits are
assumed to be equal, theoretically, reallocation should take place
until marginal costs are equalized. If population characteristics and
other factors influencing costs are known, reallocation or a more
equal distribution of these factors across institutions may produce
lower overall costs. Witte, Block and McGuire have begun to identify
factors which are relevant in explaining costs, among them violence,
crowding, alcohol abuse, etc. It is not feasible, as one author has
suggested, to minimize overall intake of individuals possessing such
characteristics, but conceivably a more cost-minimizing distribution
33across the prison system might be effected. The federal data re­
ported earlier indicated that lower costs are associated with such 
factors as high rehabilitative services, little or significant over­
crowding, low proportion of alcohol abuse, etc. It is theoretically 
and practically possible to operationalize such findings in population 
distribution and service provision.
A recent study examined optimal allocation of offenders between
treatment modes, or production processes —  in this case, prisons and
34residential treatment centers. The output measure, reduced offenses, 
is expressed in absolute terms, rather than as a valuation of the
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of the benefits of such reductions. Formally,
x X
1 14m
R - I (Ot -0*t) 4 £ (.Ot - Ot)
T= T0 T =  T
where
R = reduced offenses
0T = predicted offenses per time period
0* = actual offenses during treatment period
0 = actual offenses during post-treatment periods
tj = treatment period
x _ = successive post-treatment periods
Given a budget constraint, the production function is simply
indicating that, given a budget constraint, a treatment mode can 
accommodate Pi offenders to achieve output . Costs depend on the 
treatment population, so
for the two treatment modes.
Figure 5-1 expresses optimality conditions, following the usual 
analysis:
R± = Ri (Pi),
Ci = Ci (Pi)
and
Budget (B> = + C2
Slope B = ACj, . AC.
Slope R = ■ AR, AR,
A4>£ AP|
Tangency: a R?
1 1  ^ 35
or allocate offenders such that MP MP
M'C^  " MC2.
FIGURE 5-1
Optimum Budget Allocation Between 
Treatment--Alternatives to Maximize R
I4J
1
Alternative 2P,
Source: Timothy M. Hennessey et al., "Choosing Among Corrections
Alternatives: A Political Economy Perspective" in Stuart
S. Nagel (ed.), Modeling the Criminal Justice System. 
(Beverly Hills, CA: 1977), Figure 3.
In this example, since the authors assumed increasing costs, 
the allocation of offenders between prisons and residential treatment 
centers should be such that the ratios of marginal product (i.e.,
reduction in recidivism) to marginal costs are the same for both 
treatments.
However, the empirical evidence derived to date indicates that 
individual prisons appear to be operating in the declining region of 
the average cost curve. These findings seem to hold for increases in 
inmate population beyond the actual operating experience of the in­
stitutions. If this in fact is the case, there are some interesting
36implications for multi-plant allocation.
Let Figure 5-1 depict the total and average cost functions for 
two prisons a and b, where x is the number of inmates.
FIGURE 5-2 
Alternative Tbtal and Average Cost Curves
C
0
x
C
X
0 Xb
(x-e)
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There exists only one point on the total cost curves at which 
a ray from the origin strikes both curves at equivalent costs and out­
puts. Ctoserving, then, the lower diagram, we see that average costs 
are equal in both prisons at population x^; for populations less than Xp  
(i.e., x^ - e ), prison "a" exhibits lower average costs; for popula­
tions greater than x ,^ (i.e., x^ + e ), prison "b" exhibits lower average 
costs.
In other words, each prison may have an average cost function 
of the form:
c b - a  ,—  - —  + ax , , o<a<l
, -1 -a= bx + ax
Average costs are at a minimum when the first derivative,
d f t  1  = 0 (first-order condition —  necessary);
and the second derivative, d^ i—  I  ^ _' (x ) , > O
(second-order condition —  sufficient, if first order conditions hold).
(c. ) _2
But, d fx ) = -bx- - a ax < O,
dx
so our necessary condition is not met and we cannot proceed to verify 
a minimum.
There are several policy implications which are suggested by 
this example. First, in the single-plant case, a producer theoretically 
has no observable limit to the size of the inmate population capable 
of being accommodated in a particular institution. Practically, there 
may be such a limit which is not reflected fcy cost analysis; however, 
within some range, the producer may increase inmate populations and
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in any case will not experience increasing average costs.
However, for multi-plant allocation decisions, we consult Figure 
5-2 again and observe that while average costs are indeed decreasing 
for prisons "a" and "b," that allocating prisoners between facilities 
may produce some unexpected results. For populations in excess of x-^, 
placing than in prison "a" will produce higher average costs than if 
they had been placed in prison "b, " and total system costs will be 
higher. The reverse obtains for populations less than x^.
Summarizing, if no general cost-minimization is possible, a 
producer should select the process with the lowest cost. However, this 
"rule" cannot be used as an overall selector of capacity, since the 
lower cost observed for one process beyond a certain capacity may 
cost more than another process below that capacity level. In effect, 
with varying usage of prisons, the entire cost range for each institu­
tion must be considered. Theoretically, a multi-plant producer needs 
information on the shape of the average cost curve for all alternatives 
before allocations between institutions can be made.
5.5. Prison Industries
The development of prison industries, as was seen in earlier 
chapters, has been a patchwork of conflicting purposes and organiza­
tional arrangements. Work was very central to initial penitentiary 
reform philosophy, fueled by the idea that prisoners should contribute 
to their support. Various contractual and leasing systems of the 
nineteenth century gave way to state-use arrangements in the twentieth.
Prisoner work began to take on various tones of meaningfulness, from
37the rehabilitative focus to reintegration. Industries today
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represent a curious paradox of economic theory and correctional
philosophy, and there is some hope on the part of corrections' officials
that correctional industries can be made self-supporting and eventually
37provide scsne offset to total institutional costs.
An operating objective in a large prison is the minimization 
of inmate idleness, but an objective of the rehabilitationists and 
reintegrationists is meaningful work, reflective of conditions pre­
vailing in the outside world. In a world of scarce resources (one 
of them inmate skills), these objectives came into conflict. In 
the ongoing denouement, inmates rarely work in the traditional low- 
skill, labor intensive trades (e.g., bindertwine) and the absolute
numbers of inmates employed in correctional industries is less today
38than a hundred years ago, or before seven years ago.
There has not been any comprehensive writing on prison in­
dustries since 1931. A recent study of a federally-sponsored effort 
to promote self-sustaining and profitmaking prison industries had an 
economic evaluation as a principal component. Major findings in­
clude :
• profit maximization may be a legitimate goal for 
prison industries but is constrained by:
—  lack of performance incentives from legislative 
or correctional authorities;
—  procurement policies which increase raw materials 
costs;
—  lack of timely accounting procedures;
—  the treatment of profit as a residual.
• implicit subsidies distort the true operating struc­
ture of prison industries and lead to suboptimal 
pricing. They include:
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—  inmate wages (generally $.25-.50/hour);
—  provision of support services which do not appear 
in overhead calculations;
—  industry deb^and capital charges carried by other 
departments.
In addition to these considerations, however, more thought 
needs to be given to the appropriate framework in which to evaluate 
prison industries. Corrections' agencies incur a substantial "fixed 
cost" for inmates, whether or not they are employed in industries, 
including food, housing, clothing, programs and so forth. There 
are also non-accounting or opportunity costs in the nature of the 
foregone productivity of incarcerated inmates, which may approach 
$10,000/inmate annually. The tendency in correctional agencies has 
been to keep accounting for prison industries separate from the 
outlays for general prison functions, so that revenues in excess of 
costs are not used to defray inmate maintenance costs (nor are 
losses similarly charged). Room and board charges are generally 
assessed against inmates only when the industries population is 
coexistent with the inmate population. Cbrrectional authorities are 
reluctant to charge room and board to industries'-employed inmates 
when they experience living conditions identical to inmates who are 
not employed. In addition, in many states, any profit demonstrated 
by industries is diverted to the general revenues and not made 
available to industries for capital investment.
Any holistic framework must consider what goals an industries' 
operation is intended to accomplish. In the nineteenth century, 
inmate work was expected to support the entire prison and contracting
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arrangements were developed to accomplish this. In the first part 
of this century, the relevant goal was the minimization of inmate 
idleness, and labor-intensive industries flourished. The current 
goals of rehabilitation and reintegration suggest industries that 
reflect the capital-intensive nature of much of our nation's produc­
tion. What remains unclear is the relationship of prison industries 
to the prison itself. Tb what degree, if any, should industries' 
operations be expected to defray the cost of prisoner mainte­
nance? Should corrections generally, or industries specifically, be 
responsible for reducing the cost of foregone inmate productivity?
Is there a rehabilitation benefit produced by industries which 
should be reflected in accounting procedures?
Human resource accounting may be a promising framework for 
evaluating prison industries. Its focus on the development and 
measurement of human capital permits the combination of business 
(e.g., profit) as well as non-business objectives (e.g., rehabili­
tation). Its potential utility for correctional industries is based
on the premise that inmate labor includes a value that is not being 
accounted for and part of this value is represented by the rehabilita­
tion and reintegration capacities of industries. Such an approach 
might also incorporate measures of foregone productivity and the 
portion of prison outlays for which industries should be responsible.
5.6. Some New Directions
In addition to the central corrections issues discussed 
above, there is preliminary research on a variety of topics which 
warrants brief reference.
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5.6.1. The Output Side
Much of the research and ensuing policy recommendations have 
been constrained by the lack of definition and valuation of cor­
rectional outputs. Tabasz derived estimates of net social benefits
for inmates in the federal prison system, using linear programming 
40techniques. The model calculated net benefits (confinement, re­
habilitation services and post release benefits) and 'distributed" 
prisoners according to the net social benefit produced by their 
confinement. Tabasz valued and estimated averted crimes while in 
prison and post-prison, controlling for age, crime type and 
drug or alcohol history. A sample result, in 1973 dollars, is 
as follows:
Inmate Crime
Age Type
15-25 Violent
40+ Violent
The range of net social benefits to the FBOP, if reallocation of
populations takes place (i.e., confining, in "order" those whose
captivity produces the greatest net benefit) is estimated at $982
million in the case in which no reform of the individual takes
place, to $1.2 billion in the high-reform case.^ The data used
to estimate FBOP costs as well as those used for valuing averted
crimes are imperfect and the analysis must be regarded as pre-
42limxnary, albeit an interesting direction.
McGuire estimated incapacitation (crimes avoided due to 
incarceration) benefits for federal correctional institutions
Addiction or Net Value
Alcoholism Priors of Confinement
No None $40,158
No None $ 7,836
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during 1976, using FBI and victimization data and also included
43inmate opportunity costs. As did Tabasz, he estimated the costs 
and frequency (weighted by age) of different crimes for which offen­
ders were incarcerated, but excluded post-release benefits. Tabasz'
44figures are not incorporated into the model. McGuire found that, 
on average, the incarceration services of a typical federal correc­
tional institution prevented 237 arrests per year for assaults, 
burglary, robbery, larceny and motor vehicle theft, with an
estimated social cost of $163,000. The use of victimization figures
45would increase this social cost to $1.3 million. But the produc­
tion (i.e., prison outlays) cost necessary to preclude this social 
cost is $1.9 million, excluding inmate opportunity costs. Estimates 
of general deterrence benefits are not available, nor are data on 
displacement effects, and McGuire, while recognizing the need for 
further research, tentatively concludes: ". . .The costs incurred by 
society in producing incapacitation benefits are so substantial
that an economic justification for correctional institutions must
46likely lie in their provision of other social benefits."
5.6.2. Production Functions and Efficiency
The research is extremely tentative in this area but some 
preliminary results are briefly discussed to indicate the state- 
of-the-art.
Witte, et al, estimated production functions for federal 
47institutions. They hypothesize a long run, homothetic CES func­
tion with the elasticity ofsubstitution nearly equal to one and 
increasing returns to scale. At this point the findings do not
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48seem implausible, with the exception of the elasticity term. The 
proxy (electricity) for capital charges was unsatisfactory, however, 
so these results should be viewed as highly preliminary.
Similar caveats apply to an attempt at frontier analysis in 
the same work, whereby in a set of higher similar activities, the 
plant exhibiting the lowest costs may be used as a model for the 
other members of the set. The analysis should only be undertaken 
in cases where the production units use similar technologies to 
produce eguivalant outputs. The authors suggest that the FBOP con­
fines fewer inmates than is technically possible and that a re­
allocation between labor and capital (toward capital) would reduce
*. 49 costs.
5.6.3. Quality
A continuing problem in analysis has been controlling for 
quality, either cross-sectionally or in time series. Without a 
standardized definition or method of control it is difficult to assume 
that what is "produced" at one institution or at one point in time 
is comparable to another institution or another time. What may 
appear to be cost minimization, ceteris paribus, may in fact be an 
artifact of subtle decreases in the quality of confinement. Over­
crowding is an example of where it would be important to have 
quality indicators. In addition, standardized definitions would per­
mit comparisons of research findings.
A single attempt has been made to develop quality measures 
which would be applicable nationwide. While it is not argued that 
measures are definitive, they do represent a beginning. Rather than
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using standards, which are certainly one set of quality indicators,
this analysis uses an environmental approach and the experience of
all 559 state institutions to develop national means and standard 
50deviations. Five quality categories and nine total measures were
derived. Table 5-3 illustrates the findings. The measures can
then be used to evaluate a state system, or individual prison unit.
Since definitions and usage of the various factors may differ (e.g.,
cost disparities, different criteria for placing inmates in segregated
custody, different security definitions), these results should be
viewed as preliminary. What makes them interesting is the fact that
they introduce a degree of standardization heretofore missing from
the research and incorporate some proxies for assessing the atmosphere
of an institution, and not mistakenly treating "outputs of different
51quality as if they were the same."
5.7. Summary
This chapter examined economic contributions arrayed fcy issues 
of interest in institutional management and allocation. Included were 
discussions of optimal scale of plant for prisons and jails, short­
term population changes, multi-plant allocation, prison industries 
and some emerging areas of work. The overall theoretical framework 
was that of a multi-plant firm producing confinement and rehabilita­
tive outputs. It remains to briefly review and assess issues of 
data, assumptions and policy recommendations.
5.7.1. Data
Data issues remain problematical. Because of differences in 
accounting practices both within and between systems and different
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Table 5-3 
QUALITY MEASURES, STATE PRISONS3 
(n=559)
Category X
1. Density & Occupancy
A. % less than 60 square 
feet of living space/
inmate 65
B. % Multiple housed 55
2. Level of Deviance
A. % in disciplinary
segregation 3.0
B. % in protective
segregation 2.3
3. Freedom of Movement
A. Nb. hours confined 9.6
B. % Maximum Security 52
4■ Access to Services (Programs)
A. % Service Providers 16.3
B. Ratio: Inmates/Svc
Providers 19.4
5• Expenditures Per Inmate
A. Direct Cost per Inmate
per year $6500
Standard Deviation
11.4
18.3
.80
.95
.7
15.3
2.8
6.4
$4200
a/ Source: Lawrence A. Greenfield, "Assessing Prison Environ­
ments: A Comparative Approach" (unpublished), National
Institute of Justice, 1980, pg. 8 .
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definitions and proxies used in analysis, little comparison is yet 
possible and most study findings should be regarded as suggestive, 
rather than definitive. A bright spot on the horizon, however, has 
been the recognition by practicing economists that such problems 
exist; hence the resultant allocation of research resources to 
derive more reliable data sets. Most of the studies reviewed here 
illustrated substantial exertion to derive a reliable data set for
the analysis, lb date, the Federal Bureau of Prisons has been the
most appealing system to examine because its facilities operate under 
similar procedures and accounting practices. But systems for collect­
ing and standardizing state and local data are sorely needed. A
recommendation in this area then is that standardized definitions of
costs, outputs, quality and valuation be developed. Admittedly no 
small exercise, it would permit better evaluation of methodologies 
and findings and allow comparisons between different studies. In 
the interim, data sets and definitions should constitute a primary 
portion of new research and be displayed along with findings for 
evaluation.
5.7.2. Assumptions and Definitions
A related concern is the variety and level of assumptions 
utilized in present analysis. Often it is not clear exactly what 
assumptions are in force; sometimes they represent a serious lack 
of touch with the correctional phenomena to which they are applied.
For example, Block controlled for differences in confinement outputs 
by stratifying by security level. Definitions of security levels 
are difficult; what is medium security in South Carolina may be maximum
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security in Minnesota, and in-state differences may exist as well.
52The cost structure may vary fcy the way security levels are maintained. 
Wider use of statistical procedures and standardized definitions would 
help to assure that cross-sectional as well as time series data are 
reliable.
Research practices ordinarily assume no slack resources 
in the production unit under analysis, yet resource levels and 
allocations may be arbitrary or at least unplanned. The present 
(albeit necessary) focus on the input side may produce cost func­
tions which, e.g.,reflect legislative parsimony more than cost 
minimization behavior in the theoretical sense. A related concern 
is the effect of crowding in the context of increasing prisoner 
populations in the short run. It is widely believed that personal 
crowding creates frustrations which produce behavioral changes; 
however, unless resources are expended to address such behavioral 
change, its impact will not be captured in the analysis. Because 
the consequences of study recommendations have significance in 
human terms, these effects are important.
Finally, assumptions about the substitutability of labor 
and capital need to be examined in the light of actual correctional 
operations. It is not at all clear that assumptions of an 
elasticity of substitution at or near unity are correct; yet this 
has been used in policy recommendations.
5.7.3. Policy Recommendations
The overriding consideration when evaluating correctional 
policy recommendations is the appropriate use of economic-based
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information in this relatively new area of economic inquiry.
For recommendations to be feasible, rather than just theoretically
interesting, they must be grounded in a familiarity of the operational
milieu. In addition, recommendations need to be qualified on the
53basis of the data and study techniques utilized. Extrapolation 
beyond data sets or generalizations that improved morale creates 
lower costs may be interesting but hardly grounded in empiricism.
Findings on population composition, services and staffing 
characteristics may prove useful for planning. Development of 
quality and output measures should improve information in decisions 
to reallocate populations.
Research on cost functions should be designed to improve on 
these early findings. As discussed above, a statement that violence 
may occur with crowding but not affect costs needs to be empirically 
verified. So, too, does the issue of managerial resources; it may 
be that very large institutions may be theoretically possible but 
operationally infeasible because of administration and management 
problems.
The policy recommendations emanating from the economic 
analysis of institutions fall into two major categories:
• short-run operations, including allocation of 
prisoners within and between institutions; and 
projection of cost changes effected by variations 
in population types and levels;
• long-run planning, including optimum prison size, 
types and level of programs, reallocation between 
prisons and community.
In sum, the findings and policy recommendations of the
various studies are useful in telling more about factors which
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influence costs, in providing viable examples of economic applica­
tions and in the investigation of appropriate analytical techniques 
to further illuminate the field. Better specification and evalua­
tion of outputs should produce better analysis and more usable policy 
recommendations.
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untrustworthy in a technical report find their way into the 
literature. Witte, et al., derived an inverted cost curve for 
California prisons and determined that their analysis inappro­
priately controlled for institutional similarities and the model 
could not be trusted. Ihe summary, however, included policy 
recommendations and production functions based on the findings. 
Ihe L.I.F.E. project discussed in the next chapter is a similar 
example.
Chapter Six
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CORRECTIONS: COMMUNITY ISSUES
6.1 Introduction
Economic principles as they relate to issues surrounding in­
stitutions were addressed in the preceding chapter. This chapter 
addresses the sphere in which the balance of correctional activities 
take place —  the community. While many community activites may be 
viewed as alternatives to incarceration, and analyzed from that 
perspective, there are a host of considerations characterizing correc­
tional community service provision which warrant separate examination.
Correctional services essentially are a public good, but this 
does not preclude involving the private sector, nor does it preclude 
one iurisdiction (e.g., state) from encouraging more provision by 
another (e.g., local). In fact, there are a variety of means avail­
able to correctional agencies to accomplish social objectives, includ­
ing: direct provision of community services; contractual and financial
arrangements with private organizations to provide community services; 
providing transitional aid to released offenders; tax or subsidy 
programs to foster additional service provision; and, direct involve­
ment of the offender in the reparations for criminal behavior.
Ibis chapter will focus on three major areas of community 
service provision:
• private sector provision of correctional services;
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• restitution and income maintenance programs;
• taxation and subsidy incentives to encourage community 
service provision.
These three areas are reasonably representative of correc­
tions' issues and provide ample latitude for economic analysis. They 
generally represent areas where policymaking has lacked an economic 
perspective.
6.2. Private Sector Service Provision
The provision of correctional services in the community dates
back to the nineteenth century (see Chapter Two), but only in recent
years have these services become widespread. As late as 1967, a task
force was moved to state,
In the main, however, private programs for offenders 
are very rudimentary . . . (I)n view of its gjeat 
potential, this area has been barely touched.
The view then was still of the private sector as a complement,
rather than substitute, for public agency provision. A few years later
this outlook began to change and the Joint Commission on Correctional
Manpower and Training more unequivocally endorsed the private sector:
Correctional agencies should utilize more fully the resources 
of private industry. In areas such as management development, 
research, basic education and job training for offenders, the 
private sector may be able to provide considerable assistance 
to corrections. Federal and state funding should be made 
available to correctional agencies to facilitate contracting 
for these2services which might be better performed by private 
industry.
The National Advisory' Commission on Criminal Justice Standards 
and Goals in 1973 further endorsed the move to the community, regard­
ing every step in the corrections process as a potential opportunity
3
for community and private involvement. These developments,
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coupled with substantial federal largesse, ushered in the private 
sector provision which prevails today.
6.2.1. Rationale for Involvement
Besides the philosophical and financial thrusts reported above, 
there is presumably a cost-effectiveness rationale (alluded to by the 
Joint Commission) for private sector involvement. The smaller (relative 
to a corrections agency) private firm may offer unique capabilities, 
convenient, less costly administrative arrangements, and greater flexi­
bility in adjusting to small client populations and changing client 
needs. The typical corrections agency cannot easily produce the 
specialized services available in the private sector. This has become 
more true as new treatment modalities are introduced.
In any case, private provision of correctional services in 
the community has become prevalent enough that a national accredita­
tion body has issued standards for performance, and some research has 
been conducted on its organization and management. There are two basic 
service provision formats: residential (where the client lives in
and receives treatment, although may be free to work or study in the 
community during the day); and nonresidential (where services are pro­
vided on an outpatient basis). Residential programs often have a 
fixed length-of-stay, while for nonresidentials, the service provision 
is more casual. Services offered by both types of organizations include 
counseling, drug and alcohol treatment, job training and placement, 
education and legal services, housing and other assistance.
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6 *2 *2 . Theoretical Framework
It is possible to examine community providers in a traditional 
economic framework, focusing on issues of demand, supply, and market 
structure. Emerging work has begun to identify, for example, the various 
consumers of community corrections activities and how their responses 
may be justified or measured. There is much information on the firm 
(i.e., the community provider) as well —  its size and managerial 
practices —  and it is also possible to draw some preliminary con­
clusions about the competitive structure of the market in which serv­
ices are provided. Such information is relevant to a corrections 
agency contemplating initiation or continuance of involvement with 
the private sector.
There is ample research on community corrections. However, much 
of it has been conducted on one or a few providers; this was dis­
cussed in the chapter on cost analysis. In order to discuss concepts 
of demand, or market structure, aggregated analysis is more useful 
and there are a few comprehensive analyses which will permit this 
perspective. In 1975 the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration 
funded a nationwide study to evaluate the level and type of service 
provision, funding and contractual arrangements, and market character­
istics of correctional services provided in the community. In 1980, 
Minnesota conducted an evaluation of its Cbmmunity Corrections Act;
4
and another statewide study of private providers was completed.
These studies provide much of the background for the analysis which 
follows. The approach taken in the following section is an analysis 
of economic phenomena, rather than a presentation of each study,
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since taken as a whole>these studies provide insight on the overall 
conduct of community service provision.
6.2.2.1. Demand. There exist three parties which can be viewed as 
consumers of community correctional services —  the correctional
5
agency, the public as a whole, and the offender/client. Related con­
sumers are of course the courts, the legislature and the executive but 
it is assumed their preferences are reflected by the agency or the 
public. Each may be expected to have a different preference structure 
and an optimal case prevails only if all preferences are satisfied.
Hie traditional demand function
Qd = f (P, Y, t&p, Ps, Pc ) 
is quite suitable for analyzing the first two groups. The relevant 
variables are:
P = the cost of the community program;
Y = overall funds available for correctional treatment;
t&p= attitudes about service provision in the community 
and associated risk;
P = the cost of alternatives, such as incarceration; s '
P = the cost of ancillary services necessary to main­
tain services in the community, such as administra­
tion evaluation, and so forth.
A demand function for the offender is a little more contrived;
let it suffice to say that "satisfaction" is derived in at least two
ways:
• receipt of services which meet expressed needs; and
• imposition of the least drastic sanction (i.e., offenders 
are not sentenced to a more restrictive environment than 
necessary).
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The price of community services is of interest to agencies 
and the public but limited knowledge of an "appropriate" price 
(particularly given the dearth of outcome and cost-effectiveness in­
formation) relegates it to less than principal status. The income 
level (appropriations and grants) of a correctional agency will affect 
its demand for additional services. Ihe increase in federal criminal 
justice subsidies under the Safe Streets Act (from $60 million in 
1969 to $800 million in 1975) undoubtedly added pressure to absorb 
these funds by contracting with existing service capabilities. Hie 
1973 Part E amendments to the act with first priority cn community- 
based corrections increased the movement to non-justice providers.
Since the funding was federal, a state or local citizen may have been 
unaware of these events.
Tastes and preferences about community provision relate to 
issues of risk, but also, for the corrections agency, to attitudes 
about the suitability of rendering services through non-corrections 
providers. The movement toward the private sector was accomplished 
in port by the various task forces and federal funding; but the 
question of risk is still widely debated. In many cases, considera­
tions of risk produce a "widening of the net" insofar as community 
placement is not an alternative to incarceration but a method of 
increasing the supervision of offenders who otherwise might have been 
fined or set free. Methods for assessing risk include collecting data
on incidents of clients' criminal behavior while under supervision
6and survey research on community attitudes. Substitutes may range 
from alternative provision mechanisms in the community to incarceration
in prisons and jails. Ihe latter are probably not widely viewed as 
substitutes for community services. Ihe comparison remains imperfect 
because outputs have not been defined or measured such that one could 
speculate on the suhstitutability of prisons and halfway houses.
Finally, complementary services or arrangements may be necessary 
to the provision of services in the community. Conceptually, these 
might include additional administrative mechanisms, public education 
campaigns and so forth. In a cost-benefit analysis, these would 
appear as costs beyond those suggested by program operations.
The fact that the offender/client has no choice about the 
services or provision structure suggests the need to infer attributes 
that maximize the offender's satisfaction given a constrained situa­
tion. These attributes fall into two major areas —  criminal justice 
system dispositions and program content. Assuming that no sanction at 
all is the most desirable disposition from the client's perspective, 
more satisfaction will obtain if the sanction imposed in the presence 
of, e.g., a residential community program, is less harsh than in its 
absence. If an offender otherwise would have been committed to prison, 
then residential community placement is a more satisfactory option; if
probation would have been imposed, then the more restrictive residential
7
placement is a less satisfactory alternative. Recent attempts to
• • 8measure this appear promising.
An offender may be said to realize satisfaction from services
provided if, given forced participation, the services provided to
9
clients relate to the needs of those clients. Evidence as 
to whether services meet needs is sketchy both because of data and
because of the location and timing of the needs assessment func-
6 .2.2.2. Monopsony. Monopsony is the buyer's counterpart of monopoly 
a single purchaser for an industry1s output or a sole employer of a 
factor of production. This arrangement gives the buyer more control 
over the terms of trade than in a competitive setting. In the context 
of community services provision, this control is exercised more subtly 
than directly. The public agency may provide only a portion of client 
costs and cover only a part of the organizations's fixed costs. This 
phenomenon has not been closely examined for its effects on pro­
viders, but recent research suggests an effort might be fruitful. A 
1975 study found that 119 private sector organizations derived two-
thirds of their revenues from public funding sources, and averaged
11only two referral sources. Provider organizations attempt to
counter this situation by diversifying services and seeking unre- 
12stricted funds.
6 .2.2.3. The Firm. The typical community service-providing firm 
tends to be small, new, and to offer counseling as its primary thera­
peutic mode. An average budget for a residential organization is 
under $200,000, while for nonresidentials it is under $150,000."^ 
(Chapter Four presented sample budgets for halfway houses illustrating 
the distribution of costs.) Generally, personnel expenditures consume 
about two-thirds of a residential budget, about three-quarters for a 
nonresidential organization. The usual staff complement includes an 
executive director/administrator, specialized program personnel, and
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support staff. Because of factor indivisibilities (and in resi­
dential facilities the need for five employees to staff one position 
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week), the staff complement is 
fairly constant for wide ranges of clients, and fixed even for very
small client populations. Client populations tend to the low side,
15averaging twenty or less for a typical residential facility.
But certain staff resources, such as an administrator or a counseling 
supervisor, will be underutilized in such facilities, as the number 
of persons they can manage (staff and client) is in excess of the 
lower program staff required for small populations. The Kassebaum 
study found the ratio of program to administrative staff to be 1.9 
in small programs (<_5 staff) but 7.25 in larger programs C> 30 staff). 
Thus, average client costs will tend to be higher in the smaller 
facilities.
Output measures for community providers have been difficult 
to develop. They may be time-related, e.g., a 90-day stay; program- 
related, e.g., client obtains job or is drug-free; or something in 
between. Few studies utilizing rigorous test protocol have been per­
formed to determine changes in criminal behavior which would permit 
cross-program and institutional comparisons.
6 .2.2.4. Market Structure. Available data has permitted some 
hypothesizing about the market in which community services are provided. 
As in the American economy generally, it appears that monopolistic 
competition is the best definition. Monopolistic competition rests 
between pure competition and oligopoly and is characterized by relatively 
easy entry and numerous sellers, each producing a product or service
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similar to its neighbor tut differentiated enough so that buyers
do not regard the products as perfect substitutes. The result is
that each firm tends to operate suboptimally, i.e., not at minimum
average cost, and the consumer pays a higher price than would obtain
under perfect competition.
Community correctional services provision is characterized by
many small firms and product differentiation occurs through the way
"producers" name themselves and "advertise" their services. In the 1975
study by Kassebaum, Funke and Wayson, forty programs were analyzed in
detail. What initially appeared to be major program distinctions
proved to be slight variations in essentially residential or non-
res idential settings. A 1980 analysis of 28 organizations revealed
16no significant difference other than residence arrangement.
Programs differentiate themselves in two general ways —  type 
of service (drug, alcohol, employment) and type of client (male, female,
17
adult, juvenile) —  but the variations are considerable and creative. 
Competition is always nonprice. Market entry is relatively easy; 
physical capital requirements are low and during the 1970s, availa­
bility of federal funds virtually guaranteed that a specialized focus 
would yield referrals and funding. Finally, the typical provider
operates as well under capacity, further increasing per diem (product)
4- 1 8  costs.
What prevails then, when one considers both consumers and 
producers, is production of community services characterized by suboptimal 
output and price levels. The community and the corrections agency 
may prefer smaller client populations at a particular facility because
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of attitudes about risk; suppliers differentiate their products in
order to attract and maintain funding sources. The result may be
characterized along the dimensions developed by Cassels in differentiat-
19ing departures from "ideal" output.
— — . — ........   —   — ...................................         —   -j
FIGURE 6-1 
Ideal Outputs and Excess Capacity
•SAC SAC
Q, QuantityC
In Figure 1, ideal output is given at Qc , corresponding to the 
minimum point on the long-run average cost curve. Ibe firm will observe 
SACp as its long-run curve and operates at Ep, producing Q£ rather than 
the socially optimal Q£' ; deviation between QE' and QQ arises because 
of differences between social and individual optimal sizes. Ihus, the 
phenomena of monopolistic competition and consumer preferences about 
smaller community facilities cause divergence from an optimum.
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There are some policy recommendations which evolve from this 
analysis. Public agencies need more information on community providers 
to determine whether differentiated services are a necessity or a con­
struct. If the latter obtains, then it is appropriate from an economic 
perspective to more fully utilize a few providers and permit others to 
exit the market. Over the longer term, research on optimal scale 
of plant combined with public information strategies to develop 
community acceptance of .larger-scale facilities could help reduce 
average costs.
6.3. Financing in the Cbmmunity
6.3.1. Background
Overcrowded prisons and concerns about humane treatment have 
led some states to encourage more provision of correctional services 
by local jurisdictions. This section examines the state-of-the-art 
in such programs, discusses the outcomes of some programs which have 
been evaluated and examines the theoretical purpose of subsidies within 
the correctional policy -context.
There is considerable latitude on the part of courts to sentence
20offenders to state or local incarceration or community treatment. A 
state wishing to shift some of its commitments to the local level may 
accomplish this by providing a payment to localities for retaining 
offenders or by charging localities for sending offenders to state 
facilities. Correctional jargon characterizes these approaches as 
"subsidies" or "chargebacks." Until the mid-1960s, only five states 
provided subsidies to local corrections; by 1977, 23 states had enacted
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authorizations for funding corrections at the local level and 41
programs were in effect. In fiscal 1975 state appropriations for local
21corrections' subsidies were $120 million.
In theoretical terms, a subsidy is offered to one entity 
(jurisdiction) by another in order to reduce the cost or increase 
the production of some desirable output. In criminal justice, this may 
involve state underwriting of part of the service at the local level 
to make local alternatives more feasible to produce. Finally, a "tax" 
or chargeback may be imposed on undesirable behavior (such as increas­
ing state commitments by local jurisdictions) to make local alterna­
tives appear less costly. Many correctional subsidy programs incorporate 
both tax and subsidy features. Stated in terms of objectives articulated 
by state agencies, the purposes of a subsidy are:
• to shift more of the responsibility for correctional 
service provision from the state to the local level;
• to reduce or control commitments to state correctional 
facilities;
• to foster development of community-based correctional 
alternatives;
• to encourage minimum standards for improvement of local 
programs;
22• to stimulate regional coordination and cooperation.
Subsidy programs typically constrain the types of expenditures
which can be made. Commonly, operating, maintenance, personnel and 
personnel-related costs, such as travel, education, training and 
fringe benefits are allowable expenses. Usually, expenses to support 
private vendors are not allowed nor are construction and renovation. 
Criteria for determination of shares range from a percentage support
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formula, to compliance with performance standards, to a competitive 
23process.
Essentially there are two output goals associated with local 
subsidies: to increase the quantity and/or quality of local service
provision to adult and juvenile clients. Some states have a related 
goal of reducing local commitments to state facilities or super­
vision. Appendix B presents a summary of forty-one subsidy programs 
in twenty-three states, including the purpose of the subsidy, alloca­
tion formulas and target expenditure categories. Qualitative changes 
in service provision are often fostered by salary subsidies to 
personnel with bachelor's degrees or a partial reimbursement to local 
residential facilities. Quantitative changes are achieved through 
subsidization of construction or funding needed personnel. Seven 
states have reduced-commitment goals, four of which impose reduced- 
commitment quotas for reimbursement eligibility.
6.3.2. Selected Programs
This next section will examine analyses of two well-known 
subsidy programs —  California's probation subsidy and Minnesota's 
Community Corrections Act. A general evaluation of state subsidy 
programs and the relationship between goals and strategies will 
appear at the end of this section.
6 .3.2.1. Probation Subsidy. Probation subsidies are state grants 
to localities which may be used for salaries, operating expenses and 
service improvement for local probation. Often a full-time officer 
position will be funded for small, rural counties. A variant on this
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approach, which will be discussed here, is the use of performance in­
centives —  payments to counties for achieving reductions in their 
commitments to state institutions. Qf the seven states with reduced- 
commitment goals built into their financing structure, the most widely 
known and evaluated has been the California probation subsidy program. 
Begun in FY 1966-67 as a response to substandard local service and 
increasing adult and juvenile institutional commitments, the program 
has expanded from 31 participating counties with awards of $5.6
million to 43 counties (95 percent of the state population) and 1975
24awards of $120 million. The detailed research on the program made 
possible its evaluation along two economic dimensions: output changes 
(in this case, the shift of service provision from the state to the 
local level); and valuation of net social benefits (the difference 
between costs in the program's absence and in its presence, measured 
by averted state costs less program disbursements).
Under early evaluative procedures, the program was deemed a 
success as measured along these two dimensions. Subsequent discussion 
centered around the absolute amount of the state savings generated 
by the program and over the years these savings have been adjusted 
downward. The important policy concept here is that early analysis 
seriously overstated the averted costs attributable to probation 
subsidy; thus expansion of the program within and among states could 
fail to produce the desired effects, at least in their initially 
conceived magnitude.
The award procedure is fairly straightforward: a county's 
expected annual commitment rate is derived by using historical
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commitments weighted by county and state populations. Subsidy is
received if actual commitments over a particular year are less than
expected commitments. The amount of the subsidy ranges from $2,080
to $4,000 with larger amounts awarded as the percentage of reduction in
commitments increases. As of 1974, use of funds is nolonger limited to
probation services; expenditures for local detention facilities and
programs are also permitted. Caseload and other standards are used to
25mitigate deterioration of services.
Early benefit estimates were derived by estimating the career
cost (the average cost of an average institutional stay plus parole
26and capital costs) times the reduced commitments. By 1973, the 
state savings were calculated by summing the costs of cancelled con­
struction, closed institutions, new institutions not opened and con­
struction savings, and positing net benefits of $124 million compared
27to subsidy payments of $60 million.
At this time, new analysis of population projections indicated
that there was a leveling trend in institutional commitments and that
the reduction attributable to subsidy was smaller than originally
estimated. A subsequent analysis used revised commitment figures and
career costs to produce a range of savings of $19 to $111 million de-
28pending on the commitment rate selected.
Subsequent consideration of these early evaluations has not 
necessarily produced a definitive net benefit figure. However, several 
additional qualifications to the analysis are noted here as examples 
of what must be undertaken before cost-benefit estimates can be used 
as program justification:
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• commitment rates were not weighted by the probability
of an offender actually serving the average term, rather 
than being paroled, etc. (a shorter than expected 
sentence would result in overstatement of the averted 
prison costs);
• local career costs in excess of the subsidy were not 
estimated (i.e., for some offenders, the supervision 
cost may exceed the subsidy);
• recidivism costs were not estimated either during or 
post-program;
• administrative costs of the subsidy program are generally 
not included in the analysis;
• differences in quality of2^are of state and local pro­
viders are not estimated.
In addition, research quoted earlier in this paper (Chapter
Five) indicates that using average costs will tend to overstate the
30savings of a reduced commitment.
The most that can definitively be argued for probation subsidy 
is that some state commitments were diverted to local jurisdictions, 
and that producing or estimating a net social benefit is an elusive 
process. The earlier estimates doubtless encouraged other states to 
institute the program (the usual problem being that understating costs 
leads to production at levels that may be non-optimal from a social 
perspective). It may be better to argue that there are some positive 
factors arguing for service provision at the local, rather than 
state level; but these relate more to the intangible benefits of 
neighborhood service provision rather than realized averted costs.
6 .3.2.2. Community Corrections. Minnesota's Community Corrections 
Act (1973) had an impetus similar to California's probation subsidy, 
i.e., to decrease state commitments and encourage expansion and
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development of correctional services at the local level. A related 
concern was the fostering of more "organizational coherence" and 
coordinated interjurisdictional planning. The Act provided for charge­
backs to counties for state institutional commitments of certain cate­
gories of offenders, combined with subsidies to improve local services. 
Seventy percent of the state's population is represented by the 27 
counties participating in the Act, with an annual subsidy eligibility 
of $13 million.
An extensive evaluation of the Act, conducted after the Act 
was in effect, was undertaken to determine changes along the following 
dimensions/goals of the Act:
• planning and administration;
• local correctional programming;
• retaining offenders in the community;
• appropriateness of sanctions;
• public protection;
• social justice;
• economy; •
32• efficiency.
In many ways this evaluation is a formal examination of the 
unresolved issues surrounding probation subsidy. Its comprehensive­
ness provides better policy tools than analysis of averted costs. An 
elaborate conceptual framework hypothesized the linkages between the 
evaluation areas above and the research summarized verifiable linkages 
and direction of change. Selected results are briefly summarized 
here.
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More offenders are retained in the community under the Act,
but absolute numbers are small and the authors conclude that
" . . .there is little evidence that the chargeback provision is an
33effective disincentive." A second goal, economy, or the realiza­
tion of net savings through consolidation of administrative services, 
reduction in state institutional costs, and better resource alloca­
tion, was not met. Essentially, the administrative costs not only 
did not decline, but increased, and the savings attributable to
reduced institutional commitments were insufficient to offset the 
34costs. Administrative costs rose by over 500 percent for two
reasons: overhead costs rose as each area established individual
administrative units and, perhaps more importantly from a policy
perspective, the state did not "wither away" but rather acquired and
maintained an additional layer of personnel even though services were 
35decentralized. A new, less efficient "technology" replaced the old. 
Finally, efficiency was evaluated in terms of cost per public protec­
tion success. There was no significant change in recidivism before 
and after the Act, so public protection was maintained; however, 
costs rose, so the efficiency measure exhibited a decrease.
The Minnesota subsidy was evaluated more comprehensively than 
California's probation subsidy; but generally, the available information 
suggests that multiple evaluation measures are necessary; and there may 
be no real savings associated with the promotion of local corrections 
activity. Admittedly scant data on chargebacks for state commitments 
indicate that localities may have a relatively inelastic demand for 
state commitments and that substantial inducements may be necessary
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to produce a significant effect. Whether these inducements would 
approach or exceed state costs is an open question.
The Minnesota experience suggests that planning to control 
administrative costs is necessary if effectiveness is to be maxi- 
mi zed, and that evaluations need to incorporate measures of this 
phenomenon. More accurate information on criminal activity and its 
costs would also improve the evaluation process. Generally, the evi­
dence suggests that earmarked expenditures and performance measures 
improve the potential for goal attainment. Yet most of the programs 
listed in the appendix provide only general funding requirements; there 
is no way to identify or measure qualitative change or to link it 
directly with different reimbursement schema. The formulas used for 
funding vary widely as do the purposes they are designed to accomplish. 
From an economic perspective, while it appears that some changes in 
the quantity and quality of output do in fact occur as a result of 
state aid to local corrections, the general lack of performance 
criteria and output specifications probably result in suboptimal 
solutions. The assumptions underlying the Minnesota Community 
Corrections Act suggested that effective resource utilization is 
maximized when the decisionmaking is vested in the unit of govern­
ment directly responsible for production; yet the evidence suggests 
some structural problems in effectuating this.
In the last analysis, subsidies may not be "paid for" by 
averted state costs, but may be desirable as a way of providing 
broad-based correctional services, since it may be ". . .questionable 
that local governmental units would shift an increasing amount of
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of declining property tax dollars to corrections if a (state) policy 
did not exist.
6.4. Taxes and Subsidies for Offenders
The analysis thus far has focused on correctional service 
provision and financing, with consideration of offender programs a 
more tangential issue except as it affected costs or otherwise con­
tributed to economic analysis. Ordinarily, correctional programming 
has a rehabilitative focus and is evaluated in terms of whether 
criminal behavior is altered as a result of the various services offered. 
However, three program approaches —  restitution, fee-for-service, and 
financial aid to released offenders —  introduce a financial component 
(payment by the offender in two cases and payment to the offender in 
one case) and will be discussed briefly.
6.4.1. Restitution
Restitution is defined as a financial or service reparation
by an offender for a criminal act. It is generally imposed as a
supplementary sanction to probation or parole and usually for crimes
against property. It differs from victim compensation programs in
which the state agency uses tax monies to compensate victims of
(violent) crimes against the person. In 1978, forty restitution
programs nationwide were identified, primarily involving adult
offenders and provided in a nonresidential setting. A second survey
also found 86 percent of a sample of juvenile courts using restitution,
37but an absence of formal programs.
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There is no general agreement on the purpose of restitution, 
whether it be deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation. It has 
been suggested, for example, that rehabilitation is accomplished by 
making the payment an "(e)xtra effort, a sacrifice of time or con­
venience, " while assuring the public that the offender is indeed
38being "punished" by this approach.
Most (90-95 percent) restitution programs are financial; 
nationwide data are not yet available, hut a small 1977 survey found 
an average loss per victim of $214, with an average restitution pay­
ment of $167. Judges appeared to be sensitive to the offender's
ability-to-pay and most clients were middle class whites with no 
39prior record. Other studies indicate some deviance from the 
above figures, with average payments ranging from $89 in South Dakota 
to $144 in Oklahoma, $272 in Oregon, and $137 in Georgia. (In this 
latter case, the average restitution payment assessed was $519). ^
Ibe majority of the evaluations have focused on the be­
havioral features of restitution —  the positive aspects of a 
personal reparation from offender to victim —  or recidivism, in 
much the same way that any program is addressed; or on the monies 
returned to victims.
What has not appeared in any evaluation to date, yet would 
appear important given the nature of the situation, is a considera­
tion of restitution as a tax on legal income. Incarceration, restitu­
tion, and other rehabilitative activites are designed to increase 
the opportunity cost of illegal activities by making legal options 
more attractice; but a tax on legal income, in the form of restitution,
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may in fact reduce again the opportunity cost of illegal income 
41sources.
Limited data on offenders in restitution programs suggests 
that this issue may be worth investigating. It is often argued that 
restitution payments are small, yet in one program of twelve hundred 
clients, the average income was between $4 - $8 ,000/per year.^ In 
another, during a one year period, 31 percent of 400 clients had no 
reported income, and 61 percent had average earnings of $4,700. In 
this latter group, 31 percent were rearrested within six months after 
program release, 59 percent after twelve months, and 87 percent after 
eighteen months.^
Presently there is little information on in-program re­
cidivism but the low income of participants and (limited) data on
high post-release recidivism suggests that the tax perspective is 
44not illogical. If there is an unemployment-low income-crime link, 
and the opportunity cost theory has credence, then the additional 
burden of restitution may be a critical factor in determining subse­
quent behavior. Further, if the program focus suggests that repara­
tion should be a sacrifice, i.e., not an option for the (relatively) 
wealthy, then restitution may indeed be viewed as a tax on legal 
income, and programming is necessary to address this eventuality. 
Programs which provide offenders with jobs only represent one option. 
Research on any relationship between disposable income levels and 
economic crime would help to identify what, if any, level of restitu­
tion payment would not contribute to future criminal behavior.
207
6.4.2. Correctional Service Fees
A related area, which may be evaluated from the perspective 
just introduced above, involves the payment by offenders for cor­
rectional services. Occasionally this is a component of a work- 
release or prison industries program in which offender earnings are 
set high enough to permit the "experience" of paying taxes and room 
and board; i.e., it is part of the treatment modality.
In addition, nearly every state charges offenders who reside 
in its release programs and many charge for specialized services 
such as drug or alcohol treatment, medical service, vocational 
training, and so forth. Florida, for example, in 1978 collected 
$5.10 per day from 1, 722 community center participants.
However, in response to rising costs, twelve states have 
current or pending legislation permitting fee charges for probation 
or parole supervision. Fees are mandatory in four states. In 
addition to revenue generation, proponents argue that fees "promote
responsibility in offenders, have a deterrent effect and provide tax-
46payers with a form of-symbolic restitution."
Of the nine states presently charging fees, rates range from
$2/month (1 ), to a $10/month average (6 ), with annual upper bounds
of $200 (1), $600 (1) and $730 (1). Colorado collected $139,000
47in 1977 while Texas collected $6 million. Ability-to-pay criteria 
are strict: in Florida and Alabama, offenders with annual incomes
exceeding $3,900 are eligible for fees; other states have medical, 
handicap and other hardship waivers, but these seem to be a matter 
of court discretion. Court costs may be charged in addition to 
supervision fees.
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Opponents or evaluators of fees-for-service, as with 
restitution have yet to use an economic-crime approach in their 
arguments. They do charge that the arrangement creates a financial 
burden on the offender, may be questionable because freedom is con­
tingent upon ability-to-pay, acts as a double tax, and forces the 
offender to pay for her/his own punishment. Some argument has also 
been male about the use of collected funds; one state did not increase 
supervision services but instead directed the money to the prison
4- 4 8system.
What represents, in most states, minimal additional revenue 
may pose a substantial burden for offenders. Here as with restitu­
tion, the tax effects could potentially create more crime with a
49social burden far in excess of the actual payments made. It would 
seem that additional research on clients and in-program behavior is 
necessary before programs which represent a tax on legal income 
sources are widely adopted. The prior suggestion that more research 
be conducted on the relationship between income levels, relative 
burdens of fees, and potential economic crime holds in this context 
as well.
6.4.3. Financial Assistance to Offenders
Widespread belief that unemployment and crime are causally 
related has fostered programs to provide financial aid to released 
offenders on the premise that a source of funds eases community 
adjustment and precludes criminal behavior. Observations of re­
searchers in the 1960s supported the linkage between economic self-
50sufficiency and nonrecidivating behavior.
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Persons released from prison ordinarily exit with some "gate 
money," clothing, or transportation assistance provided by correc­
tions authorities, plus any savings accumulated during incarceration. 
Some states provide no assistance whatsoever but the gate money 
range is between $10 and $60 (3 states provide more than $60) and
the modal amount is between $20 - $29; in some cases if the inmate
51has savings, gate money is not provided. Given prison wage
scales, it is unlikely that the inmate will have amassed a stock of
5?wealth, although outside resources may be available.
Because of these considerations, programs to provide transi­
tional financial assistance to released prisoners were undertaken.
The conceptual framework is as discussed earlier in this thesis: 
the presence of transitional aid raises the opportunity cost of il­
legal behavior and presumably deters crime long enough for the offender 
to obtain a job and become relatively settled. The funding provided 
usually is comparable to unemployment insurance, administered through 
parole offices, and extends over a number of weeks. The projects 
undertaken thus far have generally used the experimental-control 
group design, with random assignment of individuals screened for 
particular characteristics. Various evaluation schema have been 
utilized to demonstrate the success of providing financial aid to 
released offenders. In actuality, results are at best ambiquous and 
in some cases, negative.
One of the first programs was conducted in the state of
53Washington and evaluated during 1972-73. Parolees were granted 
a stipend of $55/week for six weeks (special instructions by the
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parole office were necessary to extend coverage beyond this to the 
normal 26-week period for unemployment benefits). Under the program 
terms, perse .s engaging in part-time work had their earnings de­
ducted from the stipend. The program was labeled a "qualified"
success, because while the group receiving financial aid recidivated
54more, they had more crime-free days than the controls. Recommenda­
tions included extension of the program for 26 weeks and the pro­
vision of employment aid.
Another project in California also produced somewhat 
ambiguous results, with an 8 percent difference in recidivism between 
the experimentals and controls.^ The evaluator took a then-new 
tack, and produced a rough cost-benefit analysis, which showed a 
substantial savings due to the financial aid program. Unfortunately, 
the authors used average costs for estimating "saved" prison expendi­
tures, assumed a probability of 1.0 that arrest would lead to a 19- 
month incarceration, and did not include costs of program adminis­
tration since these were provided in-kind by the department of 
corrections. They conclude that " . . .it is probably safe to assume
(the program) would fall among the top money-returners in the 
56field." The assumptions used to reach these conclusions should 
speak for themselves.
The most well-known transitional aid program was the L.I.F.E. 
(Living Insurance for Ex-Prisoners) Project, conducted in Baltimore 
from 1971 to 1974 under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Labor. 
This program followed the compensation patterns of other efforts —  
$60/week for 13 weeks, but with a difference: instead of the usual
dichotomous aid/no aid design, some variations were added. Four
groups were created: a control group receiving nothing, a group
receiving financial aid, a group receiving job placement services
and a group receiving job placement and financial aid services. A
high-risk population with high chances of rearrest was selected. In
another variation on earlier projects, the weekly stipend was only
reduced if a participant had earnings in excess of $40 and then on
57a 2/1 basis ($10 earnings resulted in a $5 stipend reduction).
Overall recidivism was virtually the same for the groups receiving
financial aid alone and aid plus job placement, and higher, but
comparable for the controls and persons receiving placement services
only. When only theft crimes are considered, the financial-aid-only
group did the best; finally, the inclusion of unauthorized auto use
results in equivalent rearrest rates for the group receiving financial
58aid and job placement and the controls. In other words, the group
in which the most (financial aid and job placement assistance) was
invested compared equally with the group in which no investment
was made. Table 6-1 illustrates the several results and suggests
that some sensitivity analysis might have been appropriate; in
addition, in subsequent analyses (later papers), the results of the
four groups never again appear. Groups I and II are referred to
only as the "financial-aid group," III and IV as the "non-financial
aid group" and all conclusions are based on these collapsed groups,
an unfortunate turn of events both for researchers and the subse-
59quent efforts in Texas and Georgia.
On the basis of the results of the L.I.F.E. experiment, the 
program was replicated in the mid-1970s in Texas and Georgia, as
Table 6-1 
RESULTS OF THE LIFE PROJECT3
Rearrests 
Total, all crimes 
Theft crimes
Non-theft crimes
Theft crimes including 
unauthorized use of auto
Group I 
Financial Aid & 
Job Placement
# %
54
27
27
31
50
25
26 
29
Group II 
Financial Aid
Group III 
Job 
Placement
Group IV 
Neither
# 7o # 7. # 70
53 49 63 58 60 56
21 19 35 32 31 29
32 30 28 26 29 27
21 19 37 34 31 29
a Source: Kenneth J. Lenihan, When Money Counts: An Experimental Study of
Providing Financial Aid and Job Placement Services to Released 
Prisoners. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Social Science Research, 
Inc., 1976, p. 50, Table 7 (adaptation).
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T.A.R.P. (Transitional Aid to Released Prisoners), again under 
Department of Labor auspices.^ Both states used essentially the 
same design, providing varying amounts of financial assistance to four 
groups, employment assistance to a fifth, and nothing to the sixth,
strict control group. The findings were similar for the two states: 
financial aid made no positive difference; the groups receiving finan­
cial aid had the highest rearrest rates. In Georgia, the group with 
the largest stipend had the worst rearrest rate, and both research 
teams concluded that financial assistance programs are a disincentive 
to job search activity. Implied in the findings is the conclusion 
that the disincentives of financial aid may have combined with the 
availability of extra time to permit clients to engage in criminal 
behavior. The best results were obtained by clients who secured a 
job on their own, and worked steadily through the study period.*^
The program results are disappointing but, from an economic 
perspective, not surprising. A typical concern with income mainte­
nance programs is the effect on incentive; combining this with pro­
clivities toward illegal income sources would be expected to produce
62the results observed in Texas and Georgia. It appears from these 
results that financial aid alone is not a sufficient deterrent to 
criminal behavior.
6.5. Summary
This chapter has reviewed community correctional issues: 
service provision and financing arrangements, and taxes and sub­
sidies for offenders. Economic principles were found to be 
relevant in all cases: the community corrections market appears
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to be characterized by monopolistic competition —  the presence of 
numerous vendors selling products which are differentiated more by 
assertion than substance. The combination of this phenomenon with 
small production units in part occasioned by public attitudes toward 
risk results in suboptimal production levels and higher prices for 
the individual firm and an inefficient provision structure. An un­
intended consequence of this is the resultant inability of community 
providers to compete on the basis of price with more traditional 
correctional institutions. Program outcomes may be insufficient to 
compensate for the differences. While complete comparability of 
outputs may not be necessary because of different valuations placed 
on the provision of services in the community vs. the institution 
(or, conversely, technically a method should be found to compensate 
for this), it is advantageous from a social viewpoint to perform 
programmatic and cost adjustments such that the differences in the 
evaluation of costs and benefits at the margin are minimized for the 
two sets of alternatives. From the perspective of the contracting, 
e.g., corrections agency, then, two distinct kinds of policy 
recommendations follow: downward pressure on price can be exerted
encouraging somewhat larger provision scales and by treating pro­
viders as if they produced similar services (which preliminary evi­
dence indicates that they do). Over the longer term, research on 
real differences in treatment provision and its relationship to 
client outcome should be conducted to increase whatever benefits 
flow from community provision.
Restitution and fees-for-service were discussed in the 
economic context of taxation effects. The retribution goal suggests
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that such arrangements will be visited on the offenders least able 
to make reparation. If in fact financial restitution and supervision 
fees are viewed as symbolic rather than substantive, there is a 
question as to the social efficacy of using scarce public re­
sources, i.e., administrative costs,to produce a symbolic effect.
It is dubious that, under the current system, an offender would 
observe a benefit in making reparation that would result in a 
feeling that the reparation or fee was justified.
An ability-to-pay approach, however, will not satisfy the 
retribution goal; in fact, the opposite result will obtain.
Furthermore, one unintended consequence of restitution and fees 
includes the very real possibility of economic crime to compensate 
for the tax (an increase in illegal work effort). Again, little is 
known on offender response patterns to such "taxes," although the 
presence of both low legally-earned income levels and client experience 
with illegal activities suggests that present programs may be produc­
ing social costs in substantial excess of observed benefits. As with 
other policy choices,-economic arguments may not be the only decision 
criterion but they can provide additional information about the con­
sequences of a particular set of choices. Too little is known about 
the effects of restitution and fees to conclude that they represent 
appropriate policy choices. There may be a level of payment 
sufficient to meet public goals, which will not produce unwanted 
behavior on the part of the offender. Research on offender preferences- 
and gains from illegal income sources would be a start toward identify­
ing this level.
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Such research would also have utility in the examination of 
programs which provide financial assistance to offenders. The abject 
failure of such programs to date suggests that different provision 
mechanisms may be necessary to assure appropriate behavior during 
the post-release transitional period. Hie expected presence of dis­
incentives to work does not necessarily argue for abandoning the 
notion of assistance but rather to develop alternative delivery 
strategies. If the earlier experiments had been appropriately 
evaluated, it is possible that the later programs could have been 
more successfully tailored. Too, it was not necessary to reinvent 
the wheel and discover that ex-offenders, as many other people, when 
given the choice of equal earned and unearned incomes, will choose 
the unearned. Thus, the portion of the experiment which reduced 
assistance nearly dollar-for-dollar might have been replaced by an 
employer incentive or similar program feature. There is some evi­
dence which indicates that many employers are reluctant to hire 
ex-offenders without additional inducements. Thus, information 
available from the economic and corrections literature could have 
been brought to bear in the program design. Unfortunately, the 
federal resources and interested administrators will probably not 
again be available in the magnitude necessary to examine the concept 
on a broad basis. Hopefully, smaller efforts will be undertaken 
so that the idea is not lost before it is appropriately evaluated.
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Chapter Seven 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Having toured the history, expenditures and contemporary appli­
cations of economics to corrections, we now turn to a summary and 
organization of the knowledge thus gained and offer some recommendations 
for future endeavors. This chapter will focus on summarizing the various 
findings, consideration of the issues within the economic framework 
and providing some research guidelines both for economist and correc­
tional practitioner.
7.1. Summary
The overall focus of this paper has been the utility of the 
economic approach to the analysis of correctional activities; more 
precisely, an integration of economic thinking and correctional decision­
making. Ihe approach has included a synthesis of knowledge in the field, 
the bringing to bear of the economic perspective, and finally, conclu­
sions and recommendations. It was suggested that while economics is no 
stranger to corrections, that the applications have been limited as 
well as somewhat preliminary. Corrections in part has contributed to 
this as has the criminal justice setting generally; nationwide, there 
are varying definitions of crime, multiple sanctions not applied uni­
formly, differing supervisory and administrative structures, different 
goals and variation in service provision. Corrections itself is char­
acterized by shifting, sometimes conflicting, always multiple goals.
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There is much variation both between and within states in the types 
and levels of services provided. The concept of multiple consumers 
and elusive notions of output are further barriers to analysis.
In spite of, or because of these difficulties, it is argued that 
the economic framework is critical to complete analysis and understand­
ing of corrections. Economics has been recognized as having utility 
in the analysis of criminal behavior and sanctions. Gary Becker was 
largely responsible for the transformation, essentially arguing that a 
little economic thinking about crime and punishment removed the apparent 
uniqueness of the subject matter and made it susceptible of non-extraord­
inary analysis. (Perhaps the absence of such a spiritual godfather 
specifically for corrections has contributed to the later kindling of 
interest.) In any case, there now exist economic analyses of correc­
tions on a wide variety of topics. What is necessary, however, is a 
holistic approach wherein economic thinking permeates the analysis of 
correctional issues both from the perspective of individual cases and 
systemwide applications.
The framework for the paper was policy analysis —  the use of 
scientifically derived information in the public decision setting. This 
focus was chosen because there are really two users, or audiences for 
economic analysis. One is economists, searching for new applications, 
refinement of techniques, etc.; but the other is the corrections 
decision-maker —  the person or group endeavoring to make more informed 
policy decisions. Ultimately the utilityof the economic approach lies 
in its explanatory and predictive power. The application of economics 
in a setting where the users are non-economists requires that special 
attention be given to the development of viable policy recommendations.
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In short, the practitioners of each field must occasionally wear the 
hat of the other. Because correctional managers are non-economists, 
the economic implications of their choices are not always apparent.
So togfor economists, the need for analysis and feasible policy 
recommendations may not be obvious or easily attainable.
Policy analysis unites these perspectives and, it is argued 
here, provides the setting for major economic contributions to correc­
tions. There are areas discussed here in which the economic approach 
has been overlooked —  by economists unfamiliar with criminal justice —  
and by corrections' practitioners unaware that economics is capable of 
providing far more insight than what things "cost."
That the issue is worthy of analysis is an understatement. The 
costs of crime are estimated at $73 billion for 1978. Some two million 
persons are under correctional supervision, nearly one-fourth of them 
in secure incarceration. The moment in history at which the punishment 
of confinement replaced torture and execution created an ever-expanding 
network of persons under correctional supervision. Prison populations 
which numbered 58,000 in 1885 are nearly one-half million today and 
increased by 137,000 persons in the 1970s alone. The largest correc­
tional proprietor is state government with prison populations approach­
ing 300,000. The United States incarcerates 209 persons per 100,000 
population, largely due to these burgeoning populations at the state 
level.
Financially, corrections and criminal justice are also "big 
business." The early systems of chargebacks and convict lease and 
contract arrangements permitted substantial self-support for prisons.
The twentieth century change to state-use systems and the concomitant
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restoration of prison control to prison officials had its tradeoff in 
the decline of self-support. Community alternatives have never reduced 
the prison burden, functioning more as alternatives to more unrestricted 
freedom.
Criminal justice system expenditures consume $110 per capita, 
nationwide; of that, $25 goes to corrections. At the federal level, 
corrections consumes 11 cents of the criminal justice dollar; for cities 
and counties the share is 14 cents; and at the state level, nearly 
one-half (48 cents) of the criminal justice dollar is expended on 
corrections. Nationwide, an average of $7,200 is spent on each state 
inmate but the range is broad and approaches, sometimes exceeds,
$20,000 per inmate in some jurisdictions. Prison expenditures comprise 
about 70 percent of corrections expenditures, or five times the outlays 
for probation and parole. Institutional populations, conversely, 
account for just under one-fourth of all persons under supervision.
Ihe magnitude of correctional populations and expenditures, as 
well as philosophical problems about treatment of offenders, provides 
a fruitful atmosphere for analysis. Conflicting or multiple goals of 
punishment, deterrence and rehabilitation are something of a frustration, 
however, to a discipline which largely focuses on outputs. As a result, 
much of the first economic analysis was confined to the input side, 
itself no small task, given the wide variety in definitions, record­
keeping and accounting practices. Chapter Four chronicled the 
applications of cost analysis to corrections, revealing substantial 
work on the input side but somewhat fewer efforts to address cost- 
effectiveness and cost-benefit questions. Ihe latter are confounded 
by the problems of specifying and measuring output, something to which
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corrections has historically been unaccustomed. Ihe analyses them­
selves range from the generally illuminating to specific works designed 
to inform a particular policy question, t^echnical problems such as 
joint products and factor indivisibilities and the additional opportun­
ity costs of a largely idle inmate population contribute to the 
analytical challenges. Measuring and valuing criminal behavior —  the 
reduction of which is usually an explicit or implicit program goal —  
were found to be necessary to much of the analysis, yet time-consuming 
to conduct. Overall, however, the substantial work on the input side 
and the promising work on the output side suggested that the foundation 
for economic analysis was well in place. Information on the limitations 
of analysis, its use in policy decisions, and the interpretation of 
results was also reviewed.
Chapter Five revealed the extent of economic analysis on issues 
concerned with institutional populations and management. First begun 
in 1974, research on cost functions is beginning to illuminate the 
variables which affect institutional costs. Ihe analyses are still 
preliminary, or formative, but mark a significant beginning on collect­
ing data and utilizing statistical techniques and should provide inspi­
ration for future efforts in this area. Very tentatively it appears 
that marginal costs fall well below average costs for wide ranges of 
inmate populations and that optimal, cost-minimizing scales of plant 
may exceed those in current use. Some very preliminary analysis sug­
gests that prisons are not a worthwhile investment in terms of the 
social benefits now measurable and that other justifications for 
confinement need to be explored.
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But generally, the contribution of the work to date is the 
beginning of the establishment of the analytical framework through 
which to examine institutional choices. More work is necessary to 
establish comparability within and between data sets and to introduce 
agreed-upon quality measures. Additionally, some effort needs to be 
devoted to the development of feasible policy recommendations —  not 
just findings from the analysis but an understanding and translation 
into suggestions which are understandable and icapeble of implementation 
by decision-makers. Presumably as correctional administrators and 
economists talk to each other or occasionally become one and the same, 
this issue will be favorably resolved.
Chapter Six, in addressing economic contributions to community 
issues, took a slightly different tack than its predecessors. In this 
chapter, it was hypothesized that economics could be highly useful in 
analyzing community service provision, financing structures and offender 
programs. Despite the apparent presence of enough information to 
conduct preliminary analysis, or structure programs based on economic 
theory, the economic perspective had been somewhat neglected. Ihe 
potential phenomenon of monopolistic markets in service provision, 
the possibility of restitution and fee programs acting as a tax on 
legal behavior, the misadvised experimental design of income mainten­
ance programs —  all of these issues could benefit from an economic 
approach. While program failures per se are few, solutions presently 
appear suboptimal and it is hoped that the entry of economics will 
provide information and incentive for modification and improvement.
Ihe review and critique in this peper indicates that although 
the utility of the economic approach to corrections has indeed been
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demonstrated, much remains to be done. Ihe range of contributions is 
substantial, yet understates the potential. In the following section 
the contributions are reviewed; the concluding section provides research 
recommendations.
7.2. An Economic Framework
Economics can provide new and relevant information for program 
decisions. Ihe use of the economic approach generates information but 
also structures the decision-making context. Ihe contributions reviewed 
in this paper have illustrated the general utility of economics in 
informing decisions and widening knowledge about particular correctional 
activities, functions or programs. Ihe knowledge thus produced ranges 
from halfway house costs to a cost-benefit analysis of a diversion 
program to development of statistical cost functions for correctional 
institutions.
Ihe current characterization of corrections is that of an 
industry comprising cost-minimizing, multi-plant, multi-product, firms. 
Ihe firm produces intermediate outputs such as confinement, rehabil­
itative services, employment assistance, etc.; ideally, there is a 
desired final product of altered criminal behavior, but no general 
consensus about the mix and level of intermediate outputs which will 
"produce" this final output.
Ihe research conducted over the last few years allows an assess­
ment of what economic concepts have been found relevant to corrections 
and what information has been produced. Generally, the input side is 
well within reach; Chapter Four reviewed the wide range of research on 
costs of prisons, jails, halfway houses, diversion programs, and
probation. Chapter Three provided an overview of aggregate expendi­
tures for corrections at the federal, state and local level. The out­
put side —  both in definition, measure, and valuation —  remains more
elusive, yet critical if decision-making is to be assisted by informa- 
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tion at the margin. The work on cost-effectiveness has begun to explore 
output measures but at present generally is forced to express outputs 
in input terms. Cost-benefit analysis in its limited applications 
indicates promising direction in measuring program outcomes and express­
ing them in financial terms.
7.2.1. Marginal Costs
The utility of this concept is no less to corrections than 
other endeavors. Marginal cost analysis is critical to determining 
optimal scale of plant, which in the short run indicates the effects 
of increasing or decreasing inmate populations within a particular 
facility; and in the long run indicates the institution size which will 
minimizelong-run average costs. Most of the research has been con­
ducted on correctional institutions and the available evidence indicates 
that marginal costs lie substantially below average costs and may be 
constant or decreasing for wide ranges of inmate populations. It also 
appears that average costs may not reach a minimum except at, per­
haps, impracticably large populations. Factors which affect costs 
have begun to be identified but are as yet inconclusive. One study 
found, for example, that a violence-prone inmate population tended to 
exert an influence on costs, while another found no such effect. Some 
research indicates that the presence of substantial rehabilitative 
services tends to result in lower long-run average costs than their
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absence. Very tentative results suggested that increased inmate space 
may produce a similar cost-minimizing effect. Preliminary jail research 
indicates that for small jails, marginal costs approach average costs 
in considerably larger facilities than usually found in rural jurisdic­
tions. No rigorous research has been conducted on community programs 
but informal observation suggests that at least for residential facili­
ties, firms do not operate at the minimum point on their short-run 
average cost curve, i.e., marginal costs lie well below average costs.
7.2.2. Externalities
Several analyses have begun to examine this important criminal 
justice phenomenon. Most frequently, cost-benefit analysis incorporates 
an examination of externalities in its research design. These ordin­
arily include analysis of effects of community programs on public 
attitudes, education and other program utilization external to the 
program, and increased client opportunities for criminal behavior in 
a community setting. The concept has been applied in more limited 
fashion in institutions. The "happier inmate" notion, for example, 
suggests that rehabilitative activities and increased inmate space 
produce a feeling of well-being beyond the direct attributes of the 
service provision, which is reflected in a reduced need for security- 
related resources. Research on overcrowding (however measured) 
suggests that oppressive conditions may result in inmate frustrations 
which are expressed in post-release criminal behavior. The possibility 
of economic crime induced by restitution payments or fees may be an 
unintended consequence of such programs.
Still tentative, the research generally indicates that
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unplanned consequences or "third party" effects are an important 
phenomenon, capable of measurement and necessarily a component of the 
economic analysis of correctional programs.
7.2.3. Opportunity Costs
Ihe above discussion of externalities,coupled with recent cost- 
benefit analysis, promises the provision of more complete information 
on the opportunity cost of correctional undertakings. Work on the 
value of inmate manpower indicates that the opportunity cost associated 
with foregone productivity may be substantial. However, at present the 
work is usually viewed as an isolated exercise and is rarely incorpo­
rated into other work where it might produce more complete information. 
One author who did include estimates for foregone productivity suggested 
that incorporating inmate opportunity costs so affected benefits and 
costs of incarceration that unless additional benefits could be found, 
prison sanctions constituted an extremely poor social investment. It 
is unlikely that prisons will be abolished because of their high 
opportunity costs, but additional work on the foregone earnings 
associated with providing incarceration would be useful in illustrating 
that the investment may be more costly than is otherwise believed.
Such work also should include better estimates of deterrence effects, 
although it is granted that they are difficult to measure. Further 
analysis of the costs of constructing new facilities as well as 
information on the costs of withdrawing land and other resources from 
other productive purposes may be useful in at least helping to advise 
decisions on whether to add secure facilities or consider alternatives.
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7.2.4. The Firm
The usual treatment here has been that of a firm producing 
multiple outputs which may be characterized as short and long-run 
or intermediate and final. During correctional supervision, confine­
ment, punishment and rehabilitative services are provided with the 
ostensible goal of producing long-term or post-release changes in 
criminal behavior. For institutions, the link between intermediate 
and final goods is unclear, particularly since there is conflict in a 
production process which generates negative (punishment) and positive 
(rehabilitation) outputs. For general purposes in the analysis the 
manager was assumed to cost-minimize (although this in fact may not be 
the case) and some tentative work on correctional production functions 
has been produced, of a homothetic, CES form. As indicated earlier, 
production units (prisons, community facilities) appear to operate in 
the range of decreasing average costs. It may be that there is no 
feasible point at which average costs are uniquely minimized; in 
addition, the possibility of multiple, decreasing average cost func­
tions suggests that allocations between plants (prisons) should be made 
only when knowledge of each cost function is availabe.
In the community, it appears that monopolistic competition may 
characterize the market of correctional service providers (Funke and 
Wayson, Chapter Six) and that considerations of risk compound this 
effect, resulting in non-optimal price and output levels.
7.2.5. Outputs
As discussed above, correctional outputs presently are less 
than adequately defined and measured, but the use of cost-effectiveness
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and cost-benefit analysis has provided some direction. For decisions 
at the margin, whether among or between alternatives, valuation of 
final output is critical. Community programs, moreso than institutions, 
are evaluated on their final outputs —  reduction in recidivism (often 
measured in a variety of ways), and earnings benefits due to program 
participation. As a result, there are some good data on the savings 
associated with averted crimes (e.g., see Holohan's work in Chapter 
Four) as well as the lifetime earnings benefit associated with program 
participation. Perhaps in the future it will be possible to determine 
more exactly the amount of investment in rehabilitation required to 
raise the opportunity cost of illegal behavior sufficient to substan­
tially reduce it. As matters stand presently, the output of some 
correctional activities has been measured, valued and compared with 
costs. Diversion and supported work may produce outputs which justify 
their cost; there is some indication, (Bloom and Singer, Chapter Four) 
that increasing lengths of institutional stay do not produce an 
incapacitation effect sufficient to justify their cost.
Many economic concepts are subsumed within this and the pre­
ceding discussions. Theories of demand need to be used carefully since 
the primary consumer —  the general public —  exhibits conflicting 
notions about what correctional allocations "buy" and probably has 
little idea of supply prices. Attitudes about risk and the difficulty 
of placing a value on it, combined with the fragmented provision of 
correctional services suggest that evaluation at the margin of all 
correctional alternatives is some distance away.
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7.3. Recommendations
It remains to collect and categorize a set of recommendations 
which are intended to improve the quality and utility of future economic 
research on corrections.
The major recommendation is of course the use of the economic 
approach in addressing correctional issues. It is, however, useful to 
articulate specific areas of endeavor or mechanisms by which this might 
be accomplished and the benefits to be derived. Greater collaboration 
between the two fields is required, but also necessary among economists 
conducting correctional research. This approach would be beneficial 
because the universe of correctional activities and questions which 
can be informed by economic analysis is probably considerably larger 
than the existing research would indicate. It was suggested in Chapter 
Six that local incentives and offender fees and assistance represented 
areas which rather obviously could benefit from the principles of 
economics. Ihe possibility that the market of private community pro­
viders may be characterized as monopolistically competitive is another 
untapped example of potential illumination.
It may be that there are correctional activities which represent 
a good social investment but without economic evidence have been dis­
missed on other grounds. Prison industries are not expected to operate 
at a profit or to even meet their costs in most states; usually this 
is ascribed to low inmate skills. However, the economic perspective 
suggests that viability be judged in light of what is being produced; 
prison industries presumably produce more than manufactured goods, and 
the use of human resource accounting, valuation of true marginal 
productivity, and identification of constraints peculiar to the
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the correctional setting might reveal industries to be more "pro­
ductive" than is commonly believed.
It was observed earlier that seme of the findings and policy 
recommendations flowing from current economic research may be inap­
propriate or infeasible in a corrections setting; these include 
suggestions that the elasticity of substitution between inputs is near 
unity or that prison administrators seeking to cost-minimize should 
reduce their intake of violent offenders, or that violent populations 
do not affect costs. Ihe latter two not only are in conflict, hut 
indicate some lack of familiarity with correctional practices. (Cor­
rections has little discretion at intake, occasionally more at release, 
depending on how parole is administered; also, if resources are not 
used to address violent behavior, an estimated cost function will not 
pick up "costs" of violence. The universe of prisons analyzed to date 
is far too small to yield conclusive results.) In addition, it is not 
at all clear that there exists substantial flexibility of substitution 
between inputs; even were this theoretically the case, there are many 
constraints imposed by physical plant, unions, budgeting practices and 
other factors which may mitigate against broad substitution in a 
particular correctional facility. Ihe derivation of smooth cost 
curves may understate what appear to be substantial fixed labor re­
sources over wide population ranges, or "lumpy" combinations of labor 
and capital. Failure to consider the corrections milieu may result in 
less questioning and re-examination of theoretical findings than would 
be the suitable to resolve the issue or may lead to policy recommenda­
tions so infeasible that they obscure the benefits of economic 
analysis to correctional decision-makers. Collaboration between
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economists and correctional administrators would help sort out invalid 
research findings, provide reliability check on others, and produce 
policy recommendations which are capable of implementation.
More research is needed to determine the most suitable techni­
ques for analyzing correctional activities. These include statistical 
techniques for estimating correctional cost functions as well as 
methods for ascertaining similarity of production units. Ordinary 
least squares has been the predominant technique utilized for cost 
functions but there has been little discussion in the literature about 
other techniques which might produce better results. Techniques 
utilized should be specified in the analysis to assist in the dialogue. 
The use of terms such as "standard cost-benefit analysis" belies the 
possibilities for arbitrariness and does little to advance the research 
on better techniques. Cbst-benefit analysis can be quite frail because 
of the many opportunities for discretion throughout the process. 
Appropriate measures for valuing earnings, education and system benefits, 
and assumptions about future productivity and the choice of a discount 
rate are but a few of the problematical areas. There is probably no 
existing set of techniques which can be uniquely applied to any correc­
tional phenomena; properly the field is engaged in a search for such
techniques. What would help, however, is clarification of techniques, 
data and assumptions utilized in the analysis and some movement toward 
agreement on such valuation measures as discount rates (or at the 
least, the use of sensitivity analysis) and estimated changes in pro­
ductivity. Generally, when methodologies heretofore foreign to correc­
tions are employed, the rationale and assumptions required should be 
clearly articulated.
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A related concern is the lack of standardized definitions and 
measures in existing analysis. While ideally, a single set of defini­
tions would appear in all analyses, permitting pooling and comparison, 
at the least, two suggestions are offered which might improve matters. 
First, research should more explicitly identify the data sources and 
measurement procedures used in the analysis; secondly, definitions and 
assumptions which are likely to confuse or otherwise affect the inter­
pretation of results should be made explicit as well. There are numer­
ous areas where definitions, assumptions and measurement may vary, 
including: categorization of inputs, derivations of direct, indirect, 
and external costs, and treatment of capital; definitions of outputs, 
whether final (e.g., reduced recidivism) or intermediate (e.g., pro­
vision of rehabilitative or confinement services), units of measure­
ment (e.g., crime-free days, rearrest, reconviction); output measures 
and valuation procedures; and the costs of crime or the benefits of 
averted crime. The major consumer of correctional services —  the 
offender —  is often ignored in analysis. It was suggested earlier 
that foregone inmate productivity —  an opportunity cost of incarcera­
tion and certain other program options —  approaches $10,000 per person 
annually, This cost is often absent in analysis and while speculation 
about its magnitude may be appropriate, it is a substantial cost 
associated with correctional choices. Decisions at the margin which 
ignore this cost are suboptimal from an economic perspective because 
they will operate on distorted comparisions of costs and benefits.
At present, data utilization is often dictated by availability and 
definitions and measures vary with the research.
239
There are other research directions which may be capable of 
shedding additional light on correctional issues and increasing economic 
understanding. Che such direction involves the concept of offender 
choice. In the chapter addressing community service provision, it was 
suggested that the offender's demand for correctional services might 
be characterized in terms of situations which increase satisfaction 
or leave it unchanged under constrained choice. Thus, in the presence 
of a cormiunity residential program, an offender sentenced to this new 
alternative who would have otherwise received probation is worse off 
with the option than without. While there is an assumption that 
offenders surrender certain rights, this does not preclude attempting 
to minimize inappropriate dissatisfaction in an attempt to maximize 
positive outcomes. Mopting a (constrained) choice perspective may 
help to better inform decisions about programs which ostensibly lie 
within the offender's discretion. Tb say that an offender "chose" to 
pay restitution or service fees rather than serve a prison term in­
dicates a lack of understanding of the concept of choice. Similarly, 
substantial medical experimentation has been performed on inmates who 
presumably chose to enter the program —  when the alternative was 
lower pay, poorer living conditions and more monotony.'*' Tb the extent 
that offender attitudes are important to post-release behavior, it may 
be appropriate to study the choice setting and to incorporate real 
preferences into the decision framework. Tb date, little has been 
done on this subject.
More research should also be conducted to determine what system 
adjustments are required to produce successful outcomes. Analytical 
frameworks to assess, for example, the impact of state incentives on
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local corrections have usually taken a cost-benefit perspective but 
have not attempted to analyze program failures. It was suggested 
earlier that the failure of localities to retain offenders in the face 
of subsidies and chargebacks may indicate a somewhat inelastic demand 
for state services —  the reasons for which are not presently known.
If this is in fact the case, more research on this phenomena might pro­
duce more favorable incentive arrangements. Generally, more analysis 
of what does or does not "work" would increase the probability of 
future program success by identifying the areas of adjustment.
Issues of equity have been little discussed in the economics- 
corrections literature. Perhaps equity "is not within the purview
2
of economics tut should be left to philosophers, poets and politicians."
Nevertheless, it seems appropriate to suggest that concepts of equity
may be relevant for evaluating correctional activities. Ihe range of
applications is potentially quite broad.
However, problems arise because of the possible divergence of
economic and social equity. Equalizing "economic punishment" may create
social inequities and equalizing social punishment can lead to economic
inequity. A crime punishable fcy a prison term of one year deprives
all offenders equally of freedom hut if their opportunity costs vary,
3
then there is a disparity in economic punishment. Similarly, resti­
tution programs which require equal payments for "like" crimes may not 
be imposing an equal economic sacrifice on the offender-clients. If, 
as some argue, restitution should also represent a sacrifice on the 
part of the offender, an equal-payment structure will not suffice.
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Clearly, the issue is far from resolution; but equity consider­
ations provide yet another arena in which to approach correctional 
goals and activities.
Another general research effort might be the closer examination
of the theories which are currently in use to explain correntional
phenomena. The usual production approach, for example, has been the
traditional theory of the firm. It may be that other theoretical
constructs would be more illuminating. The behavioral theory of the
firm represents one such avenue. Using this perspective, interest
focuses on the decision-making process within the firm; the producer
4
may not profit maximize or cost minimize, but have other goals. In 
the case of corrections this might include maximization of budget share 
or increasing the size of the agency or division under the producer or 
manager's control. The decision-problem focus is quite analogous to 
correctional producers: uncertainty, less than 100 percent rational 
behavior, and choice between two or more courses of action. The future 
is uncertain but relevant as "decision-makers realize that present 
actions may influence conditions which will confront them in the 
future.
The state-of-the-art is as yet at too preliminary a stage to blithe­
ly cast out one theoretical framework in favor of another. However, broader 
hypothesizing about which approaches may produce valid findings and
decision-relevant information would seem to be particularly appropriate 
at this stage.
Finally, the suggestion that economic criteria and considera­
tions become routine components of the analysis of correctional 
activities is meant to imply that economics is broadly useful. It may
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not always be necessary or possible to utilize a rigorous study frame­
work, but economic theory is rich enough to increase the information 
brought to bear on many decisions, if only informally. A rigorous 
framework is not necessary to begin thinking in economic terms. 
Ideally, the general objective may be marginal analysis, but within 
the resource constraints and time limitations of the policy analysis 
setting, less ambitious efforts can produce usable information and 
enhance the value of the economic approach. An administrator desirous 
of knowledge about the impact of short-term increases in inmate popu­
lations, the effect of more liberal parole procedures, or the average 
costs of a community program may be happy to settle for,e.g., engine­
ered rather than statistical cost functions.^
Existing research has demonstrated the relevance of economics 
to corrections. Hopefully future efforts will more firmly cement the 
economic approach and lead to the more thorough integration of the 
two fields.
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2. Richard A. Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory 
and Practice. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980), p. 89.
3. Indeed, some critics argue that our nation's prisons tend to be 
disproportionately occupied try offenders with low opportunity costs 
and that we in fact do not "punish" equally for equal crimes, at 
least in terms of deprivation of liberty.
4. Kalman J. Gohen and Richard M. Cyert, Theory of the Firm: Resource 
Allocation in a Market Economy. (Eiiglewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice- 
Hall, Inc., 1965).
5. Ibid., p. 310.
6. For example, one can produce estimates of marginal costs for a 
prison by employing some assumptions about what costs might vary 
with changes in the inmate population and inspecting budget or 
expenditure reports to derive figures for these costs. This method 
lacks the analytical force of a more rigorous approach but never- 
the less is capable of producing decision-relevant information.
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APPENDIX A
,a/
COSTS OF CRIME, 1978- 
(Dollar Amounts in Thousands)
# Crimes
Total
Costs Percent
Victims - Household b/
Violent Crimes
Homicide 19,555 $ 858,871
Assault 558,102 4,450,938
Rape 67,131 525,151
Property Crimes c/
Burglary 2,017,922 990,800
Larceny 5,983,401 1,065,045
Robery 47,125 19,274
Auto Theft 991,611 1,447,752
Fraud 7,162,600
Victims - Business d/
Retail 7,485,400
Wholesale 2,027,300
Manufacturing 2,807,000
Services 4,210,500
Financial Institutions 171,500
Other 8,218,300
Privately Purchased Protection 5,146,200
Total $46,586,631 64%
Criminals e/
Foregone Productivity $ 3,655,300
(—  Roan and Board) (1,588,400)
Welfare Benefits - Dependents 130,150
Total $ 2,198,050 3%
Society
Total Federal CJ Expenditures $ 3,122,290
Total State CJ Expenditures 6,688,192
Total Local CJ Expenditures 14,321,513
Total
Grand Total
$24,131,995 33%
$72,915,676
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a/ Sources: Holly Ulbrich and Lowell Nordquist, "The Distribution of 
of the Costs of Crime," Readings in Correctional Economics. 
(Washington, D.C.: American Bar Association, 1975); U.S. Department 
of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United 
States 1978; adaptation by author, 
b/ Includes survivor grant awards for murder @ $42,900 average and 
funeral expenses; assault and rape awards § $7,400 average and 
average disfigurement awards of $975 x .16 (assaults); and 
unreimbursed medical expenses. 
c/ Average burglary value § $491; larceny § $178; robbery § $409; auto 
@ $1,460.
d/ 1971 figures expressed in 1978 dollars.
e/ See Chapter Fbur for calculation of opportunity costs.
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APPENDIX B
SUMMARY OF SUBSIDY CHARACTERISTICS^'a/
State/Correct.
Area
AL J*
AZ
AZ
CA
CA
00
Purpose Formula Target
• improve service quality
• provide family 
counseling
• support foster care
« salary match 
9 fulltime position in 
small counties
9 client proportion of 
total county 
population
9 approved per diem 
rates of private 
agencies
personnel
expenses
purchase of < 
service from 
private agencies
operating and i
maintenance
expenses
CA A/J 9 reduce state conmitments 9 Actual state conmit- e comprehensive a
9 reduce recidivism
9 retain juveniles in 
conmunity
9 reimburse local
incarceration costs of 
parole violators
9 develop conmunity 
facilities
ments < Expected 
conmitments 
9 sliding payment scale 
based on E-A 
9 50% maintenance < $95/ 
child/mo.
9 Actual costs
comprehensive 9
operating and 9 
maintenance
* J = Juvenile; A - Adult
9 per diem costs 
£ $15.50/day/res 
£ $51.00/pay/nr
9 comprehensive 9
Program
probation
probation
(family counseling)
probation (resi­
dential care)
probation
residential
treatment
residential juv­
enile outpatient
detention services
residential
treatment
State/Correct.
Area____
APPENDIX B (continued)
Purpose______ Formula____ Target Program
CO
GA
GA
IL
IN
IA
IA
IA
ME
A
J
A
J
A
• foster conmunity 
corrections
0 assist county detention 
centers
• county correctional 
institution with state 
prisoners
9 state service 
contract
9 base and relative 
county expenditures
9 $3.00/day
• raise academic require- @ 50% salary < $300/mo. 
ments (B.A.) for juvenile
probation officers
• expand probation ser- @ 50/50 with county 
vices
• ccnmunity-based juvenile 
correction (residential)
9 conmunity-based 
correction
• improve, expand local 
youth services
• HWH (re-entry)
9 open —  location, 
type of service
9 open —  population, 
geography, services
« reimbursement of 
actual costs (50% 
local, 100% state)
9 availability of $ and 
"merit" of proposals
• operating 
costs
« operating 
maintenance
0 partial salary 
reimbursement
0 salaries, oper­
ating, mainten­
ance
0 operating 
maintenance
0 comprehensive
© direct care
0 operating 
maintenance
© operating and 
maintenance
0 juvenile detention 
centers
0 county correctional 
institutions
o probation
0 not yet funded
0 shelter and 
detention
© comprehensive
• not funded, resi­
dential and non- 
residential care
© Halfway House
State/Correct.
Area
APPENDIX B (continued)
Purpose  Formula
MD
MI
MI
9 100%, reimbursement if 
standards met
9 establish conmunity 
corrections 
9 reduce prison population 9 75% Capital
9 50% Capital (jail)
9 small county service 
provision
9 protective care
9 < 75,000: $10,000 
9 $5,000 for joint 
services
9 50% costs
MI
MI
J
A
9 provide juvenile 
officers
at least one officer 
6 $8,5000
reduce state conmitments 9 $3,000 per E-A
IN J/A 9 local alternatives to 9 open 
incarceration 
9 participate in C C Act
J/A 9 transfer responsibility 9 needs and ability-to-
(CCA) 9 reduce corrmitrnents pay
9 improve coordination/ 
locals
9 promote local planning
Target Program
comprehensive 9 jails and residential
treatment centers
costs-of-care 9 residential, non­
public and residential programs
private
personnel 9 foster care
direct or pur­
chase of services
u io
personnel costs « court services
salaries, oper- 9 supervision, resi- 
ative, mainten- dential, centers, 
ance, purchase services
of service
operating, 9 residential treatment 
maintenance facilities programs
comprehensive 9 comprehensive jails,
residential facilities, 
group homes, probation, 
parole
State/Correct.
Area
APPENDIX B (continued)
Purpose______ Formula
m  j/a
MN J
MN J 
M) J 
NV J
NY J 
NY A 
OH J
• discourage local lockups, 
promote regional jail 
and detention facilities
• promote probation - 
services in small 
counties
• promote group hones 
in smaller counties
• develop local conmunity- 
based treatment sercices
• improve conmunity treat­
ment
• improve probation
• reduce state commitments
• provide foster care
• provide probation 
services
• ADP x $450A
$800J 
(Z-county consoli­
dation required)
• 50% probation officer 
salary and fringe
• 50% care <_ $150/mo/ 
per/client
9 proportionate to 
county youth 
minimum = $5,000
• up to 5C% if no Fed. 
if Fed = 50%, state = 
25%
• up to 50%
• expand, improve • up to 50%
probation services salary and travel
Target Program
0 operating and 0 regional jails 
maintenance
0 salaries 0 probation develop­
ment
0 cost of care 0 foster homes
0 comprehensive 0 comprehensive
0 salaries, oper- 0 comprehensive 
ating, 
maintenance
0 operating and 0 probation 
maintenance -
0 salaries, oper- 0 probation 
ating, and 
maintenance
0 personnel, sup- 0 probation 
port staff
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APPENDIX B (continued)
State/Correct.
Area
CH J
Purpose Formula
CM
CM
OR
PA
PA
PA
TX
J
J
J
• provide residential 
treatment
• development of detention 
facilities
• new facilities for 
adjudicated delinquents
• reduce institutional 
populations
• maintain, mininun 
standards for 
residential care
• improve probation 
services
• improve probation 
services
• 50% cost < $5.00/day/ 
child
• population > 100,000
• 50% cost/$6,000/bed
• age, scale
• 50% construction cost/ 
$6,500/bed
• 50% operating costs/ 
$200/mo./child
• 70% cost of approved 
plans
• 50% daily costs 
® 100% construction
• 25% salary (if B.A.)
« up to 100% salary 
(if B.A.)
Target
• reduce state conmitments • $4,050 for A-E > 0
• direct care 
® construction
• construction, 
operating, 
maintenance
» salaries, oper­
ating, mainten­
ance, direct 
care
• operating, 
maintenance, 
construction
• partial salary 
reimburssnents
• salaries
• salary, oper­
ating, direct 
care
Program
9 residential 
facilities
• detention
• residential treat­
ment facilities and 
programs
residential, non- 
residential treatment 
programs
9 detention and 
residential 
facilities
m probation 
development
• adult probation
• conmunity residential 
care and probation 
services
n;Uiro
i
State/Correct.
Area
UT J
VA J
VA J 
VA A
m  J/A
m  j
Purpose
APPENDIX B (continued)
Formula Target
o minimum care standards 9 50% detention costs
develop community-based 
detention facilities and 
post care facilities
® 50% construction, ®
rermovation ®
® 2/3 personnel expenses 
9 100% equipment 
® 10C% operating expenses 
9 10C% travel
operating, main- 9 
tenance, salaries
comprehensive 9 
construction 
personnel, oper­
ating, equipment, 
maintenance, travel
9 salary supplements to 9 50% salary and travel 9 court service, 9 
court services personnel
9 underwrite local jail 9 2/3 personnel costs, 9 
costs for state offenders up to $8,000/person
(base = $12,000)
9 other reimbursement 
on per diem 
9 50% construction costs 
< $100,000
salaries, oper- 9 
ating, mainten-
9 promote regional health 
and social service 
facilities
9 funds contingent on 
meeting state 
priorities (feasibility, 
need, etc.)
® construction
9 reduce state carrmitments 9 $4000 x A-E > 0 or ®
9 increase probation one fulltime salary
services reimbursement
salaries, pro- 9 
grams, operations
Program________
detention services
pre- and post- 
dispositional 
residential care
intake, diversion, 
probation, parole
comprehensive jail 
services
facilities
special probation 
services
APPENDIX B (continued)
State/Correct.
Area____
m  J •
_________ Purpose______
provide probation services 
§ local level to serious 
offenders
Formula Target
• personnel and 
direct care
Program
• probation development
• residential treat­
ment
• alternatives to 
incarceration
s:Ui
•p*
a/ Source: Adapted from Jack D. Foster, Michael Kannensdhn, et al., State Subsidies to Local
— Corrections: A Summary of Programs (Lexington, ICY: The Council of State Governments,
1977), p p . 12-56.
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